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ABSTRACT
The multi-purpose agricultural cooperatives of Thailand play 
an increasingly important part in the economic life of the country.
They are an instrument of Thai government policy, intended both to 
help modernize farming and to perform welfare functions, especially 
in relieving farmers from debt. They are expected to carry out a 
number of purposes, i.e., credit, selling farm supplies, purchasing 
crops etc.
The data available were mainly aggregates, so that the study 
is essentially a macro study. But it is combined with attempts to
V
probe the situation also at the micro level. Thus, the study was 
primarily concerned with analysing data from the agricultural 
cooperatives in the aggregate but also presents a case study of 3 
individual societies. The whole study was based on time series 
analysis and cross sectional analysis.
The study stresses the inadequacy of management of the 
cooperatives in decision-making, financial skills, attracting business 
to the societies and in maintaining the loyalty of their members. It also 
shows that the aims of the. government are not being effectively realized. 
Some assistance is being given through the cooperative system to the 
modernization of agriculture, but this seems to be only limited.
The movements' welfare aims, however, are hardly being carried out.
The farmers that benefit from subsidised state assistance channelled 
through the cooperative system are the middle income class. The 
poorer farmers so far seem to be missing out on the benefits. Overall,
Vless than 10 percent of all farmers are members of societies.
On the financial aspects of the societies, the accountancy 
system was found to be inadequate. The accounts are not presented 
in a conventional way and fail to make adequate provision for 
doubtful debts, depreciation and stock changes. They also lack a 
flow of funds statement which would help make the financial position 
clearer now that the societies are undertaking multi-purpose activities.
The concluding chapter of the thesis gives some recommendations 
for remedial action. More specifically, it makes three main 
recommendations. First, that the efficiency of primary level 
cooperative management should be improved through incentive payments 
and greater training, especially in financial skills. Second, that 
the societies should be granted greater flexibility to respond to 
market conditions, in offering higher prices or in paying higher 
interest rates, so as to attract more membership and greater loyalty 
from their members. Lastly, that much more extensive research should 
be carried out on agricultural cooperatives in Thailand.
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
1. 1 Introduction
A large proportion of the people in most of the developing 
countries in Asia endure low living standards resulting from poverty.
In addition, these people are often exploited by middlemen and the higher 
classes which worsens their living conditions. The newly developing 
nations have, therefore, searched for suitable patterns of agricultural 
development to create the conditions for economic progress and to ensure 
a fair distribution of the gains to lower income groups. In doing so, 
rural development must be tackled as an integrated problem encompassing 
all economic, social, scientific and cultural aspects. Of all these measures 
used, "cooperation' is frequently seen as a strategy best suited to 
improve living conditions in the rural communities. At this level co­
operatives deal with credit, farm supplies, agricultural extension, 
marketing, water management, education and any business activities needed 
by the community.
Although the cooperative form of business is by no means a panacea 
to cure all economic and social ills, it may help in the following way 
(McGrath 1969, p.2)
(a) it gives the farmers some leverage in the 
market place;
(b) it keeps the economic proceeds of a region 
invested locally;
(c) it provides experience in management and
democratic decision-making; and
2(d) it supplies incentives to farmers to
stay on their land instead of migrating 
to the cities.
Some Asian countries have successfully carried out part of their 
economic and social development through cooperatives, e.g. Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan and to a lesser extent India, although it is true that the 
cooperative system has also proved disappointing in many cases. The 
Thai Government seems to have hopes of the potential of the cooperative 
movement as a means of improving life for small farmers, and has done 
several things to encourage the cooperative movement in Thailand.
1.2 What is Cooperation?
In the past, the definition of the concept of cooperation usually 
proceeded consciously or unconsciously from the European types. Today, 
however, a definition of the concept of cooperation has developed far away 
from the countries where it originated in Europe. A good definition which 
should be fruitful with regard to the situation in developing countries is 
given by the International Labour Office (1963, p.5):
"Cooperation has been defined for different 
purposes and in slightly different ways by 
economists, law makers and others. Perhaps 
it is enough to say that the cooperative is 
an association of persons, usually of limited 
means, who have voluntarily joined together 
to achieve a common economic end through the 
formation of a democratically controlled 
business organization, making equitable con­
tributions to the capital required and 
accepting a fair share of risks and benefits 
of the undertaking."
3The fundamental principles of cooperation which have been adopted 
to lay the foundation for cooperative action and which distinguish the 
cooperative society from other types of enterprise have been those 
established by the Rochdale Pioneers, started in 1884, they include:
(a) open membership;
(b) democratic control;
(c) limited interest on shares;
(d) patronage rebates;
(e) goods to be sold at current market rate 
and for cash only;
(f) neutrality in race, religion and politics;
(g) sale of pure and unadulterated goods; and
(h) continuous education of members.
These principles, however, are not everywhere applicable because 
they were based on consumer cooperation and some have become out of date in 
some respects owing to certain recent developments within the movement 
(Helm 1968, p.6).
The article cited from the International Labour Office (ILO 1963, 
pp.7-8) gives six general principles for cooperative rules:
(a) membership in the society must be fully 
voluntary, and open to everyone;
(b) all members must have an equal voice in 
the affairs of the societies, each member 
will have one vote only, no matter how many 
shares he has subscribed;
(c) all members make a roughly equal con­
tribution to the capital of the society;
(d) interest on shares is restricted and
relatively low;
(e) surplus must be distributed to members 
in proportion to their business with the 
society; and
(f) a cooperative society must be owned and 
controlled by those who use it.
Cooperation can,however,be considered as an economic superstructure 
servicing the affiliated economic units: marketing, industries, credit, 
banking and insurance, and agriculture. This study will concentrate on 
cooperation in the field of agriculture because agriculture has been and 
still is the mainstay of the Thai economy.
1 •3 General Introduction to Thailand
The kingdom of Thailand is located in Southeast Asia, entirely 
within the northern tropical zone. it has an area of 321 million rai ^  
(514,000 square kilometres). Of this total, the farm holding area was 
109.4 million rai (17.5 million hectares) or 34 percent in 1973. (Thailand.
Division of Agricultural Economics 1976,p 6). The country may be divided 
into 4 regions which coincide with the geographical zones and administrative 
purposes of the country. The North consists of 16 provinces, and is the 
second largest region with 33 percent of the total land area, mostly 
mountainous. The Northeast, 16 provinces, is the largest area with 33.1 
percent of total land. Cultivation there is generally very unproductive, 
owing to poor soil and lack of water. The Central region, 26 provinces, 
is the most productive region owing to good soil and a suitable climate.
The South, 14 provinces, is the smallest region. its high humus light 
soil in some parts and sandy soil with heavy rains make it suitable for the 
cultivation of rubber, coconut and fruits (Ilongladarom 1971, p.5).
As of 1976, the total population of the country stood at 
approximately 42.9 millions. It has an average growth rate of 2.7 per­
cent (Thailand, Economic Studies Division, 1977a, p.33), which is considered
(1) 6.25 rai = 1 hectare
shigh according to world standards. In the same year, Thailand's per capita 
income was about $US369 (Thailand National Accounts Division, 1976a, p.2).
1.4 Agriculture in the Thai Economy
Thailand is essentially an agricultural country, although other 
sectors of the economy are rapidly gaining in importance. Yet; the 
agricultural proportion of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) remains the 
largest, about 27 percent including fishing and forestry (Table 1.1).
75 percent of the total population is engaged in agriculture. The sector 
provides some 70 percent of total export earnings.
Thai agriculture consists primarily of crop production. Rice 
is not only the most important crop for domestic use, but also the 
country's principal export, i.e., its contribution to Thailand's export is 
14 percent and to Gross Domestic Product 10 percent in 1976 (Thailand. 
National Accounts Division 1976a). The role of rice has been so dominant 
that until a decade ago, Thailand was essentially a one-crop economy. 
Thailand has made astonishing progress in the diversification of crop 
production, i.e., maize, rubber, cassava and kenaf.
The success of Thai agriculture in expanding and diversifying its 
production has contributed perhaps decisively to the remarkable economic 
development of the country over the past decade. Agriculture created a 
large share of the resources on which the rest of the economy built its 
rapid growth, primarily by earning foreign exchange.
1.5 The Problems
During the First and Second Plan periods (1960-1966 and 1967-1971), 
the Thai economy experienced some structural changes. There had been a 
shift of production away from agriculture toward industrial production, 
services and raw material exploitation. The share of agriculture in GDP 
had decreased from 38 percent in 1961 to 28.2 percent in 1971, while
6TABLE 1.1
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN AT CURRENT MARKET PRICES
(million of Baht)
Industrial Origin 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
1 . Agriculture 40,786 49,919 73,233 75,033 91,182 97,135
Crop?; 2(3,0(34 35,960 56,443 63,204 67,673 73,09 1
Livestock 5,474 5,882 6,278 10,314 11,592 11,659
Fi sherios 4,489 5,206 6,975 7,545 7,889 8,173
Forestry 2,739 2,871 3,537 3,970 4,028 4,210
2. Mining and Quarrying 2,963 2,886 2,857 4,708 4,303 3,964
3. Manufacturing 24,908 27,864 35,614 46,372 51,358 59,529
'1. Construct i on 7,327 7,160 (3,340 10,530 11,913 13,791
5. Electricity and Water Supply 1,904 2,251 2,682 2,814 3,286 3,499
6. Transportation and Communication 8,955 10,514 13,237 15,992 17,979 20,689
7. Wholesale and Retail Trade 26,269 29,881 41,071 53,488 53,002 58,797
0 . Banking Insurance and Real Estate 6,251 6,922 8,797 12,233 14,649 17,563
9. Ownership and Dwellings 3,100 3,199 3,552 4,179 4,433 4,802
10. Public Administration and Defence 6,664 7,178 8,292 10,530 12,724 14,255
11. Services 15,480 16,844 18,868 23,086 26,958 31,088
Gross Domestic Product,(GDP) 144,607 164,626 216,543 268,973 291,787 325,112
Plus: Net Factor Income Payment
from the Rest of the World 30 -327 -424 1,079 111 -1,133
Gross National Product, (GNP) 144,637 164,299 216,119 270,052 291,898 323,979
Sources: Thailand. National Accounts Division 1976a.
1industrial production, manufacturing, construction, mining and quarrying
i
and electricity had increased their share from 19.3 percent to 25.7 
percent during the same period. Since 1971, the share of agriculture 
in current prices had changed quite significantly year by year, owing 
mainly to large changes in rice prices. In 1973 the agricultural share 
in the GDP (current prices) rose to nearly 34 percent, but by 1976 it 
was under 30 percent.
However, the percentage figures showing the share of agriculture 
in GDP at current market prices during 1971-1976 are rather difficult to 
follow owing to the weight of rice in the valuation and to the annual 
fluctuation in rice prices. Therefore, a 3 year moving average was worked 
out to indicate the longer term trend. According to these calculations, 
the share of agriculture declined from 31.2 percent in 1971-73 to 30.8 
and 29.7 percent in 1973-75 and 1974-76 respectively.
Mention should be made here of changes in the general level of 
prices which took place during the period of the study, that is between 
1971-76. Data on prices in rural areas in Thailand are available only 
for wholesale goods. The cost of living index compiled is confined to 
the urban areas. Taking the Wholesale Price Index published by the 
Bank of Thailand (1978, base 1968 = 100) prices are shown to have risen 
by only 0.3 percent in 1971 and by 7.8 percent in 1972. The following 
two years WPL rose sharply, by 22.8 percent in 1973 and 28.9 percent in 
1974. It slowed down markedly in 1975 to 3.7 percent and declined further 
to 2.5 percent in 1976. The average annual rate of growth between 1971 
and 1976 was nearly 13 percent.
The major problem of agricultural production in Thailand is low 
production resulting from low productivity, and low returns. From Machima's 
discussion (1976a, p.13), the factors which caused low production and 
productivity in Thailand are the following:
(a) lack of adequate irrigation facilities and 
lack of water management. Only 15 percent 
of the arable area is under irrigation;
(b) lack of technical know-how among the 
farmers due to a low level of education 
and training;
(c) the land tenure system is not conducive 
to agricultural development because of 
the small size of land holdings (around 
6 acres [2.4 ha.] per family), 
fragmentation and a large number of 
tenant farmers. At present 25 per­
cent of the farmers are tenants;
(d) unemployment or disguised unemployment 
problems in the rural areas due to the 
surplus of unskilled manpower in the 
rural areas;
(e) lack of credit institutions and credit 
facilities for agricultural production. 
Only 25 percent of the farmers in Thailand 
(in 1972) were financed by credit 
institutions; government, cooperatives, 
Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperatives and commercial banks. 
Assistance is minimal compared to actual 
needs, only 1,027 Baht ^  per family, while 
the need is 5 or 6 times higher;
1 20.8 Baht = $US1.00
9
/
(f) lack of agricultural extension facilities.
According to the latest figure, it is 
estimated that the ratio of agricultural 
extension workers to farm families in 
Thailand is 1:5,000, while in Japan it is 
1:540, in Taiwan 1:1,500;
(g) natural disasters, i.e., drought,
flood, disease, pestilence etc. Droughts 
and floods alone are estimated to reduce 
rice production in the delta region by 
as much as 30 percent in 1 out of 3 years 
(Sabatini 1972, p.14);
(h) lack of information on the application of 
fertilizers, pesticides, insecticides and 
a low degree of farm mechanization.
According to Machima (1976a), low returns are due to:
(a) lack of marketing institutions;
(b) lack of price support policy from 
the government;
(c) farmers poor planning o£ production;
(d) lack of group efforts among farmers;
(e) lack of sufficient understanding of 
farm problems, farm business and the 
procedures on farms;
(f) exploitation by middlemen.
Because of these problems, development of the agricultural sector 
has been made the principle target of the development plan. Of all the
10
efforts made, agricultural cooperation is the measure designed to help 
improve rural communities through the provision of credit, marketing, 
farm supply processing of agricultural products, farm extension and other 
services related to farmers.
1.6 Objectives of the Study
Specifically, the objectives of the present study are:
(a) to make an aggregate analysis of the per­
formance of agricultural cooperatives in 
general;
(b) to analyse the past performance of certain 
selected agricultural cooperatives that 
are judged to be relatively efficient.
To identify the factors influencing such 
efficiency and the bottlenecks which 
prevent further increasing efficiency 
of these relatively successful societies; 
and
(c) on the basis of (a) identify problems 
which impede the progress of agricultural 
cooperatives in general.
1.7 The Data
The data used in this study are compiled partly from official 
sources and partly from Thai academic studies. The thesis has drawn 
heavily on work by two Thai academics. They were Machima (1975, 1976a, 
1976b and 1977) and Doungsowasdi (1976). The principal official sources 
are the Cooperative League of Thailand; the Cooperative Promotion 
Department; the Department of Cooperative Auditing; the National Economic 
and Social Development Board; and other available supplementary statistics.
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In addition, the author was able to make a field trip to 
study cooperative societies in several areas of Northern Thailand.
Although no formal evidence or statistics were collected from the 
many farmers and officials interviewed in the societies, the general 
impressions gained were of great value for the purposes of the study, 
in giving a realistic background for evaluating the movement, at 
least in this region.
1.8 Organization of the Study
This study is presented in six chapters. The first chaptei has statec 
the general principles of cooperation, the main problems of the Thai 
economy, the purposes of the study and the data. The second chapter 
provides the overall details of the cooperative movement in Thailand as 
they relate to agricultural cooperatives. Chapter three takes a closer 
look at the management and activities of overall agricultural cooperatives 
and aims to provide an analysis of factors relevant to the cooperative 
movement. Chapter four analyses the financial conditions of agricultural 
societies in the aggregate. Chapter five analyses and compares three 
agricultural cooperatives which were recreated from 1969 onwards and have so 
far proved better than the average. It seeks to explain the apparent 
reasons for this quite successful performance. The final chapter gives 
conclusions and policy implications in the light of the findings of the
study.
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CHAPTER II
THE AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN THAILAND
2.1 A Brief History of Thai Cooperatives
Thailand's cooperative movement began in 1916 during the reign 
of King Rama VI. A request was made to the British government for the 
services of an expert. Sir Bernard Hunter, a banking expert stationed 
at Madras, India, was selected by the British government to assist 
Thailand in the establishment of her cooperative societies (Chulasapya 
1972, p.l).
Sir Bernard Hunter proposed the establishment of credit societies 
on the Raifeisen model, i.e., with unlimited liability of members. The 
first one was registered on February 26, 1916 as "Wat Chandra Cooperative 
Unlimited" in the form of a small rural credit society, with unlimited 
liability in which each member is responsible for the debts of all other 
members (Chulasapya 1972) .
The law empowering the organization of cooperative credit 
societies at the experimental stage was the Association Amendments Act 
1916 (Machima 1976a, p.l). It was not a direct law on cooperatives, it 
was an amendment to the Civil Association law. The success of the first 
group of village credit cooperatives led to a moderate expansion of 
cooperatives of this type later on. By 1920, the number of credit 
societies reached 60 and a Department of Cooperatives was constituted to 
organise, supervise and develop the cooperative movement.
In 1928, when cooperative development was fairly satisfactorily 
established, the Cooperative Societies Act 1928 was promulgated, paving 
the way for further development of cooperatives of various types (Machima 
1976a, p.l). But it was not until 1932 that other types of cooperatives
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were organized, such as land hire purchase, land settlement, marketing 
and processing, consumers', land improvement, cottage industry, fisheries, 
and thrift and credit cooperatives.
In 1943, the Bank for Cooperatives was organized to serve as the 
financial centre of the agricultural cooperatives and to take the place 
of the government's direct lendings. The bank succeeded in rapid 
expansion in loan activity from its founding in 1947 until 1954. After 
1954, expansion has been limited not because of the farmers' lack of 
interest in borrowing but owing to the shortage of funds made available 
by the Ministry of Finance and the Government Savings Bank (Thisyamondol 
and others, 1965, p.45). As new funds from these sources were limited, 
the bank had for the most part made new loans to the societies from the 
interest and repayment of old loans. The bank was therefore superseded 
in 1966 by the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives which 
was established in that year in order to widen the scope of its operations 
to include loans to individual farmers as well as agricultural cooperatives.
In 1952, administration of cooperative activities in Thailand 
changed from the Department of Cooperatives in the Ministry of 
Agriculture to the Ministry of Cooperatives. Later in 1964, the Ministry 
of Cooperatives was brought under the control of the Ministry of National 
Development.
Finally, the most important change for cooperatives in Thailand 
was the promulgation of the Cooperative Societies Act 1968, which repealed 
the Cooperative Societies Act 1928, in order to facilitate the expansion 
and improvement of the cooperatives (Machima 1976a, p.l). This 
legislation embodied two new organizational features, i.e., the 
amalgamation of cooperatives and the establishment of the Cooperative 
League of Thailand. The results of this change reduced village credit
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cooperatives from about 9,000 societies into approximately 400 
agricultural cooperative societies. At the same time the total number 
of various types of cooperatives, which had been over 10,000 societies, 
was reduced to only 1,498. Besides, there was a change in 1972 which 
dissolved the Ministry of National Development and placed the cooperative 
administration within a Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives.
At present, there are six main types of cooperative in Thailand 
(Machima 1976a). They are: agricultural cooperatives, land settlement 
cooperatives, fishery cooperatives, consumers' cooperatives, thrift and 
credit cooperatives and service cooperatives. (See Table 2.1.)
Agricultural cooperatives are the most important type of 
cooperative in Thailand: 61.7 percent of all cooperatives are 
agricultural cooperatives, and their members make up nearly 45 percent of 
total membership. This is rather a low share considering that Thailand 
is an agricultural country with 75 percent of the population engaged in 
agriculture as a livelihood. It is my purpose to investigate this matter 
fully and more details will be given later.
TABLE 2.1
NUMBER OF COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES, 1976
Types of Cooperative No. of 
Societies
Membership
Total Average x^ er 
Society
1 Agricultural Cooperatives 588 465,502 791
2 Fishery Cooperatives 4 501 125
3 Land Settlement Cooperatives 51 29,808 584
4 Consumers' Cooperatives 
(Cooperative stores)
117 214,803 1,835
5 Service Cooperatives 46 17,720 385
6 Thrift and Credit Cooperatives 147 316,826 2,155
Total 953 1,045,160 1,096
Source: Cooperative League of Thailand, 1968-76.
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Fishery cooperatives are organized as multi-purpose societies 
with the objectives of increasing the productivy of small fishermen and 
providing a higher return. In 1976, there were 4 fishery cooperatives 
with a total membership of 501 households.
Land settlement cooperatives were established in 1938 for the 
purpose of helping both landless farmers and those with uneconomic 
cultivated lands to own and operate the conserved or public land allotted 
to them. The next step is to make a land-use plan to include all the 
necessary things for living such as medical clinics, electric power 
supplies for housing, water tanks or ponds, water-ways, a market place, 
barns, roads, schools etc. In 1976, there were 51 land settlement 
cooperatives, about 5.4 percent of total cooperatives, with 29,808 farm 
households.
Consumers' cooperatives were first organized in 1938 among the 
urban as well as the rural population to help consumers in their daily 
purchase of commodities. The cooperatives have met with competition 
from private business circles. However, the two largest cooperative 
stores in Bangkok are doing well in their business operations, due 
primarily to good management and progressive policies. At present they 
are expanding into department stores and supermarkets. Others are 
enjoying merely limited success. In 1976 there were 117 cooperative 
stores in operation with a total membership of 214,803 persons.
Service cooperatives are miscellaneous cooperatives organized 
among the rural people for the purposes of improving the method of 
production, providing credit and marketing services, and raising the 
members' income, through the principle of cooperation. Besides, they 
also serve members who use their spare time to engage in sideline
16
occupations. The other activities of service cooperatives are housing 
and taxi-drivers' cooperatives. In 1976, there were 46 service 
cooperatives with a total membership of 17,720 persons.
Thrift and credit cooperatives are distributed in every province 
throughout the country, with a majority in the Bangkok metropolis. This 
type of society started in 1949 to promote thrift and help members in 
clearing old debts and meeting necessary expenses in everyday life, by 
giving loans at a low rate of interest. By-laws provide for direct 
contributions by members, from their monthly salary to their saving 
accounts, and repayment of loans is made by instalments from their 
monthly salary. These cooperatives are quite successful, and have become 
very popular among school teachers, police, and salary-earners of various 
government departments and universities. In 1976, there were 147 
societies with 316,826 members.
2.2 Raifeisen Principles of Cooperation and their Relevance to Thailand
The Raifeisen model was selected in 1916 for Thai cooperatives 
because it had been successful in Europe. At that time many of the poor 
peasants of Thailand were deep in debt, and were paying an average rate 
of interest ranging from 10-44 percent per year depending on the source 
of credit (Narksawasdi 1958, cited in Machima 1976a). Their land was 
their surety for the debt, so that foreclosure left peasants and their 
families homeless and without any means of supporting themselves. When 
traders gave credit, they expected not only to sell the peasant his 
requirements at the highest price, but to buy his crop at the lowest 
price, all or most of the profit being used to settle the principal and 
interest.
The Royal Thai government accordingly conceived the idea of 
relieving farmers from severe indebtedness and also maintaining their
17
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land ownership by launching village credit cooperatives, based on the 
Raifeisen model. Conditions were judged to be similar to those which 
existed in Germany at the time (1846-7) when Friedrich Raifeisen 
succeeded in alleviating the economic conditions of some of the peasantry 
by forming credit unions.
According to the review by Bakken and Schaars (1937, p.82), the 
Raifeisen principles have become as basic to cooperative credit unions as 
those of the Rochdale pioneers to consumers' cooperative stores. The 
main features of the Raifeisen cooperatives are:
(a) the local bank is owned and operated by, and in the 
interest of, its borrowers who are its members;
(b) par value of shares is small and payable in 
instalments;
(c) unlimited liability is the rule;
(d) each cooperative serves a single village 
or two;
(e) operation is not conducted for profit;
(f) good character is the basis for a loan;
(g) limited dividends, if any, are paid;
(h) loans are made to members only;
(i) low rates of interest are charged;
(j) reserves are indivisible; and
(k) an inexpensive management is elected by 
members, each of whom has one vote.
2.3 The Model Developed for Thailand
In many respects, the Raifeisen model of credit cooperatives was
not best suited to Thai conditions. Even in 1916, not all of the
18
regulations listed above were adopted. For example, local banks were 
not created, nor were instalment payments allowed for member's share 
subscriptions.
By far the most important exception at this time was to point 
(k) above. In contrast to the Raifeisen ideal of self-reliance of 
members, the Thai movement was from the beginning promoted by the state. 
Officials helped to form societies and assisted in their running. In 
early societies, officials were assigned to help form groups of 10-20 
farmers into a cooperative group, and each official supervised several 
of these groups as a full-time occupation.
2.4 Evaluation of the Cooperative System in the Past
2.4.1. Expansion of the Number of Societies
Many societies were created under government intervention; 
their number increased from 60 societies in 1920 to 191 in 1927, a rather 
slow increase resulting from a lack of working capital and from being in 
the first trial period.
After 1932, when Thailand changed from an absolute monarchy to 
a constitutional monarchy under a system of limited democracy, there was 
a sharp increase in the number of cooperatives. Because most members of 
the government at that time considered that cooperatives could work in 
Thailand, the government, therefore, expanded cooperative operation widely. 
At the end of 1954 there were 22 types of cooperative in Thailand 
consisting of 10,338 societies, both farm and non-farm. The expansion 
slowed after that, until before the launching of an amalgamation program 
in 1969, there were 9,684 village credit cooperatives with a total 
membership of 153,278 farm households which comprise only about 4.4 
percent of a total of 3.5 million farm households. They existed in
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286 districts of 63 provinces, out of a total of 539 districts of 71 
provinces. This shows that the area coverage is still just 53 percent 
of the total districts (Thailand. Cooperative Promotion Department 
1974a, p.ll).
2.4.2. Uncertainty of the Financial Conditions of Societies
The financial and social success of the societies was limited:
many got into difficulties and failed. The reasons for these financial 
difficulties appear to have been mainly inexpert management, lack of 
working capital and lack of commercial experience of the members. 
Corruption does not seem to have been an important problem.
Trading conditions were difficult and varied during the period 
before World War II. The price of rice, for example, Thailand's chief 
crop, was halved between the late 1920s and the early 1930s, so that 
credit extended by societies to farmers on the basis of high prices could 
not be repaid after the price collapsed and many societies foundered. 
During World War II foreign markets were disrupted. Post-war controls, 
and finally the rice premium (imposed by government to prevent domestic 
prices rising during the rice export boom of the early 1950s) both made 
commercial conditions too complex and volatile for most societies' 
managements to handle.
2.4.3. Major Cause of Failure
One important cause of failure of the cooperative societies under 
Raifeisen rules was the provision of unlimited liability, whereby each 
member became responsible for the debts or liabilities incurred by the 
society as a whole. It was no doubt very hard on the members, who may 
not have borrowed anything or who may have discharged in full any debts 
owed by them, to then be held responsible for the debts incurred by a
defaulting member or members.
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2.5 Reform of 1968
In the late 1960s a major reform of the cooperative movement was 
attempted by the government. This reform had two main aims, to help to 
modernize agriculture in general, and to assist the poorer farmers 
throughout the districts in particular. By the 1960s it was clear that 
the existing societies could not effectively carry out these aims, and so 
changing formulations and changing practices, to meet changing economic 
and social conditions, became unavoidable.
There were four main elements in this reform. First the Raifeisen 
principle of unlimited liability for members was dropped. Second, the 
role of officials of the ministry in charge of cooperatives was expanded. 
Third, the state compulsorily amalgamated the societies into larger entities, 
partly to make them more manageable by the bureaucracy and partly to enable 
them to enjoy economies of scale. Lastly, societies which had previously 
been confined to credit operations were encouraged to enlarge their sphere 
of operations and transform themselves into multi-purpose cooperatives, which 
also carried out such activities as crop purchase, milling and the selling 
of farm inputs and retail goods to members. Subject to some variations, 
detailed features of the reform can be summarised as follows:
(Thailand. Cooperative Promotion Department 1974a, p.13.)
Objectives:
to relieve farmers from debt and to carry out 
other activities for the farmers' welfare.
Capital Structure:
a principle of limited liability is adox^ted; 
no member can hold more than one fifth of total
shares;
all cooperatives are required to accumulate 
their own funds in the form of reserves, an 
amount equivalent to at least 10 percent out 
of annual net profit;
the acceptance of deposits from members, both 
savings and time, is also energetically 
stimulated as a means of acquiring local funds 
for local use;
the cooperative can keep a reasonable amount 
of funds in the office and its bank in the 
locality;
the cooperatives are required to hold share 
capital at the Bank for Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives of at least 2 
percent of the credit limit which they 
are allowed annually.
Loams:
each member is required to buy a share or 
shares in the cooperative equivalent to at 
least 5 percent of his loan at the time of 
borrowing (some members purchased more 
shares than the amount required; however, 
each shall have only one vote); 
certain aspects of supervised credit methods 
are adopted; - '
loan inspection is also made at least 
twice for each loan in order to ascertain 
that the loan proceeds are being used 
according to the purpose for which it was
granted;
lending procedures are simplified so as to 
shorten the time for loan processing and to 
relax security requirements; 
all cooperatives charge the same rate of 
interest of 12 percent per annum.
Activities;
some cooperatives should maintain such farm
machinery and equipment as tractors and
♦sprayers to undertake contract work for 
the members;
members are encouraged to make joint 
purchases of farm supplies and other 
necessities, and to sell their farm 
products jointly;
the size of the cooperative is to be large 
both in terms of membership and area of 
operation, to ensure a large volume of 
business so that it can afford its own 
office and paid employees; 
extension services should be performed by 
the cooperative officials themselves, 
and/or through their contacts by local 
agricultural extension offices; 
informal group meetings of members are 
held from time to time for the purpose 
of credit education and dissemination of 
agricultural knowledge, together with 
discussion on problems and resolutions 
relating to their occupations and well-being.
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2.6 Present Relationship between Government Agencies and Cooperatives
The newly reorganized Cooperatives Promotion Department (CPD) was 
established in October 1972 under the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives, to be responsible for cooperation and consultation with 
the Cooperative League of Thailand (CLT), and to make every effort to 
bring about the rationalization of existing agricultural cooperatives. 
Overall the CPD is working with two categories of existing cooperatives, 
agricultural and non-agricultural, at three levels: district, provincial 
and national. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1. More intensive efforts 
will be made to improve the existing agricultural cooperatives to function 
as multi-purpose cooperatives integrating the services of credit, marketing, 
purchasing and farm guidance in one cooperative. Technical and training 
services are also provided when necessary to assist cooperatives (Thailand. 
Cooperative Promotion Department 1974a, p.29). Presently, a staff of 
slightly more than 2,300 is employed by the CPD. Under a central 
administration and a provincial administration, the CPD staff is divided 
into twelve functions as described in Figure 2.2.
2.7 The Structure of Agricultural Cooperatives
In Thailand, the structure of agricultural cooperatives is three­
tiered, with the national level at the apex, the provincial level for 
secondary societies and the local level for primary societies as shown in 
Figure 2.3 (Machima 1976a, p.24).
Nominally, this structure is semi-independent, consisting of 
a voluntary association of cooperative societies at different levels.
In reality, it is heavily supported by the state in two ways. Firstly, 
officials have not only helped to form the various bodies, but also 
participate in their day-to-day operations with advice or actual 
management. Secondly, the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperatives (BAAC), derives most of its funds from the central government
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FIGURE 2.3
STRUCTURAL CHART OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES , 1975
Bank for Agriculture & 
Agricultural Cooperatives
The Agricultural Cooperative 
Federation of Thailand
Cooperative League of Thailand
Provincial Federation
Coordination
Business Transaction
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budget and is subject to ministerial control on broad lines of policy.
The primary societies comprise individual farmers at the district 
or local level. Each society is divided into various groups of farmers 
ranging from 5 to 30 groups. The main function of such societies is the 
provision of credit and other services to the members: marketing farm
supplies, farm extension, processing, water management and funeral services.
The secondary level or provincial federation was first established 
in Chicng-Mai province in the north in 1951 and the second in Nakornrajasima 
province in 1957. This level comprises at least three or more societies 
in particular adjoining areas. Their main functions are similar to those 
of the primary societies but on a larger scale. Special processing 
activities are undertaken by the federations, such as rice milling, 
tapioca processing, feed stuff mixing and so on. In 1977 there were 21 
federations.
The national level comprises representatives of primary and 
secondary societies. At present the Agricultural Cooperative Federation 
of Thailand (ACFT) is the apex society of agricultural cooperatives in 
Thailand; its headquarters are in Bangkok. This organization grew out 
of the former Cooperative Marketing and Purchasing Federation of Thailand 
Ltd. (CMPF). It has a long history of business re-organization. Its 
beginning goes back to 1937 when Thailand's first cooperative store, the 
Ban Gaw Cooperative Store, was established in Changwat Ayuttaya (Ayuttaya 
Province). Its responsibility was to operate a central cooperative 
store to provide assistance in buying and delivering products to 
cooperative stores in each region. It was replaced by the Cooperative 
Wholesale Society of Thailand Ltd. (CWST) in June, 1952. Later on, hoping 
to offer better services to cooperative members, the name was changed to 
the Cooperative Marketing and Purchasing Federation of Thailand Ltd. (CMPF) 
in August, 1969. The major reason for the latest change to ACFT in
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October 1975 was to make it possible for the ACFT to borrow from the BAAC.
The membership of this Society is comprised of agricultural 
cooperatives. In 1975, 550 cooperatives throughout the country were 
members of this central body, i.e., roughly three-quarters of primary 
agricultural cooperatives.
The main responsibility of the ACFT is to serve as a national 
federation of almost all agricultural cooperatives for their business 
dealings: farm marketing, farm supplies, providing credit for marketing
including the exporting and importing of the products marketed.
(Machima 1976a,p.25.)
Besides the ACFT, there are other related organizations functioning 
at the national level as well. For societies dealing mainly with credit, 
the most important of these is the BAAC which was organized under the Bank 
for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives Act 1966. This state- 
sponsored bank is managed by a board of directors appointed by the cabinet.
It consists of a chairman, a vice-chairman and ten other directors 
including representatives of the Ministries of Finance, and Agriculture 
and Agricultural Cooperatives. The board of directors appoints a general 
manager, who serves as an ex-officio director. Its objectives are to 
provide credit to agricultural cooperatives and farmer organizations, and 
to give technical advice in collaboration with extension workers. In 1975 
there were 58 branch offices of the BAAC at the provincial level and 492 sub­
branch offices at the districts (BAAC 1975, p.2).
The authorized share capital of the bank is 1,000 million Baht 
($US48m.) divided into 10 million shares of 100 Baht each. These shares 
can be sold by the bank to the Ministry of Finance, farmers, farmers' 
associations, agricultural cooperatives, financial institutions and others 
subject to the regulations of the bank. The Ministry of Finance is the
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major shareholder. For advancing fresh loans, the bank has depended 
largely on funds made available by the government. However, the Bank 
of Thailand has agreed to provide facilities for discounting agricultural 
bills since 1968.
The other organization is the Cooperative League of Thailand (CLT) 
which is a non-government organization, a joint venture between the 
government and leadership within the movement. Its objectives are in 
general: to promote and develop the cooperative movement in Thailand;
to educate and assist the leadership within the cooperative movement; to 
build and expand cooperative activities; and to serve as the representative 
of cooperatives in the country. Membership of the CLT is open to all 
cooperative societies in the country, both farm and non-farm. In 1975 
there were 1,316 members, representing agricultural cooperatives, 
consumer cooperatives, thrift and credit cooperatives, land cooperatives, 
fishing cooperatives, and service cooperatives. The CLT has a permanent 
staff and a new headquarters building in Bangkok is owned by the League.
The management of the CLT is similar to that of primary 
cooperatives, i.e., the board of directors reserves for itself certain 
management functions. These take the form of operating policies, and the 
director of the CLT is expected to carry out his functions within the 
framework of these policy decisions. At present, the board of directors 
is composed of 33 members: the government appoints an executive director
who is an ex-officio board member; five directors are appointed from 
various government departments dealing with cooperatives; and there are 
27 representatives of the member cooperatives. The term of office on 
the Board is 2 years. There is an obligatory annual meeting which is
held in November of every year.
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The CLT obtains its revenue mostly from the contributions of 
member societies. Under the terms of the Cooperative Act of 1968, all 
member societies contribute a portion of net margins for the financial 
support of the league at the rate of 5 percent but not more than 5,000 
Baht. Other revenue is made available from government aid and other 
income.
2.8 Organization and Administration of Agricultural Cooperatives
The cooperatives at the primary level consist of all members who 
form the general meeting. The general meeting elects the board of 
directors (Machima 1976a,p.26). The board of directors acts as the
governing body in the cooperative. Its main powers and responsibilities 
are: to prescribe the form and maintenance of membership records and to
approve membership; to render services; to establish policies, rules and 
regulations of the cooperative; to employ and dismiss the general manager 
and determine his responsibilities, duties and his remuneration; to know 
and understand the financial operation of the cooperative and satisfy 
itself that the records kept are accurate in every detail. The 
cooperative board is small with an average of 15 directors (Thailand.
CPD 1974b,p.10) and the term of the board is 3 years. The board has a 
meeting at least once a month.
The manager of the cooperative administers the entire operation 
under the advice and supervision of the board of directors, e.g., he has 
the right to hire and fire his subordinates in various sections (as shown 
in Figure 2.4) according to a general policy created by the board; to plan, 
organize, direct, coordinate, conduct and control all the administrative 
and financial operations of the cooperative; and to make his periodic 
reports to the board of directors together with his recommendations 
concerning the cooperative operation.
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THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF PRIMARY SOCIETIES ,1975
Individual Member
group leader
secretary
Board of Directors
Manager
General Meeting
Group Representatives
Group of Members
Se
rv
ic
es
32
The structure outlined in Figure 2.4 illustrates the theoretical 
principles of organization. However, in actual practice, few cooperatives 
can be managed by themselves because there exists among the people a high 
degree of illiteracy and a lack of experience. Generally, the business 
of societies is conducted by the district cooperative officers, most of 
whom have been hurriedly recruited and trained for one year. We, therefore, 
can not really say that the cooperative societies in Thailand are truly 
owned and controlled by their member-patrons (Manuspaibool,(ed), 1972,p.14).
FIGURE 2.5
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISTRICT COOPERATIVE 
OFFICERS AND PRIMARY SOCIETY
Coop. Officers Coop. Officers
Manager
board of directors')
(elected and hired by
Board of Directors 
(elected by the 
general meeting)
District Cooperative 
Officers
(supervise and give 
advice to board of 
directors and 
manager)
2.9 Membership and Number of Societies
This year is the sixty-second year of the Thai cooperative movement.
But we cannot look back with pride and claim that the success of
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cooperatives has been very significant in terms of modernizing agriculture. 
Nominally, cooperatives cover less than 10 percent of the farm population 
today, and their effective coverage is far less (Singh 1970, p. 8) even though 
there has been a sharp increase in the number of cooperative societies and 
membership.
Table 2.2 shows the growth in numbers of societies in the five 
years to 1974 and the 50 percent increase in average membership per society 
compared to the previous four years. The sharp increase in membership 
and in numbers of societies in 1973 and 1974 seems to have been due to 
a government effort to expand the cooperative system.
TABLE 2.2
NUMBER AND MEMBERSHIP OF AGRICULTURAL 
COOPERATIVES IN THAILAND 
1970-1974
Year No.of Societies Membership AverageMembership
1970 304 129,334 425
1971 401 171,306 427
1972 395 171,074 433
1973 460 207,252 451
1974 544 354,501 652
Source: Department of Cooperative Auditing
The largest size of cooperative in terms of membership, those 
with a membership exceeding 1,000, constituted 14.7 percent of the total 
number of cooperatives in 1974 (see Table 2.3).
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TABLE 2.3
THE SIZE OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES 
CLASSIFIED BY MEMBERSHIP IN 1974
Size of Coops, 
(persons)
No. of Coops. Percentage of Coops.
10-100 15 2.76
101-200 46 8.46
201-300 43 7.90
301-400 56 10.29
401-500 73 13.42
501-600 77 14.15
601-700 51 9.38
701-800 45 8.27
801-900 36 6.62
901-1000 22 4.04
1001 or more 80 14.71
Total 544 100
Source: Department of Cooperative Auditing
A more recent estimate given by the National Economic and Social
Development Board, puts the number of agricultural cooperatives in 
Thailand in 1977 at 595. These are classified into 3 ranks, i.e., first- 
class, second-class and third-class agricultural cooperatives. The method 
of ranking is based on the cycle of business which consists of (1) assembly, 
production or processing (2) selling consumer goods or farming materials 
(3) loans to members.(4) agricultural extension services (5) land 
improvement activities, which consist mostly of the provision of minor 
irrigation networks at the farm level and (6) education and training.
In addition, membership, working capital and profit are also important.
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At present there are 14 first-class agricultural cooperatives (about 
two percent of total agricultural cooperatives), 177 second-class and 
404 third-class agricultural cooperatives (Thailand. Economic Studies 
Division 1977b,p.5).
According to the field visits of the Cooperative Resources 
Committee (CRC) team (1976,p.17), average cooperative membership was fairly 
low. The team held that at least a part of the reason for such low 
membership can be explained by requirements and procedures for cooperative 
membership that are rigid and tend to be exclusive.
In order to become a member a farmer proceeds as follows:
(1) he makes an application to the cooperative; (2) the application is then 
turned over to the group leader of the area where the applicant farms, it 
is reviewed by the group and then is passed on to the cooperative officer 
(a government employee); (3) the cooperative officer investigates the
applicant and passes his recommendation on to the board of the cooperative; 
(4) the board makes the final decision on the application.
A farmer who owns no land is usually not accepted as a member.
There are exceptions to this, however, and there is no clause in the 
national cooperative law that states that an applicant for membership 
must be a landholder before he can become a member. It would appear that 
considerable membership potential is being overlooked if land holding is a 
pre-condition. As the survey by CPD (Thailand. Economic Studies 
Division 1977c,p.l) shows, farmers who are members of farmer
institutions (Farmer Associations and Agricultural Cooperatives) have land 
for cultivation at an average of 30 rai (4.8 hectares) while the overall 
farms averaged 14.7 rai in 1975.
It should also be mentioned that the rural society in Thailand is 
remarkably homogeneous throughout the country in terms of economic status 
and occupational role (Wilson 1950,p.52 cited in Hongladarom 1971).
36
Moreover, the Thai social system seems to be highly individualistic, 
as John Embree (1950,p.182 cited in Hongladarom 1971) described:
"The first characteristic of the Thai culture 
to strike an observer from the west, or from 
Japan or from Vietnam, is the individualistic 
behaviour of the Thai people. The longer one 
resides in Thailand the more one is struck 
by the almost determined lack of regularity, 
discipline and regimentation. In contrast 
to Japan, Thailand lacks neatness and 
discipline; in contrast to Americans, the 
Thai people lack respect for administrative 
regularity and have no industrial time sense."
The rural Thais want to live quietly, freely and peacefully and 
do not want to be disturbed by the authorities. The Thai, especially in 
the rural areas, is deeply influenced by Buddhist teaching and believes 
that progress is an individual task in which one may not look to others 
for assistance. Another important factor which seems to strengthen the 
characteristic of "individualism1 is the 'Substantial luxury of resources" 
in which the Thai society has developed (Wilson 1950, p. 46-47 cited in 
Hongladarom 1971). That is the Thais could afford to become individualistic 
because of the abundance of their natural resources.
Village life is loosely organized and communal organizations are 
not strong. The institutions in the village such as the Buddhist temple 
and the government school are not concerned with the corporate entity.
The rural people organize a particular cooperation at harvest time on the 
basis of reciprocity. This only concerns the work force and is entirely
different from the true nature of cooperative organization.
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Understandably, Thai peasants who become cooperative members are 
not familiar with democratic principles and methods. They have never before 
experienced being members of a "permanent" association such as the 
cooperatives. In addition, no other permanent group exists in rural Thai 
society beyond the family level or the sphere of religion. When peasants 
were assembled by a cooperative official who informed them of various 
"benefits" to be derived from being a cooperative member, most of them 
perceived economic advantages but not the social implications which are 
abstract and very strange to their traditional way of life. They join 
a cooperative society because they expect to get economic assistance 
from the government who originate, operate, and supervise cooperative 
affairs (Smuckarn 1972,p.35). This has been confirmed by a study by NIDA
(1971, cited in Manuspaibool 1972,pp.87-88) which indicates that 66 
percent of the Chacherngsao Agricultural Cooperative Society's members 
would not have joined the society if there had been no economic advantage 
(such as receiving loan with lower interest rate than the market rate).
Some of them even said that a cooperative member has to go to meetings 
often which is a waste of time! In addition, cooperatives have so many 
rules and bye-laws that they feel inconvenienced as "free" persons.
It seems to me that the majority of cooperative members in Thailand 
feel more or less the same way toward their cooperative. In other words 
there is evidence of a lack of effort on the part of members in their 
activities and the spirit of "each for all, and all for each" has not been 
properly and adequately inculcated in them, which may make them become 
disloyal to their own societies. Nevertheless, according to the study 
of Smuckarn (1965 cited in Smuckarn 1972), cooperative members often call 
a cooperative official who is also a government official,"boss" (Chaonai). 
When they have problems they come to him to seek advice, they take orders
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from him; they also respect (and in some cases fear) him. Such attitudes 
of the cooperative members radically impede the change toward "conscious" 
cooperation and self reliance which is the ultimate aim of the cooperatives.
Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the philosophy which 
guides coopera _ion in Thailand did not start from the grass roots but from 
the top. Officials have been sent out to instruct the people on 
cooperative principles and on operating methods. This contrasts with the 
theory subscribed to in many other countries where the movement was based 
on self-reliance, self-sufficiency and service to and promotion of the 
members' interests through a voluntary movement in which the noble ideals 
of equality, economic and social justice, and democracy are upheld 
(Marungi 1972,p.-134). It was the government which actually looked into 
the welfare of the farmers and initiated the idea of setting up societies 
in order to help to relieve them from debts and increase their income as 
well as standard of living. This cannot be regarded as a mistake, for it 
is generally recognized that the usual way of organizing such a society in 
this part of the world is from the top not from the roots. This has been 
necessary so long as the people in these countries do not have sufficient 
education.
There have been many arguments about whether the cooperative is, 
or should be, a movement from above or from below. If cooperatives are to 
be initially established from the top, rather than arise from the expressed 
needs and desires of the people who should benefit from them, it has 
certain disadvantages because of the paternalistic nature of the cooperative 
system imposed. First, the farmers may not whole-heartedly .accept the 
societies as their own creation, owned and controlled by them and having 
only such powers as are delegated to them by the farmers. Second, it is 
difficult for the authorities to maintain the pretence that they are either
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democratic or truly cooperative. On the other hand, if their democratic 
character was abandoned as a false pretence, cooperatives might be seen 
merely as an administrative arm of the central government and, in the 
absence of broad rural reforms, might even be seen as a purposely 
inequitable instrument of local control.
A variant of these views is that held officially in Thailand. This 
is that in the social and economic conditions obtaining in developing 
countries it is necessary that the state should sponsor cooperation and 
initiate people into it but that it should not be necessary to go much further 
by way of aiding cooperatives. It was thought that an initial start having 
been given, cooperation would strike roots in the soil and would be able to 
attract a large membership and provide a variety of services to it. It is 
hoped by this policy to help in the establishment of a genuine cooperative 
movement which will become self-contained and self-supporting. These 
are complicated and seemingly difficult problems.
2.10 Farmer Associations
The government has also intitiated less formal organizations for 
farmers in the form of Farmer Associations. These have been erected 
in order to avoid the constraints imposed by the Cooperative Act of 1968, 
which requires cooperative members who can put up land as a collateral 
for loans. In the Farmer Associations, by contrast, there are no rules 
and regulations to prevent a substantial number of landless fanners 
becoming eligible for membership of these institutions. The requirements 
to become a member of a Farmer Association are strikingly easy, i.e., 
mainly to be engaged in farming and to request membership. The criteria 
for membership and for loans is personal reputation or a lien over the
membe r1s c rops.
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There has not yet been any research into these Associations, other 
than to learn that they have grown rapidly, to 3,159 with a membership of 
306,935 in 1976 (Thailand. Economic Studies Division 1977c), both as 
non-formal and formal associations. With legal status, the Associations 
can obtain credit from the BAAC and lend to members and may even get into 
marketing activities. The main form of official intervention is the 
requirement of an audit once a year by the audit division of the CDP.
The government's administration in the period of the Third 
Economic Development Plan (1972-1976), both agricultural cooperatives and 
Farmer Associations were made the responsibility of two departments within 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. That is the agricultural 
cooperative movement was put under the control of the CPD, while Farmer 
Associations were to be supervised by the Agricultural Extension 
Department. There was little coordination between these two departments. 
In the period of 1973-1976, two Farmer Associations converted themselves 
to agricultural cooperatives and undertook all the activities of a 
cooperative society. However, the Fourth Economic Development Plan 
(1977-1981) has no specific target to convert Farmer Associations to 
agricultural cooperatives, but has a strategy to promote the establishment 
of Farmer Associations annually for the creation of farmers' opportunity 
in participating in these agricultural institutions. Government would 
like to see these Associations expand to help the poorer farmers in the
country.
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CHAPTER III
THE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES OF 
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES
3.1 The Management
According to Roy (1964,p.401), management of cooperatives concerns 
three entities: (1) the members, (2) the board of directors and (3) the
operating manager. There is a reciprocal relationship between the members, 
the board and the manager. None of them can operate effectively without 
the others. The members need the board, and the board of directors
requires a manager. The manager needs the board of directors, and the 
board exists only to meet the objective of the members.
3.1.1. The Membership in Cooperatives
Cooperative members are the legal owners of their business. 
Nominally, it is not the board of directors or the manager who has the 
controlling authority over the cooperative, but the members. In theory, 
it is the members who usually plan and form a cooperative, and it is the 
members who receive the benefit from the cooperative. It is only through 
them, by their actions and authority, that the cooperative will be a 
profitable and sound business enterprise (Roy, 1964,p.401). But, in 
practice, the members of the Thai cooperatives are usually relatively old 
and illiterate as has been explained in Chapter II. They are busy with 
their occupations and not very interested in the business of cooperatives. 
They joined the cooperative in order to got loans. This means that the 
cooperatives are not controlled by the membership. They, therefore, might 
easily be exploited by some unscrupulous people. It is said, for example, 
although we have no evidence to support this, that some cooperative 
committee members and big farmers get together to divert the bulk of
loans into their hands. Only those "near and dear" to the cooperative 
leadership can obtain significant funds. It is also possible in a society 
dominated by a rice miller, money lender or trader for him to use it to 
institutionalize his patron relationship with his small farmer clients.
In other words, the operation of the societies can easily be diverted for 
the benefit of a small group of people. The majority of members may be 
satisfied by a little advantage given to them and obliged to keep their 
mouths shut, oblivious of the fact that the others are taking so much away 
from them.
In addition, according to the survey carried out by the Cooperative 
Promotion Department (1974b, p. 10) there is the problem of the society 
fitting in with the natural grouping of the community. The average 
membership of a society surveyed was about 587, divided into 15 groups 
(according to the vicinity of the members' farms). Each group had roughly 
14 members, scattered in various villages. According to the rules, a village 
should represent a group. Yet, in practice, because of the small number 
of members, the members from several villages were gathered into one 
group. This resulted from the amalgamation of village credit cooperatives 
into agricultural cooperatives. It was found that there was little 
relationship between individual members in each group and the relationship 
between the members and their cooperative was also distant, 
oblivious of the fact that the others are taking so much away from them.
3.1.2. The Board of Directors
As has been said in Chapter II, according to the by-laws 
responsibility for overall control of the societies lies with the board of 
directors. But as a result of cooperative members' characters the 
societies lack directors who are efficient. They have no say in the 
running of the cooperatives. This means that most decisions come from 
the centre directly to the government officials. And, most district 
government officials do not understand how to approach the farmers, quite 
often they regard farmers as their clients or dependants, not as partners.
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3.1.3. The Manager
In any business, success or failure hinges on management competence. 
In a cooperative, the manager is commonly thought of as the spearhead of 
management (Roy, 1964,p.419). He has a dual challenge. He must 
(1) solve the technical business problems which include external operating 
policies, such as sales promotion, preparation of products for market, 
purchasing and all problems that relate to the physical distribution and 
pricing of commodities and services; (2) manage the accounting, financing, 
personnel and other problems of internal operations. Furthermore, the 
board of directors must be a constant challenge to the manager if he is to 
work efficiently with them.
In the Thai cooperatives, according to the survey by the CPD 
(1974b,p.16), few managers are efficient. Most agricultural cooperatives 
have a manager or a deputy-manager who is usually appointed from the staff 
and has usually worked for the cooperative for a period of at least 3 years, 
and is approved by the board of directors' president and the district 
government official. In the case of an agricultural cooperative which 
does not have a manager or a deputy-manager, a director of the cooperatives 
will replace him in this post or there will be some circulation amongst 
the directors. For a staff of the cooperatives, the overall agricultural 
cooperatives hire an average of 2.3 employees per cooperative.
The survey also reveals the educational level of the managers 
and deputy-managers. About 46 percent were educated at the level of 
secondary school or lower, 8 percent from high schools and 46 percent from 
vocational schools. For the staff, most of them,about 69 percent, were 
educated in secondary schools. The others were educated at high schools 
and vocational schools in equal proportions.
The survey also discussed salary levels. It showed that a manager 
or deputy-manager is paid an average of about 1,074 Baht per month ($US50), 
employees were paid about 908 Baht per month, and a director who worked 
as a manager was paid an allowance at about 25-30 Baht per day. These 
levels can be criticized as too low and for providing too small a margin 
over general staff for responsibility.
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3.1.4. Regulatory Power
Another aspect that has turned the management of cooperatives into 
a rather inflexible bureaucratic organization is the regulatory powers 
resulting from the Cooperative Societies Act 1968. The Act gives to the 
Registrar of Cooperative Societies wide powers over the movement. First 
of all, he determines which society to register. Any regulation or 
amendment to the by-laws of a cooperative society must be approved by the 
Registrar. The Registrar appoints or approves the auditors for all 
registered societies. The Registrar can, of his own accord, direct and 
inspect the affairs of any society, and controls the cooperative societies 
on technical business and financial aspects. The Registrar may also order 
the dissolution of a cooperative society, and liquidators of cooperative 
societies are also appointed by the Registrar. The Registrar may also 
delete a cooperative's name from the register when he agrees with the 
liquidated accounts. The Registrar must grant the amount of annual loans 
or guarantees of all societies and further approve money lending of a 
cooperative society to any other cooperative societies. The Registrar 
may also approve the cooperative society's deposits or investment in any 
other cooperative society or any bank. In addition, the Registrar can 
approve the cooperative society's purchase of shares of other cooperatives 
or any institute whose business is to facilitate or promote the activities 
of cooperative societies.
It can be seen that government powers under the Act are wide.
Ideally, it is expected that these agricultural cooperatives should function 
like any highly developed business institution. The. government is aware, of 
course, that this ideal is not practicable at present. There are three important 
problems related to the government's execution of its control. One is that 
the Department concerned is understaffed and inexperienced. Second, there 
is the bureaucratic red-tape system that leads to delay in many activities.
The third problem is that rules are often implemented without any serious 
regard for the peculiarities of each individual situation. The "rules are
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made to be followed and followed without qualification" seems to be the 
motto of the field staff. Needless to say, this leads to adverse re­
actions in the cooperative movement.
Finally it must be noted that many conflicts between the government 
and the cooperative movement are the result of the inadequate methods by 
which the government tries to improve the quality of performance in the 
movement. The inflexible way in which state powers are exercised often 
alienates movement leaders and staff from the ambition of realizing the 
formally stated cooperative goals. Thus, government efforts, in many 
cases, do not contribute by breaking the vicious circle of poor management. 
3.2 The Societies and Agricultural Credit
3.2.1. Funds or Working Capital
The funds of the societies can be divided into 2 categories namely, 
own and borrowed funds. Own funds consist of share capital, statutory 
reserves, retained profit and so on, while borrowed funds are obtained 
mainly from loans granted by the BAAC and government aid. In the early 
days of the cooperative movement, most of the finance for cooperatives 
came from within the movement itself, mainly through share capital con­
tributed by members of primary societies. But nowadays, only a small 
proportion of funds is mobilized for expansion within the movement from 
the statutory reserves and unallocated annual net profits. At present, 
most of the working capital is obtained from outside the movement, mostly 
from short-term borrowings within a period of 1-1.5 years which contribute 
at least about 60 percent of working capital. This means that the 
societies depend more on the borrowed funds than their own funds.
The total funds of the societies obtained from various sources
are shown in Table 3.1. As can be seen from the Table, the funds of the
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societies have been increasing year after year. In 1970 the total funds 
of the societies were only 560.8 million Baht. They increased to 1,131.3 
and 1,808.5 million Baht in 1973 and 1974 respectively. In other words, 
after 1970 their total operating funds more than tripled. This sudden 
increase in 1973 and 1974 resulted from a large amount of revolving 
funds allotted from the government budget for lending to agricultural 
cooperatives to finance paddy collections, building storages and 
operating rice mills.
3.2.2. Sources of Loanable Funds : the BAAC.
According to a report from the Department of Cooperative Auditing 
(Thailand. Department of Cooperative Auditing 1971) only 47.2 percent of 
loans made to the members of these cooperatives came from their own capital 
in 1971. In order to acquire enough funds to make loans to members, 
agricultural cooperatives have to borrow from outside. Their main source 
of loans, about 57.3 percent was the BAAC (Thailand. Department of 
Cooperative Auditing 1971) which provides a constantly expanding 
agricultural credit service through cooperatives, Farmer Associations and 
directly to farmers. As shown in Table 3.2 loans from the BAAC to 
cooperatives have increased from 129.4 million Baht in 1969 to 866.1 million 
Baht in 1975, nearly a six-fold increase at current prices. In totalcoop­
erative loans amounted to 2.2 billion Baht ($US101m.) over the 7 years.
Table 3.2 also shows that Farmer Associations, which are new 
claimants on the BAAC resources, have lately been obtaining a substantial 
share of funds allocated collectively. In 1975, such associations received 
almost half as much in loan funds from the BAAC as did the cooperative 
societies.
However, it should be noted that agricultural cooperatives have 
been unable to obtain from the BAAC the full volume of loans requested 
and that the approval rate is declining. As shown in Table 3.3 the BAAC 
approved only 82, 77 and 64 percent of cooperative loan requests in 1973,
1974 and 1975 respectively.
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TABLE 3.2
LOANS MADE BY THE BANK FOR AGRICULTURE AND 
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES FROM 1969 TO 1975 
(in million Baht)
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
1 Individual Farmers 562.8 563.3 509.4 670.9 773.7 1203.7 2100.9
2 Agricultural Coops. 129.4 167.6 164.0 224.6 249.1 308.7 066.1
3 Farmers Associations - - - - - 143.4 387.8
Total 692.2 730.9 673.4 895.5 1022.8 1735.8 3354.8
Source: BAAC, 19 75,p .1
TABLE 3.3
AMOUNT OF LOAN REQUESTS AND 
RECEIVED FROM THE BAAC PER 
COOPERATIVE, 1973- 
(Unit:Baht)
AMOUNT OF LOANS 
AGRICULTURAL 
1975
Year Amount of Loan Amount of Loans Percent of
Requests Received Loan Received
1973 1,083,077 890,112 82.00
1974 1,678,528 1,286,732 77.00
1975 2,787,727 1,776,566 64.00
Source: Cooperative League of Thailand, 1976,p.2.
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The main reason for the BAAC to turn down agricultural cooperatives 
requests for loans is their default record. This in turn results from the 
default on loans of cooperative members (this matter will'be discussed 
later). The other reason is a shortage of funds of the BAAC. Therefore, 
the BAAC prefers to give loans to individual farmers with the interest 
rate of 12 percent compared to 9 percent interest rate obtained from the 
cooperatives (Cooperative League of Thailand, 1976). This can be 
seen from Table 3.2 which shows that only a fifth to a quarter of all 
BAAC loans to farmers was made through the cooperatives.
The direct clients of the BAAC are mainly larger farmers because 
of the administrative costs involved in lending to smallholders. The 
BAAC employs its own credit officers many of whom are resident in the 
up-country areas and who are closely in touch with the farmers in many 
respects. Their work includes investigating evidence of land holding, 
occupation, farm machinery, product, income expenses and other aspects 
concerned and then selecting eligible borrowers who mostly are middle- 
size or larger farmers. Moreover, the credit officers almost always 
investigate whether the loans are used productively and quite often they 
supervise their clients.
The BAAC's more generous treatment of individual farmers might 
cause members to resign from being members of the cooperatives to be 
clients of the BAAC. This in turn might cause the collapse of the 
cooperative societies. The provision of credit to farmers in a district 
both as individual clients of the BAAC and as members of the cooperative 
societies which often receive a substantial part of their funds for the 
BAAC is unsatisfactory. It often leads to much dissatisfaction between 
agricultural cooperatives and the BAAC staff, because both are doing 
the same business in the same area, and at the same time, the agricultural
cooperatives have to depend on the BAAC for borrowing.
The procedure for lending through the cooperatives is as follows.
The cooperative supervisor assists in the preparation of the loan 
applications and the required supporting documents. Then the applications 
are forwarded to the credit department of the head office of the Bank.
That department processes the applications and passes them on to the banking 
division for remitting the approved funds to the cooperative, usually 
through a branch office of the Government Savings Bank. This procedure 
involves trouble and expense.
3.2.3. The Loan Repayment Records to the BAAC
As a result of default on loans of cooperative members and the 
refusal of some loans by the BAAC, the repayment records of the societies 
are very indifferent. In 1976, the Cooperative Resource Committee (CRC) 
carried out field visits to discover the explanations for this extensive 
loan delinquency. The main reason given by the cooperatives was that it 
took so much time and effort to obtain a new loan from the BAAC, that it 
was to their interest to relend the loan repayments of farmers rather than 
remit them to the Bank in repayment of the cooperative loans. From the 
survey of the CLT in 1975 this occurred on average 118 times per society per 
year (Cooperative League of Thailand 1976,p.3).
It is found from the Table 3.4 that even at best in 1968, annual 
repayments to the BAAC amounted to only 32.7 percent of net loans outstanding. 
By the mid-1970s, accumulated bad debts had risen so greatly that annual 
repayments amounted to little over 10 percent of accumulated net loans 
granted.
The delinquency record is better if repayments are related to recent 
debts, rather than to debts accumulated over a long period. This is done 
in Table 3.5, which was derived from the Table 3.4 by a 3 year moving 
average method. It relates average repayments in one period to average 
loans made in a period lagged by one year. It is rather a crude measure, 
as some repayments are for loans from before the period and some loans run
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LOANS FROM THE BAAC AND THE REPAYMENT 
PATE OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES 
1967-1976 
(in million Baht)
Year Accumulated 
Loans, netd^
(1)
Loans During 
the Year
(2)
Total Debts 
(3)
Repayment 
During the 
Year 
(4)
% of 
the
Repayment to 
Total Debts
(5)
1967 217.39 125.07 342.46 95.84 28.0
1968 259.19 135.33 394.52 129.13 32.7
1969 295.76 129.46 425.22 132.67 31.2
1970 317.59 167.56 485.15 106.47 21.9
1971 409.18 164.04 573.22 73.18 12.8
1972 539.45 224.63 764.08 134.64 17.6
1973 681.49 249.10 930.59 203.22 21.8
1974 785.29 388.66 1,173.95 207.37 17.6
1975 966.58 866.13 1,832.71 190.69 10.4
1976a) b) 1,642.36 672.07 2,314.43 244.77 10.5
a) Up to 1973, figures appear to include small components, 
averaging about 8 percent, for interest or administrative costs.
b) To September 1976.
Source of Columns 1, 2 and 4: Thailand. Economic Studies Division 1977c._____
beyond the period. However, it gives a somewhat more favourable picture.
The repayment rates seem to be from two-thirds to three-fourths of fresh 
loans and even at best, in the late 1960s, covered under 95 percent of 
sums due.
As figures on repayment rates continue to deteriorate, administrative 
costs,of course, are high. This is likely to be a serious problem con­
fronting the BAAC. The improvements of the BAAC must be developed within
the Bank itself and it must find a way to attract the properly qualified peopl* 
needed and also to establish in-service training programmes. Otherwise,
it would be expected that the Bank will have serious administrative problems.
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TABLE 3.5
THREE YEAR MOVING AVERAGES OF LOANS DURING THE 
YEAR FROM THE BAAC AND THE REPAYMENT RATES OF 
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES 
(in million Baht)
3 Yr Moving 
Averages
Loans During 
the Period
(1)
3 Yr Moving 
Averages
Repayments 
During the 
Period 
(2)
% of Repayment 
2:1
1967 - 69 129.95 1968 - 70 122.75 94.5
1968 - 70 144.12 1969 - 71 104.11 72.2
1969 - 71 153.69 1970 - 72 104.76 68.2
1970 - 72 185.41 1971 - 73 137.01 73.9
1971 - 73 212.59 1972 - 74 181.74 85.5
1972 - 74 287.46 1973 - 75 200.43 69.7
1973 - 75 501.30
Source: Estimated from Table 3.4
3.2.4. Other Sources of Funds
The Royal Thai Government's (RTG) Committee for Farmers' Aid has 
allocated funds from the RTG budget for lending to agriculture to help 
farmers to increase production and also to improve their productivity.
The Prime Minister is the chairman of the committee. The committee 
allocates this money to various agriculturally related departments and 
agencies in support of specified projects. Up to 1972 the government gave 
financial assistance through government agencies, a total amount of 489 
million Baht. This financial assistance is free of interest charge 
(Machima 1976a,p.40) and is not included in the sums loaned to cooperatives
through the BAAC.
For 1974 the Bank of Thailand reports that cooperative societies 
borrowed 42.3 million Baht from the Cooperative Promotion Fund and 22 
million Baht from the funds provided by the Committee for Farmers' Aid.
In addition, from January 1 to November 30, 1975 the Cooperative Promotion 
Department received 130.6 million Baht in support of cooperative projects 
of rice storage and processing and 25 million Baht for the ACFT grain silo 
project. These loans are long-term and bear a 2 percent interest rate 
(Cooperative Research Committee 1976,p.8). In brief, the government
allotted 205.6 million Baht for collecting paddy during 1972 - 1975 and 
79.7 million Baht for construction of storage during 1971 - 1977 (Thailand. 
Economic Studies Division 1977c).
However, the role played by the government in the field of credit 
can be criticized as inadequate in amount, unequal in distribution and 
inappropriate in its basis of security. For example, all government 
loans granted to agricultural cooperatives through government departments 
amounted to less than 2 percent of all loans obtained by the cooperatives 
in 1975 (Machima 1976a,p.53).
The commercial banks also supply credit direct to the well-to-do 
farmers, who too often live in urban areas rather than rural areas. Such 
credit is extended solely on the basis of tangible security. The rates of 
interest charged by the commercial banks vary from 7.5 to 15 percent per 
year. However, the commercial banks have played an active role in 
extending agricultural credit to farmers in the last decade. As will be 
seen in the Table 3.6, total loans outstanding by all commercial banks was 
2,266 million Baht in 1975 which was a substantial increase over the year 
before. The contribution of foreign banks was negligible. Moreover,
29 banks deposited 1,668 million Baht with the BAAC for relending to 
farmers, cooperatives and Farmers' Associations (Cooperative Resources
Committee 1976,p.7).
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The commercial bank funds deposited with the BAAC were provided 
by agreement among the banks that they would channel 5 percent of their 
total outstanding loans, as of December 1974, to agricultural financing. 
Each of the banks determined the share of these funds that they would lend 
direct to cooperatives. However, the major portion of such commercial 
bank lending to the cooperatives was made through the BAAC, presumably 
because the banks were not too optimistic about prospects for getting this 
money back on direct lending. The BAAC pays 8 percent interest to the 
commercial banks for this money.
TABLE 3.6
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT PROVIDED BY COMMERCIAL 
BANKS IN 1975 
(in million Baht)
Outstanding at 
November 30, 1975
Increased from 
December 31, 1974
Deposit with BAAC 
December 31, 1974
1 Banks Incorporated 
in Thailand 
(16 banks)
2,265.5 1,432.2 1,432.6
2 Banks Incorporated 
Abroad (13 banks) 0.2 o to 235.25
Total 2,265.7 1,432.4 1,667.85
Source: Cooperative Resources Committee 1976,p.8.
3.2.5. Loan Operation of the Societies
It can be seen from the Table 3.7 that, on the average, each 
cooperative society advanced short and intermediate-term loans amounting 
to 705,000 Baht each year ($US33,880) during the three year period. Of
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this amount just under 20 percent were short-term loans and 80 percent 
were intermediate ones. The proportion of short-term loans tended to 
decrease from 27 percent in 1970 to 18 percent in 1972. A short term 
loan is defined as up to 1 year, extendable up to 3 in certain circumstances 
and intermediate loan from 1 to 5 years.
TABLE 3.7
AVERAGE LOANS PER AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE SOCIETY, 
SHORT AND LONG TERM LOANS DISBURSED FROM 1970 - 1972
Year Short-•term Intermediate Total
Baht % Baht % Baht %
1970 109,374 26.9 297,595 73.1 406,969 100.0
1971 150,614 18.4 665,973 81.6 816,587 100.0
1972 160,747 18.1 729,862 81.9 890,609 100.0
Average 3 Years 140,245 19.9 564,477 80.1 704,722 100.0
Source: Machima 1976a,p.54.
Earlier it was stated that the government's two main aims 
in drawing up the cooperative scheme of the late 1960s were the 
modernization of agriculture and assistance to the poorer farmers in 
the community. Whether the achievements are in this direction could 
not be ascertained fully since no data regarding the amount of loans 
disbursed by farm size are available. Small farmers usually tend to 
borrow more short-term loans since they have small size of land holding 
and tend to operate near to the subsistance levels, so that they must 
borrow for financing consumption expenditure. This may probably be the 
reason why the short-term loans are proportionately lower than the
intermediate ones.
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At the same time, comparatively, the bulk of credit is going to 
modernization. It will be seen from the Table that four-fifths of loans 
during the 1970 - 1972 period went in intermediate term credit, i.e., 
credit of over one year, principally for three to five years. Such 
credit is used for financing investment in agriculture, e.g. the 
acquisition of farm machinery, the construction of irrigation wells etc.
This meant that those farmers who were already better off were best able 
to obtain such intermediate-term loans.
Security conditions favour owner-cultivators. The security 
required is a mortgage on land or two sureties, usually neighbouring 
farmers, one of whom has land. The amount advanced can not exceed 60 
percent of the appraised value of the land. The ceiling for individual 
loans varied with the society, the range being 6,000 Baht to 10,000 Baht.
A uniform rate of interest of 12 percent per annum is charged on all types 
of loans. Since the cooperatives pay 9 percent on loans from the BAAC, 
they have a margin of 3 percent to cover administrative expenses and build 
up funds.
For the lending procedures, a member who wishes to borrow from a 
cooperative sends his application to the group leader of the area where 
the applicant farms in order for it to be reviewed and then it is passed 
on to a district cooperative official. The cooperative official will 
investigate the application and pass his recommendation on to the board of 
directors which will make the final decision on the application. And it is 
favourable only if the applicant agrees to mortgage his farm to the 
cooperative. One point should, however, be mentioned here. That is that 
the district cooperative official not only scrutinises applications for 
loans before they are sent to the board, but also sits on the board which
decides on the application.
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3.2.6 Loan Repayments of the Members
As indicated in Table 3.8 and 3.9 the gap between repayment due 
and actual repayment is a higher proportion of the intermediate loans 
than in the short-term loans. This is rather unexpected. It might be 
thought that the members who borrowed for short-term loans would be the 
poorer farmers in the society who would have less capacity to repay. In 
fact, their repayment record has been better. However, the trend is in 
the opposite direction. In the case of the short-term loans it was 
decreasing, e.g. from 114.5 in 1970 to 62.2 percent in 1972 where as in the 
intermediate term loans it was 30.7 percent in 1970 which increased to 
46.5 percent in 1972.
It should be observed here that even though the loans made to 
members are only short and intermediate term loans, the percentage of loan 
repayment of members is rather low. According to the survey by the CPD 
(Thailand. Cooperative Promotion Department 1974b,p.28) the loan repayment 
of members depends on their yearly production and type of occupation. The 
members who cultivate several crops or double crops have a better repayment 
record than the members who cultivate single crops. In addition, the 
prices of crops or livestock also influence loan repayments.
It has previously been mentioned that societies hesitate to repay 
BAAC loans because they fear that they will not get fresh funds. The 
same consideration has an effect upon members in relation to their societies. 
They are afraid that if they repay the loan at the date due they will be 
unable to receive it again. Therefore, instead of paying back all the 
principal and interest owed to the societies, they only pay the interest
and keep the principal (Marukatut 1972,p.79).
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TABLE 3.8
SHORT-TERM LOANS : COMPARISON OF REPAYMENT RECORD OF 
MEMBERS PER SOCIETY DURING 1970 - 1972
Unit : Baht
Year Lent Due
Repayment
Actual
Repayment
% of
Repayment
1970 109,374 110,172 126,180 114.5
1971 150,614 156,563 100,172 63.9
1972 160,747 189,596 117,911 62.2
Source: Machima 1976a,p.58.
INTERMEDIATE-TERM 
RECORD OF MEMBERS
TABLE 3.9
LOANS : COMPARISON 
PER SOCIETY DURING
OF REPAYMENT 
1970 - 1972
Unit : Baht
Year Lent Due Actual % of
Repayment Repayment Repayment
1970 297,595 857,400 263,082 30.68
1971 665,973 1,031,072 429,186 41.63
1972 729,862 1,210,749 563,118 46.51
Source: Machine 1976a, p.58.
S9
Another partial explanation for the low rates is the ease with 
which a farmer can extend repayment. For example, when short-term loans 
cannot be repaid as scheduled they can be extended at one year intervals 
for up to 3 years. Also, as refinanced loans become more difficult to 
collect each successive year they remain outstanding. Last but not least, 
the low repayment rates may be due to the society's management, personnel 
and enforcement system. It can be expected that default rates will increase 
over the next few years unless corrective actions are taken.
The default on loans is a major problem for the cooperatives 
since they are unable to make new loans to other members who need them 
and their ability to repay the loan to the bank is also very low. This 
problem is an important one to all agricultural cooperatives and cannot be 
solved in a short time. As long as the problem has not been solved, the 
operation of these societies is doomed to failure and they are unable to 
serve the needs of their members.
In days of unlimited liability the society as an entity was 
responsible for its members' debts. Now, although individual defaulters 
are debarred from receiving fresh loans, their society as a whole is not 
excluded. Nor is there mention of the sureties being called upon to make 
good the debts they guarantee. If the loan repayment record remains so 
poor, the BAAC will clearly have to take action or cut back on its loan 
program to cooperatives. One possibility might be to reintroduce collective 
responsibility of societies for their members' debts, a system which has
disadvantages which have been discussed above (p. 19 )
3.2.7 Interest Rates on Agricultural Loans
One of the possible reasons for the low repayment rate could be 
the interest rate which is below the market rate. As mentioned earlier 
the rate of interest charged by the cooperative to its members is lower
than in the case of commercial or other credit which means that the
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interest rate is lower than the equilibrium rate of interest thereby 
creating a situation of excess demand. Because of this, credit has to 
be rationed either by supplying it to only a few of the potential 
borrowers, or by fixing certain ceilings on borrowing, or both.
Usually, the larger farmers happen to have easier access to 
financial markets than the small farmers. This is partly because of 
the farmers' socio-economic and political influence and partly because 
the per unit cost of administering many small loans is much higher 
(Gonzalez-Vega 1977). This means that instead of a large number of 
small farmers receiving loans only a few large farmers obtain them - 
in effect, the large farmers are obtaining the benefit of the government 
subsidy which enables the cooperatives to offer cheap credit. Hence 
the income gap between these two groups is further widened. Furthermore, 
an unduly low interest rate regime creates distortions in the economy 
by way of misallocation of resource. This can happen as follows. For 
a given production technology the marginal product of capital in the case 
of large farmers may be relatively lower than for the small farmers because 
the large farmers1 previous access to capital - either their own or 
borrowed - has created a situation of diminishing returns to capital 
on their holdings. (Gonzalez-Vega'1977). Hence, where large farmers 
have relatively easier access to capital the scarce resource (credit 
in this case) is diverted from more the productive section to the 
relatively less productive one - a situation which is both socially and 
economically undesirable, especially in a developing country like 
Thailand.
A further advantage of a higher interest rate structure in the 
cooperative system is that it would enable the cooperatives to attract 
more savings by offering higher interest on deposits made with them. Once 
a cooperative has established a good reputation, members may find it 
preferable, because it is less risky, to lend indirectly through the
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cooperative, rather than to lend privately. The interest rate it 
offers on deposits need not therefore be as high as on funds for 
private lending. It is possible that the total volume of rural 
savings might be stimulated in this way, so that investment is also 
stimulated.
3.3 The Marketing System
Aside from lending operations, other businesses of the agricultural 
cooperatives are the business of purchasing and the business of marketing 
of members' produce. These other two businesses are getting more important 
both absolutely and relatively to the cooperatives total activity.
3.3.1 The Business of Purchasing
The business of purchasing of the agricultural cooperatives 
comprises: (1) farm supplies, i.e., fertilizer, insecticides and pesticides
(2) farm equipment business, i.e., water pumps, hand operated sprayers, 
shovels, plows, harrows, mowers etc. The latter one is on a somewhat 
limited basis. The market for farm equipment is quite competitive among 
the many sales agencies, and the price of farm equipment is reasonable. 
Moreover, follow-up services, which cooperatives are illfitted to provide, 
are a very important part of the sales package for equipment.
Agricultural cooperatives have rather been involved in selling 
farm-supplies, especially fertilizer. Nowadays, the application of 
chemical fertilizer in Thailand is increasing rapidly. Yet the price of 
fertilizer is considered to be too high in relation to the farm prices of 
produce. One reason is that the fertilizer system in Thailand is 
monopolized. Most of the fertilizer (about 90 percent) in Thailand is 
imported from Japan by a few companies, and there is only one plant which 
manufactures chemical fertilizer in Thailand, i.e., TJC Chemical Co.Ltd.
This plant was founded by joint collaboration between Thai and Japanese 
Cooperative Federations. At present this plant is facing high costs of 
production and the competition from the importers (Agricultural Cooperative 
Federation of Thailand 1976,p.25).
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Agricultural cooperatives in Thailand obtain their fertilizer 
supplies from the ACFT. The ACFT has imported it from the UNICO OF JAPAN 
for several years on credit by the guarantee of the commercial banks.
The ACFT supplies to agricultural cooperative members both for cash and 
credit. The sale of fertilizer through cooperatives before 1975 was 
about 10,000 tons per year. This was small because the new agricultural 
cooperatives were not yet in the business of selling fertilizers. However, 
fertilizer sales are increasing as these societies are prepared to under­
take the sales. Unfortunately, there has recently been a shortage of 
fertilizer from Japan because of the oil crisis. The ACFT could not 
supply fertilizer to members adequately. For example, the ACFT had made 
a three-year contract (1973 - 1975) for 60,000 tons of fertilizer, but 
UNICO OF JAPAN dissolved the contract and sent only a portion to the ACFT 
(Cooperative Marketing and Purchasing Federation 1974,p.8).
During 1975, heavy losses were made on the cooperative marketing 
of fertilizer. The government had a policy of making fertilizer available 
at cost and on easy term credit to farmers in 1975. In order to do so, it 
put out a tender for the supply of fertilizer and then sold out to the ACFT 
on 2 year credit about 30,000 tons at the price of 3,800 Baht per ton 
($US183) so that the ACFT could supply its members at the lowest price.
This deal cost the ACFT some 114 million Baht. The ACFT then supplied 
about 22,000 tons of fertilizer to agricultural cooperative members and to 
Farmers' Associations. But, owing to the decreased price of fertilizer in 
the world market, the ACFT was not able to sell the remaining 8,000 tons 
and also there is some stock of fertilizer left in those cooperatives and 
Farmer Associations that cannot be sold. In addition, the ACFT has 
encountered the problem of collecting money from the societies and the
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Farmer Associations, and was owed 45 million Baht by the societies and 
9 million Baht by the Farmers' Associations. The effects of the 
fertilizer price and government policy have caused a big loss in the whole 
system of agricultural cooperatives and has not yet been solved.
3.3.2 The Marketing of Members1 Produce
Every single agricultural cooperative clearly states as one of its 
most important objectives the marketing of farm produce on behalf of its 
farmer-members. Among other things, it also intends to process 
agricultural produce into the form of readily marketable commodities. Of 
all the 544 agricultural cooperatives, very few indeed have been able to 
market the members' crops in the quantity which represents a reasonable 
proportion of members' total sales. (Manuspaibool 1972b,p.55,) Processing 
activity is almost non-existent, except for that of a few cooperative-owned 
rice mills that operate on an off-and-on basis. However, of all the 
marketing of members' produce, rice and maize are the major business.
Even this is complicated.
3.3.3 General Structure of Rice Marketing
In general, commercial paddy and rice marketing is operated by 
general merchants, mostly Chinese who have been in this kind of business 
for decades. The remainder is conducted by Thais and cooperatives.
Although the Chinese hold a near monopoly in the business and they 
organize and administer all marketing functions such as collection, 
processing, grading, storage, packaging, shipping, transportation, selling 
as well as exporting, Thais play a small role in several areas of the rice 
business. Some may be engaged in all aspects of marketing: they own
warehouses, transportation equipment, rice mills, money institutions and 
other important related businesses. This domination of commercial business 
by Chinese is more due to ethno-linguistic characteristics than to any 
other barriers to entry (Hongladarom 1971, p. 7).
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There are four levels of marketing practices in Thailand, namely; 
local assembly markets, regional assembly markets, central assembly markets 
and export markets. The role of the cooperatives will be discussed later.
The local assembly markets include all the places where initial 
assembly of paddy occurs through rural collectors or small businessmen 
and cooperatives. The middlemen may either be local millers who process 
the paddy for local consumption or merchants who forward the commodity to 
the district for regional assembly markets. The volume of business at 
the local market has its peak during the harvest months of December to 
April and then declines heavily thereafter.
The next assembly point is the regional assembly markets where 
rice and paddy are pooled at district levels or at big business centres 
which are located at places highly accessible to transportation facilities. 
At this level, the merchants themselves may ship paddy to terminal markets 
for retailing. Alternatively, they may also sell directly to wholesalers 
at nearby markets or to exporters in Bangkok.
The central assembly market is the principal rice market centre, 
whether in the Central Plain, in Bangkok or up-country. The principal 
function of this level includes collecting paddy for processing and storage 
as well as distributing the milled rice to wholesalers and exporters.
Finally, there are also terminal markets where rice is distributed 
to consumers whether directly or indirectly. Based on this criterion each 
of the above markets whether local, regional or central may at the same time 
be categorized as terminal, if it retails and distributes processed or 
white rice to end users.
For export markets, government and private ventures can be found 
in the rice export business in Thailand. The government has a direct role
65
in the export trade manifesto in the case of government to government 
business transactions. But, the rice export trade of Thailand is by 
and large dominated by private entrepreneurship and the role of the 
government becomes regulatory in nature. The traders are licensed and 
supervised by the government. A prospective exporter must first secure 
an annual permit from the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The temporary 
but renewable permit provides the government an instrument for exercising 
tight control and supervision over the activities of the rice exporters.
They are particularly discouraged from trade malpractices on the matter 
of quality and quantity of rice exported to other countries and are subject 
to rice export premiums and sometimes to quotas. In this way, the price 
of rice in the internal market as well as level of domestic food reserves 
can be regulated to a large extent by the government (Machima 1976a,p.72).
3.3.4 Rice Marketing System of Agricultural Cooperatives
In the past, after collecting paddy from both members and non­
members, agricultural cooperatives had kept it in storage for 3-6 months 
and then sold it to middlemen or local millers. At present, these paddies 
are milled at the mills of societies. Any societies which do not own mills 
will deliver to the mill of their provincial federation for milling.
Part of the milled rice will be delivered by the societies to the ACFT or 
to the provincial federation for export in terms of government to government 
contracts, and some will be supplied to members of the societies both for 
cash and credit.
In 1976, the agricultural cooperatives collected 90,037 tons of 
paddy from members. This was classified into 2 categories, i.e., direct 
purchase, for which the societies paid at once to the members on delivery 
at current prices, to the amount of 49,531 tons, and on a consignment basis
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FIGURE 3.1
RICE MARKETING SYSTEM OF AGRICULTURAL 
COOPERATIVES, 1976
ACFT Export
Paddy (cash)
Mills of Coops.
Agri. Cooperatives
Mill of Provincial 
Federation
Funds for collecting
paddy
Paddy (debt repayment)
(debt repayment for fertilizer, loans and others)in terms of paddy, which 
amounted to about 40,506 tons. For glutinous rice 7,750 tons was collected, 
partly in terms of cashyabout 1,200 tons7and 6,550 tons for debt repayment.
For export, in 1975 the government allocated a 10 percent quota out 
of 38.6 percent of total exports made by the government in terms of 
government to government contracts to the agricultural cooperatives, i.e., 
20,166 tons. The ACFT, however, was able to deliver to the government 
only about 16,134 tons. In 1976 the ACFT delivered 36,656 tons to the 
government (Thailand. Economic Studies Division 1977a,p.19).
These volumes formed only a very small share - less than 2 percent - 
of total rice exports, which amounted to 0.9 million tons in 1975, and 1.9 
million tons in 1976.
3.3.5 Cooperative Rice Mills and Storages
The 26 rice mills of both agricultural cooperatives and provincial 
federations have a combined total capacity of about 1,332 tons per day or
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about 400,000 tons per year. The agricultural cooperatives, however, 
were able to supply only approximately 100,000 tons of paddy in 1976 or 
25 percent of capacity. Moreover, the study by Machima in 1974 on the 
rice mills of seven agricultural cooperatives showed even greater under­
utilization, demonstrating that these rice mills were able to utilise 
only 14.1 percent of their capacity. This was because the rice mills 
were not able to collect adequate paddy either from members or from 
outside customers, owing to a shortage of funds and their delays in 
paying cash to farmers for their paddy deliveries. Moreover, rice was 
still being delivered to local money lenders to pay debts.
TABLE 3.10
NUMBER OF RICE MILLS OF AGRICULTURAL 
COOPERATIVES AND PROVINCIAL FEDERATIONS 
1951-1976
No. of Rice Mills 
Constructed 
During the Period
(1)
Average Replacement 
Cost at Current 
Prices
(Million Baht)
(2)
Total = Col.l x 
Col. 2
(Million Baht) 
(3)
Capacity 
Tons per 
Day
1951-1957 3 4.6 14.0 180
1968-1970 2 2.8 5.6 100
1972 8 2.5 20.0 330
1973 - - - -
1974 5 4.6 23.0 340
1975 5 4.0 20.0 212
1976 3 4.3 13.0 170
Total 26 ' 3.8 95.6 1,332
Note: Cost of construction at present price.
(1) 80 tons/day cost 5 million Baht
(2) 40-50 tons/day cost 4 million Baht
(3) 20 tons/day cost .66 million Baht
Source: Thailand. Economic Studies Division 1977d,p.65.
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There are 314 agricultural cooperative storage, facilities scattered 
throughout the country with a capacity to store about 150,000 tons of 
paddy, while the amount of paddy collected was only about 100,000 tons 
(Thailand. Economic Studies Division 1977d,p.20).
TABLE 3.11
NUMBER OF RICE STORAGES OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES
1963-1976
Year No. of
Built
Storages 
in Period
Average Price 
(Baht)
Estimated Cost 
for
Construction 
(Million Baht)
Capacity
(Tons)
1963-1970 102 150,000 15.30 51,000
1971-1972 30 300,000 9.00 15,000
1973 20 300,000 6.00 10,000
1974 80 320,000 25.60 40,000
1975 - - - -
1976 82 340,000 27.88 41,000
Total 314 282,000 83.78 157,000
Source: Thailand. Economic Studies Division 1977d,p.64.
Most of the funds for paddy collection came from the budget, 
i.e., cooperative promotion fund, farmers' aid fund and revolving fund for 
paddy collection. Besides, agricultural cooperatives used their own 
funds, i.e., share capital, reserves and savings. In 1976, the total 
revolving fund for paddy collection from the government was about 205.6 
million Baht which had to be repaid within one year. This amount of 
money which is the major part of revolving capital for paddy purchase, is 
being circulated among agricultural cooperatives at primary and secondary
level.
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However, in this case too, as in the case of cooperative credit, 
the societies have not repaid the government on time, possibly because they 
fear that they may not be able to get it back the next season. If this 
non-repayment continues, it will mean that government will cease to provide 
funds to cooperatives for paddy purchase. The cooperative paddy collection 
will then have to be financed from the three sources: member's repayments,
cooperative funds and the revolving fund which they have already received.
The following observations may be made about the rice marketing 
of agricultural cooperatives:
(a) the accounting system of agricultural cooperatives 
should be adjusted urgently. Any business which 
concerns several sources of funds and the business 
of assessing the price (repayment in terms of paddy) 
should have a proper accounting system.
(b) There is great underutilisation of cooperative 
investments, i.e., rice storages, rice mills and 
funds for paddy collection. Government investments 
in this field so far have not proved profitable.
It may be that the balance between investment 
in fixed assets and in working capital is 
inefficient. Unless capacity utilisation can 
be improved by better management and more adequate 
working capital, it would seem sensible to 
halt government investment in capital projects.
(c) It cannot be assumed to be the business of 
agricultural cooperatives to serve government 
policy unsubsidised. In several cases government 
requirements have caused a lot of problems for the 
societies. In practice, the government should
be responsible for the losses involved in 
undertaking non-economic activities and the 
accounting system should be separated properly.
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(d) The system of repayment in terms of paddy
should be adjusted urgently. The important 
point is to assess the price for paddy.
For example, in the era of the government by 
Prime Minister Kukrit Pramote there was a 
rice price support policy. At that time 
the agricultural cooperatives ran into 
losses in buying paddy from farmers 
because of changing rice prices. It is 
not yet known how severe this problem is, 
because of the lack of data.
3.3.6 Cooperative Maize Marketing
Like rice marketing, the agricultural cooperatives collect members' 
maize destined for overseas markets through the ACFT. The market of the 
ACFT is ZEN-NOH (Agricultural Cooperative Federation of Japan). But the 
procedures are somewhat different from rice. The procedure is initiated 
from the ACFT which informs each agricultural cooperative society which is 
a member of the Federation how much maize it wants according to the ACFT 
export quota and this quota is allocated for all agricultural cooperative 
members. The maize that is not yet exported is kept in the modern maize 
silo of the ACFT, with a capacity of 30,000 metric tons (it can handle 
500,000 tons of maize over the year). This silo was purchased at a price 
of 89 million Baht ($US4.1 million). Of this amount 29 million Baht has 
been paid to its previous owner by the cooperative promotion fund, and the 
BAAC has a loan application for the balance of 60 million Baht.
As regard to the funds, the ACFT has a revolving fund of 27 
million Baht for this maize business. Of this sum 10 million Baht has
been borrowed from the Cooperative Promotion Department, 13 million Baht
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from the Japanese Cooperative, and 4 million Baht from the share capital 
of the ACFT. Of this amount, the ACFT lends ACFT-linked agricultural 
cooperatives funds for collecting maize with 7 percent of interest per 
year. The member-societies can borrow this amount of money at the amount 
of about 70 percent of total value of maize expected to be collected.
Yet, the ACFT is short of operating funds. Therefore, in the case of 
shortage of funds, the societies may wait for money for about 3 - 5  days 
after delivering maize to the ACFT; that is when the ACFT has managed to 
deliver the maize to the ship and gathered the necessary documents to 
receive money from the bank, and then passed on this money to agricultural 
cooperatives, which then pay their members. In operating the business, 
the ACFT charges 25 Baht per ton for keeping and exporting the maize, the 
residual, i.e., the transportation cost on delivering the maize to the ACFT, 
falls to the societies.
As can be seen from the Table 3.12, ACFT maize exports increased 
from 51,174 tons in F.Y. 1969 to 123,216 tons in F.Y. 1975. However, when 
considering the quantity, this was only a small share of the country's 
total maize exports, which had risen to 2.1 million tons by the end of this 
period. Accordingly, this does not help the farmer members in terms of 
commodity price, and, that amount of maize sold would have been sold 
anyway with or without the ACFT.
It is noticeable that most of the maize exported by the ACFT comes 
from the collection by agricultural cooperatives, and the residual from 
private merchants in terms of cash by the ACFT. For example, 93,300 tons 
or 76 percent of total ACFT maize exports came from 83 agricultural 
cooperatives in 1975/6. In addition, from the survey by the Faculty of 
Economics and Business Administration, Kasetsart University in 1974,
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TABLE 3.12
VOLUME OF MAIZE EXPORTS BY THE ACFT COMPARED TO 
THE COUNTRY'S TOTAL MAIZE EXPORTS 
1969-1976
Year Maize Exported by the ACFT (1) 
(metric tons)
Country's Total Maize Exports (2) 
(metric tons)
1969/70 51,174 1,544,815
1970/71 59,883 1,447,955
1971/72 79,752 1,873,461
1972/73 40,979 1,843,619
1973/74 97,163 1,386,374
1974/75 100,000 2,232,275
1975/76 123,216 2,104,733
Source: (1) The Agricultural Cooperative Federation of Thailand, 1976
(2) Bank of Thailand, 1978
members of agricultural cooperatives marketed only 31 percent of their 
maize through the societies in 1972/73. And, in 1976, the ACFT estimated 
50 percent of maize produced by their members would be marketed through the 
societies (Thailand. Economic Studies Division 1977d,p.22).
This indicates that the members of the societies were not sufficiently 
loyal to their own society. The reasons for this might be: first, a lack
of sense of responsibility resulting from a low level of education; second, 
there is still a relationship between cooperative members and local 
merchants, who may be offering better prices for top quality grain; and 
last, the delay in receiving money from their own society or the convenience
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of selling their produce to local merchants. Having realized the above 
mentioned problems, it thus will not be beneficial to the overall cooperative 
system if the situation remains unchanged.
3.A Cooperative Education and Training
Among the supporting activities of the cooperative movement, to 
which the Thai government is committed, education occupied a central 
position. Cooperative Education in Thailand is placed under the charge 
of the Cooperative Promotion Department (CPD) and the Cooperative League of 
Thailand (CLT). The CLT aims directly at cooperative education, training 
and seminar programmes for all people, especially cooperative members, 
board members, and for the employees of the cooperative societies as well.
The CPD by the work of the Training Division, apart from helping to 
educate and train several people in the same way as the CLT, will also aim 
directly at educating and training its district cooperative officials.
At the university level there is offered a bachelor's degree in the faculty 
of Economic and Business Administration, majoring in cooperatives, at 
Kasetsart University.
Table 3.13 shows that the CPD trained 1,173 trainees during 1970 - 
1976. Of these, 552 were upper staff, including managers, and 198 
accountants. The others were either district cooperative officials or 
students, almost all of whom were qualified by one year of the high school 
curriculum.
The CLT provided programmes for agricultural cooperatives in 1977 
(Cooperative League of Thailand 1977,p.6) as follows:
(a) Seminars for managers and board members dealing 
with the milling business, 171 participants.
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TABLE 3.13
NUMBER OF TRAINEES BY THE CPD, 1970 - 1976
Type of Trainees
Number of Trainees
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Total
Managers of Cooperatives 31 34 39 34 32 30 28 238
Accountants of Coops. - - - 29 84 55 30 198
Creditmen of Coops. - - - - - 28 58 86
District Cooperative Officials - - - - - - 80 80
Students about Cooperatives 39 26 29 30 24 27 39 214
Students (curriculum by mail) - - - 92 92 92 91 91
Total 70 60 68 185 232 232 326 1173
Source: Thailand. Economic Studies Division 1977c.
(b) Conference of the leading members of the 
agricultural cooperatives and land settlement 
cooperatives, 90 participants.
(c) Training of creditmen, 30 participants.
(d) Training of accountants, 80 participants.
(e) Training of board members of the agricultural 
cooperatives and land settlement cooperatives, 
6,938 participants. This training programme 
is done through 9 mobile training units of 
the CPD with financial support from the CLT.
(f) Training of accountants organized in Self- 
help Settlement Projects of the Public 
Welfare Department, 48 participants.
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It is a pity that work evaluations have not yet been conducted.
It is, therefore, difficult to find out the impact of cooperative education.
If the results were evaluated, several things could be tested. It could 
be discovered whether most trainees who have returned back to the movement 
after a training course at the CPD or CLT have improved their performance 
and have benefited their sponsoring organizations. It is sometimes argued 
that some of the better trained employees in the movement have left their 
employers; some because they were offered better jobs in the private sectors; 
others because they had been unable to get along with their board members, 
as a result of the educational course making them "too clever" for their 
employers, which caused the board members to become suspicious of their 
newly trained employees and to assume that they might cheat them. Their 
retirements have often meant a great loss to the movement, as qualified and 
experienced employees are scarce. Nevertheless, it must be remembered 
that their knowledge and experience are made available to the economic 
development of Thailand through other institutions. From the point of view 
of the national economy, therefore, these transfers are not a waste.
So far, the priority in the field of cooperative education in 
Thailand has been to train board members and employees. Ordinary members 
have hardly had the same opportunities. This is an understandable policy.
It might be that training ordinary members is generally more difficult.
First of all, it is a complicated affair to attract them in sufficiently 
large numbers. Most of them are busy and cannot stay away from their
farms, businesses or other occupations for very long. To deal with this, 
the Cooperative Techniques Division has a number of mobile training units 
to provide members' education up-country. Again some of mobile training 
staff do not have sufficient basic education to educate the others 
(Manuspaibool 1972a,p.17). A large sum of money is loosely spent for 
the mobile training activities while there is little, if any, evidence of 
achievement. However, the most urgent matter which should be looked into
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is to arrange "crash programmes" for training the leaders, the employees 
and the members. Otherwise, the "knowledge gap" between cooperative 
leaders and the rank and file membership will increase. The latter have 
even fewer opportunities to exercise their control of the management as 
most matters are unfamiliar to them, while the board members or the society 
employees or the district cooperative officials always have an answer in 
hand. This will become a problem specific to the cooperative movement in 
Thailand.
This description has dealt with management problems as far as the 
personnel and extent of activities are concerned. In the following 
chapter we will take up the question of financial management,at least so 
far as it can be judged from the financial statements of the societies.
CHAPTER IV
THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE SOCIETIES
4.1 Financial Data
Data on the financial condition of the cooperative societies in 
Thailand are very inadequate. It is known that many agricultural societies 
are not doing well and that the government has repeatedly had to come to 
their aid either with financial support or with administrative assistance. 
But it is difficult to judge the extent of the societies' weakness from the 
information available.
The aggregate accounts presented for the movement as a whole by 
the Department of Cooperative Auditing (DCA) are also inadequate. First, 
because they do not follow conventional accountancy procedures in every 
instance, they are hard to interpret. Second, and much more 
important, because even the conventional presentation of the accounts does 
not show the true financial condition of the societies. It 
fails to deal properly with the question of doubtful or bad debts.
Table 4.1 presents the balance sheet of the societies for the 
years ended March 31, 1970-4 according to data of the DCA. Figures have 
been rearranged into the double entry book keeping system. It will be 
noticed that, in the 1972-4 years, the net profit does not quite balance, 
especially in 1974. This discrepancy in net profit will be discussed on 
page go .
4.2 Assets of the Societies
The assets of the societies consist of current assets, fixed 
assets, investment and other assets. As can be seen in the Table 4.1,
the current assets increased remarkably from time to time. For instance,
TABLE 4.1
THE BALANCE SHEET OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES
(in thousand Baht)
Particulars 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Assets
Current Assets:
Cash 39,217 33,532 39,540 74,195 113,749
Debtors (loan) 455,680 676,993 731,852 867,093 1,215,412
Debtors (trade) - - - - 83,838
Other Debtors - 122 1,517 37,111 15,673
Goods & Inventory - 824 5,219 27,543 128,789
Accounts Receivable 41,077 47,514 41,351 54,843 106,828
Total Current Assets 535,975 758,985 819,479 1,060,785 1,664,289
Fixed Assets:
Land 5,148 8,260 11,282 17,516 32,051
Building 4,709 4,351 7,717 15,370 41,305
Mach tilery - - - - 2,338
Transport Equipment - - - - 1,848
Appliances - 4,613 4,586 7,506 6,454
Total Fixed Assets 9,857 17,224 23,585 40,392 83,996
Other Assets:
Income Earning Investment 12,714 20,659 23,794 28,884 58,267
Deferred Charges - - - - 1,448
Others 2,264 1,232 2,490 1,243 463
Total Other Assets 14,978 21,891 26,284 30,127 60,178
Total Assets 560,809 798,099 869,348 1,131,304 1,808,462
Liabilities and Coops' Equity
Current Liabilities:
Creditors (borrowings) 321,150 466,758 507,534 624,522 1,076,099
Other Creditors 12,328 9,684 5,383 24,177 72,124
Deposit from Members - - 9,807 28,819 39,107
Accounts Payable 1,898 2,447 2,297 6,587 26,429
Total Current Liabilities 335,376 478,889 525,021 681,105 1,213,759
Fixed Liabilities:
Creditors (borrowings) 
Others
- 6,202
581
9,556
1,024
20,529
2,446
32,754
1,069
Total Fixed Liabilities - 6,783 10,580 22,975 33,823
Other Liabilities:
Deferred Credit - - _ _ 1 37
Others - - - - 3,659
Total Other Liabilities _ _ _ _ 1,796
Coops' Equity:
Share Capital 43,915 73,479 84,735 122,061 189,084
Statutory Reserves 159,655 200,394 197,521 224,312 262,757
Other Reserves 7,720 14,323 23,201 37,053 78,846
Annual. Net Profits 14,142 24,231 20,354* 44,371* 40,866*
(Losses) - - (63)* (574)* (14,469)*
Total Coops' Equity 225,433 312,427 .333,748 427,224 557,004
Total Liabilities and Equity 560,809 790,099 069,348 1,131,304 1,008,462
* Discrepancies: See page .90 and Table 4.8.
Source: Derived from Thailand. Department of Cooperative Auditing 1975, Part 1, p.15.
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they were only 535.9 million Baht in 1970 as compared with 1,060.8 and 
1,664.3 million Baht in 1973 and 1974 respectively. This was a substantial 
increase in real terms, since the general level of prices rose by less than 
20 percent over the five years. Up to 1973, most of the current assets 
were in the form of debtors. The share of inventories and accounts 
receivable rose slightly in 1974. The debtors include loan debtors, trade 
debtors and other debtors respectively, but loan debtors are by far the most 
important, accounting for an average of 86 percent of current assets between 
1970 and 1973. In the following year their share declined to 73 percent.
It will be seen that most of the societies' assets was made up of 
loans to members. But it is not clear whether these loans were all really 
recoverable; interest on them was being repaid but repayments of 
principal were much overdue. A more prudent accountancy practice would 
seem to have been to establish a contingency reserve (i.e., to deal with 
uncertain events) to partly write down these loan assets. At least the 
accounts should show the difference between short-term loans which are due 
within the year and longer term loans.
As regards the fixed assets which consist mainly of land, buildings 
and appliances, it is noticeable that the total value of fixed assets 
increased in 1973 and 1974. This was due mainly to the establishment of 
office buildings. The reason for this is an objective of the government 
to encourage the societies to have their own buildings. No item for 
depreciation of fixed assets appears in the accounts. It is possible that 
this has already been deducted, but depreciation should be listed separately.
It should be observed that the balance sheet does not classify the 
amount of cash of the societies into cash on hand and in current account. 
However, it is considered improper to have a big amount of cash on hand,
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for there is a possibility that someone may misappropriate it without 
the knowledge of the members. The societies should deposit money in the 
bank as soon as possible.
According to the by-laws the only investment permitted to the 
societies has been in the form of depositing their funds in the 
Government Saving Banks or any other manner permitted by the Registrar.
This matter has been very much criticized. It is argued that the 
societies should have permission to invest their funds in other businesses 
that yield more profit to the societies than deposit in the banks.
4.3 Financial Ratio Analysis
An analysis of financial statements provides an important basis 
for valuing securities and appraising managerial performance. If these 
are fully and adequately presented, the relationship between one item or 
group of items in the balance sheet and another item or groups of items 
can be established. For example, commercial management may be judged by 
estimating the financial ratios and comparing such ratios with standard 
ratios.
4.3.1 Profitability Ratios
One basic measure of the success of a cooperative is its net profit 
picture. It is true that profit making is not the principal objective of 
cooperatives, but service to members. Nevertheless, if it is to survive 
over the years, the society must at least break even over the longer term, 
and must yield surpluses on operations if it is to expand by ploughing 
back undistributed profits.
Relative to this, two ratios have been computed from Table 4.2, 
net profit as a percent of total assets and net profit as a percent of
cooperative equity (net worth). The results are as follows:
TABLE 4.2
NET PROFIT AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL ASSETS AND NET
PROFIT AS A PERCENT OF COOPERATIVE EQUITY 
1970-1974
(NET WORTH)
Year Net Profit/Total Assets Net Profit/Net Worth
1970 2.5 6.3
1971 3.0 7.8
1972 3.3 8.5
1973 3.9 10.4
1974 2.3 7.3
Based on the results in Table 4.2, profit margins as a percent of 
total assets are less than satisfactory. One measure of this is the 
fact that the rates from operations are considerably less than the going 
rate of interest for commercial banks (reported by the Cooperation Resource 
Committee to be around 14 to 15 percent at the present time). Even when net 
profits are considered as a percent of net worth, (i.e., cooperative equity) 
the percent is not equal to the going rate of interest for agricultural 
loans up-country. This presents a problem for the cooperatives that need 
to borrow funds from sources other than the BAAC, and which wish to attract 
deposits from their members.
4.3.2 Net Worth Ratios
So far we have indicated that the financial condition of the 
societies have been considered as unsatisfactory. Besides, it can be seen 
from Table 4.3 that the net worth ratio, which measures shareholders' funds 
as a proportion of the total assets of the societies has been deteriorating
over time.
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TABLE 4.3
TOTAL VALUE OF NET WORTH, ASSETS AND THE
NET WORTH RATIO OF SOCIETIES 
1970-1974
Year Total Value 
of Net Worth 
(Million Baht)
Total Value 
of Assets 
(Million Baht)
Net Worth Ratio
1970 225.4 560.8 2.5 : 1
1971 312.4 798.1 2.6 : 1
1972 333.7 869.3 2.6 : 1
1973 427.2 1,131.3 2.6 : 1
1974 557.1 1,808.5 3.2 : 1
Table 4.3 shows that the net worth ratio in 1970 was only 2.5 : 1.
This means that shareholders' funds contributed only one part of the value
of assets of 2.5 parts or roughly 40 percent. In other words, about 60
percent of the assets were derived from borrowed funds. This is an
important and significant ratio when a cooperative wishes to borrow funds 
against its assets. That is, the ratio of net worth to total assets should 
be much higher than 40 percent if a cooperative is to use its assets to 
secure funds from commercial sources and probably roughly this level when 
borrowing from government. Generally, it is recognized that if the net 
worth ratio is 2 : 1 the financial condition of a business enterprise is 
sound (Narkswasdi 1967,p.28). However, when the business is being expanded 
the net worth ratio may be temporarily higher than 2 : 1 because more 
borrowed funds will be used to secure additional assets in order to increase
the productivity of the business themselves.
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From 1971 to 1973 the net worth ratio was maintained at 2.6 : 1.
It is difficult to judge from the balance sheets presented whether such 
comparatively good ratios were realistic. The societies' accountants may 
well have wished to maintain the proportion of owned assets to outside 
borrowings at roughly the previous level in order to qualify better as 
borrowers of public funds. At the same time, as we have argued above, 
it was not clear whether loans to members were all really recoverable.
TP those loan assets had to be written down, the net worth, which is a 
residual, would also have to be written down. In this case, the net worth 
ratio would not appear so favourable. That is cooperative equity would 
have had to be correspondingly written down, and would have formed a 
smaller proportion of total assets.
In 1974, when the societies expanded their business, especially 
in selling crops, they financed this largely from borrowed funds, so that, 
according to their accounts, their net worth ratio deteriorated to 3.2 : 1, 
i.e., dependence on outside funds rose to 69 percent.
4.3.3 Current Ratios
The comparison of current liabilities and current assets, known as 
the current or liquid ratio, can also reflect the financial situation of the 
societies. In other words, the ability of the societies to repay the 
amount due to their short-term creditors is determined by the value of 
their current assets. In principle, should the value of such assets be 
more than that of the current liabilities, the societies will be able to 
repay their short-term debts as soon as they are demanded (the obligations 
are usually falling due in one year). Normally, the current liabilities 
consists of bank overdraft, trade accounts payable, accrued creditors 
payable and so on. On the other hand, the current assets consist of
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cash in hand and at the bank, inventories, debtors, accounts receivable and 
so on.
It is evident that no provision for tax need be made in liabilities, 
as cooperative societies are exempt from income taxes except for business 
taxes from milling rice. This last item is a very small amount because 
few cooperatives undertake rice milling. It probably has, therefore, been 
included in the item of other liabilities in the balance sheet.
TABLE 4.4
TOTAL VALUE OF CURRENT ASSETS, CURRENT 
LIABILITIES AND THE CURRENT RATIOS 
1970-1974
Year Total Value of 
Current Assets
(Million Baht)
Total Value of 
Current 
Liabilities 
(Million Baht)
Current Ratio
1970 536.0 335.4 1.6 : 1
1971 759.0 478.9 1.6 : 1
1972 819.5 525.0 1.6 : 1
1973 1,060.8 681.1 1.6 : 1
1974 1,664.3 1,213.8 1.6 : 1
The comparison of the value of current assets and current liabilities 
of the societies can be seen in Table 4.4. According to these records, the 
current assets of the societies have always been greater than the current 
liabilities which is in theory very satisfactory. However, in practice, 
there are some notable exceptions. For example, loan debtors are classified
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under current assets, and constituted 86 percent of total current assets 
during 1970 - 1973 (See Table 4.1). In reality, attention should be 
drawn to the fact that some loans are doubtful debts or are not recoverable, 
some other payments are much overdue. These latter consist of part of 
trade debtors (for goods sold on credit) and accounts receivable. It 
could, therefore, be difficult to appraise the societies' ability to meet 
their current obligations.
4.4 Income and Expenditures
In the past, the main business of cooperatives was lending or 
credit. Other immediate activities such as purchasing of farm supplies 
(fertilizers, insecticides and pesticides) goods for selling to members, 
and marketing of members' produce, were a very small portion. Yet, at 
present, after the further development of cooperatives into a multi-purpose 
type, (according to the new Act of 1968) the business activities of the 
cooperatives have expanded rapidly. Most of the agricultural cooperatives 
have been diversifying their own enterprises.
4.4.1 Income
Table 4.5 gives the income statement for the agricultural cooperatives, 
as published in "Agricultural Cooperative Financial Report 1975" by the DCA 
(in Thai) for 1970-74 (Thailand. Department of Cooperative Auditing 1975).
As shown in the Table, almost the whole of the 1970 income was derived from 
interest on loans. This share decreased to 20 percent in 1974. In that 
year, marketing of members' produce accounted for nearly 51 percent of total 
income and the selling of goods to members for 28 percent.
The same Table reveals' that income of the cooperatives increased 
rapidly from 37.8 million Baht in 1970 to 107.9 million Baht in 1971 and 
600.5 million Baht (roughly $US30m.) in 1974.
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TABLE 4.5
INCOME STATEMENT OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES
(in thousand Baht)
Particulars 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Income Interest on Loans 36,654 73,777 88,497 109,095 117,884
Goods Sales - 32,444 24,775 170,403 166,200
Crops Sales - - - - 300,519
Services - 29 - 695 6,927
Total Income 36,654 106,250 113,272 280,193 591,530
Costs Interest Expenses 
Bad Debts
Cost of Goods Sales 
Cost of Crops Sales 
Cost of Services
18,107
21
38,374
1,582
28,002
77
47,630
1,847
22,508
58,677
1,694
150,280
720
66,539
4,375
154,532
276,715
5,641
Total Costs 18,128 68,035 71,985 211,371 507,802
Gross Profit (Losses) 18,526 38,215 41,287 68,822 84,341 (614)*
Deduct Operating Expenses
Administrative Expenses 5,502 15,597 15,277 28,227 39,919
Selling Expenses - - - - 25,074
Service Expenses - - - - 349
Total Expenses 5,502 15,597 15,277 28,227 65,342
Operating Profit (Loss) 13,024 22,618 26,010 40,595 33,906 
(15,521)*
Add Other Income 1,120 1,608 2,161 3,669 8,938
Annual Net Profit*(loss) 14,144 24,226 28,354*
(183)*
44,371* 
(107)*
40,866* 
(13,544)*
Not Profit as % of Total Expenditures 59.9 29.0 32.3 18.5 4.8
* Discrepancies, see text page 90 and Table 4.8.
Source: Thailand. Department of Cooperative Auditing 1975, Part 1, p.7.
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[In this calculation, "the other income" (members' fees, interest from 
banks, dividends from investment etc.) from the bottom of the Table has 
been included in total income.] This expansion is because the cooperatives 
were offering other activities such as purchasing and marketing. As a 
result, income from other business increased and in the meantime members 
received more and better services from the cooperatives. When income 
increased, it was of course for the cooperatives to expand and develop 
activities for the future.
4.4.2 Costs
The chief costs up to 1972 consisted of interest payments to the 
BAAC or other banks, largely on loan money for relending to members. It 
will be seen that the provision for bad debts is only a maximum of two 
percent of total expenditure over the five years. In view of the poor 
repayment record of members, this appears to be very low. The cost of 
goods sales has been getting more important since 1973 and also the cost 
of crops sales in 1974. They together constituted about 71 and 85 percent 
of total costs in those years. This is explained by agricultural 
cooperative involvement in marketing.
In this section of the income statement, no item appears for 
inventories (stocks). The need for stock statements now that the co­
operatives are handling goods will be discussed in Chapter VI.
4.4.3 Gross Profit
The gross profits (i.e., excluding operating expenses) in Table 4.6 
are computed from the information in Table 4.5. From Table 4.6 it can be 
calculated that gross profits on the sale of goods other than crops ranged 
from nearly 8 percent to 16 percent. There is little information on what 
goods are sold, but they are mainly dry goods (blankets, soaps, rice etc.) 
or non-perishable farm inputs (fertilizers, seeds, small tools, etc.).
The figure for crop sales are available for only one year; they show a 
gross profit margin, excluding operating expenses, of 8.6 percent.
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TABLE 4.6
GROSS MARGIN ON SALES OF GOODS AND CROPS
(in thousand Baht)
Particulars Year Income Expenditures Gross Margin
Goods 1971 32,444 28,002 4,442
1972 24,775 22,508 2,267
1973 170,403 150,280 20,115
1974 166,200 154,532 11,668
Crops 1974 300,519 276,715 23,804
4.4.4 Operating Expenses
By operating expenses is meant the cost of running the business, 
including selling expenses for multi-purpose cooperatives. These have, 
as is to be expected, declined proportionately with the growth of turnover. 
They were 23 percent of total expenses in 1970 and dropped to 11 percent 
in 1974. There are no data on the share of total expenses which are fixed 
and variable costs.
It is not clear from Table 4.5 where depreciation is included. 
Usually depreciation, which represents the allowance made for the decline 
in the useful economic value of an asset due to use and obsolescence, is 
included either against manufacturing costs (if fixed assets such as a 
rice mill, storage etc. are being depreciated) or against operating 
expenses where office equipment or other things concerned with distributing 
products is being dealt with.
Operating expenses should, however, also be taken into account. 
There is no means of knowing what share of these should be allocated to
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the credit business of the societies, and what to sales of goods or produce. 
If, for example, the operating expenses are shared out between the various 
sections in the same proportion that these sections form of total income, 
then they would wipe out the gross margin on goods sales in each year 
except 1973. For 1974 crop sales, a porportionate share of operating 
expenses added to costs would result in a loss of some 9 million Baht 
(See Table 4.7).
TABLE 4.7
COMPARISONS OF GROSS PROFITS OF GOODS AND CROP SALES 
AND CALCULATED OPERATING EXPENSES
(in thousand Baht)
Total Income Total Op- Value of % of Income Calculated Gross Net
(1)
erating
Expenses
(2)
Goods
Sales
(3)
from (3) 
(4)
Share of 
Operating 
Expenses 
(5)
Margin on 
Sales
(6)
(6) - (5) 
(7)
Goods
1971 106,250 15,597 32,444 30.5 4,757 4,442 315
1972 113,272 15,277 24,775 21.9 3,346 2,267 - 1,079
1973 280,193 28,227 170,403 60.8 17,162 20,115 + 2,953
1974 591,530 65,342 166,200 28.1 18,361 11,668 - 6,693
Crops
1974 591,530 65,342 300,519 50.8 33,194 23,804 - 9,390
The same sort of calculation can be made for loan operations: i. e. ,
income (interest received) from loans is put on one side of the balance and
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interest expenses and a proportionate share of operating expenses deducted 
from it. This exercise can not be exact, as it is not known how operating 
expenses should be split up between the different sections of the business. 
But it is clear that the bulk of net profits according to the accounts are 
derived from the loan business throughout the five years 1970 to 1974.
This is unfortunate, since it has been argued above that cooperative 
credit operations are not in a healthy state, owing to default on the 
capital account in repayments of principal.
4.4.5 Net Profit
The income statements presented in Table 4.5, especially in 1974, 
are set out by the DCA report in a confusing way. The Department of 
Cooperative Auditing wished to explain that most of the societies were 
profitable, and so shows their profit separately. Thus in 1974, 482 out 
of 544 societies had surpluses of approximately 40.9 million Baht. The 
remaining 58 societies, or 6.6 percent of the total number, had deficits 
of approximately 13.5 million Baht. Those societies in deficit were 
newly established, and it was hoped that some improvement would be made 
in the following years. The aggregate position was not shown clearly in 
the income statement.
The writer has, therefore, derived Table 4.8 (from Table 4.5) for 
easier understanding. The net profit of 40,866,000 Baht shown is not 
the net profit for all societies taken as a whole, because we should have 
to take discrepancies into consideration, which are noted in parentheses 
in the original data. Operating profit for 1974 shows a discrepancy of
15.520.000 Baht, made up of an understatement of aggregate costs of
614.000 and an overrecording of aggregate operating profit of 14,907,000
Baht. One should, however, set off against this, an addition of 1,978,000
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which is an unexplained reduction of the sum of operating profit and other 
income. Net discrepancies for 1974 are thus - 13,542,000 Baht (- 14,907,000 
- 614,000 + 1,978,000). The adjusted net profit for 1974 (40,866,000 less 
13,542,000) is 27,324,000 Baht, i.c., 4.0 percent over total expenditures. 
There are similar discrepancies in previous years, but these are quite small.
TABLE 4.8
ADJUSTED INCOME STATEMENT OF AGRICULTURAL 
COOPERATIVES, 1974
(in thousand Baht)
Statement Corrected 
Sub Total
Discrepancy Adjusted
Total Income 591,530 591,530
Total Costs 507,802 507,802
Gross Profit 84,341 83,727 614 83,728
Operating Expenses 65,342 65,342
33,906 18,999 - 14,907 18,386
Other Income 8,938 8,938
Net Profit 40,866 42,844 + 1,978 27,324
Net Adjustments - 13,542 - 13,542
Adjusted Net Profit 27,324
Calculable net profit as % of expenditures = 4.8%
Discrepancies in original/ see text.
Deductions are the losses of the group of unprofitable societies.
Source: Derived from Table 4.5.
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It is obvious that adjusted net profits of the societies in the 
earlier years as shown in Table 4.5 are extraordinarily high, at least in 
theory. According to the auditors' statement, income in 1970 amounted to 
a total of 37.8 million Baht (including "other income") and expenditures
hi
(total cost + operating expenses) to 23.6 million Baht (See Table 4.5).
This would show a net profit of roughly 60 percent over total expenditures. 
Taking the same simple sums for the following years, net profits as a 
percentage of total expenditures were 29, 32 and 10.5 percent respectively. 
In 1974, net profit as recorded fell drastically, to less than 5 percent.
Apart from the discrepancies discussed, the net profits here did 
not present the true picture, for two reasons. Firstly, because provision 
for doubtful or bad debts under costs in the income statement should have 
been higher if the cooperative societies had not been too optimistic about 
getting the principal on their loans repaid. Secondly, because the total 
assets (See Table 4.1) seem to have been used unproductively in earlier 
years. When income is related to total assets, it will be seen that in 
1970, it was found that it was less than 7 percent. In 1971 and 1972 it 
rose to about 13 percent. In 1973 and 1974, however, it rose to 25 and 
33 percent respectively. The low ratio of earnings to assets in 1970-72 
seems to be explained by various factors, such as government by laws 
constraining investment and lack of managerial experience or depressed 
business conditions.
The foregoing chapter has dealt with aggregate data for the whole 
cooperative movement. The next chapter will deal with the activities 
of three primary societies, in order to give as much detail as is 
available of a cooperative in action.
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CHAPTER V
THE SAMPLE COOPERATIVES : A GENERAL SURVEY
5.1 A General Description
Three of the primary agricultural cooperatives which operate 
at grass-roots level were chosen for an intensive study. These are:
(a) Soong-Nern Agricultural Cooperative Ltd 
at Nakornrajasima Province in the 
Northeastern region;
(b) San-Pa-Tong Agricultural Cooperative 
Ltd at Chiengmai Province in the 
Northern region; and
(c) Ban Lard Agricultural Cooperative Ltd 
at Petchaburi Province in the Southern 
region.
Of these (a) and (b) were judged by a government committee set up to 
encourage the cooperative movement to be the best all round cooperatives 
in Thailand in 1974 and 1975 respectively (Machima 1976b and 1977) while
(c) was also judged a successful and good example (Machima) 1975.
In the sections that follow a general description of each of 
the cooperatives will be given. These will deal with their 
historical background, availability of working capital; loans to 
members; repayment records of the members; business of purchasing; 
business of marketing; incomo, expenditure and non-operating profit; 
and comparisons of the three cooperatives. Finally, an attempt will 
be made to judge to what extent they were successful in reality and
to explain such qualified success as they had.
5.2 Historical Background
5.2.1 Soong-Nern Agricultural Cooperative Ltd
Soong-Nern Agricultural Cooperative was launched by the 
amalgamation of 43 village credit cooperatives in December 1969.
At first the society was organized to be a finance association 
with its 699 members and had only one business, i.e., the lending 
business. The society was converted into a multi-purpose 
cooperative in June 1971 and finally transformed into an 
agricultural cooperative in October 1973, combining several 
activities, i.e., credit, processing, purchasing and marketing.
Its membership increased from 668 in 1971 to 958 in 1975. The 
members represented 10.5 percent of the farmers in the district 
in 1975.
The Soong-Nern District is one of the 22 districts in 
Nakornrajasima Province which is located in the Northeastern 
region of Thailand, 250 kilometres from Bangkok. Its population 
in 1971 was about 45,732 or 8,094 households. About 70 percent of 
the population are engaged in farming, and cultivated an area of 
59,083 rai (9,453 hectares).^ The main crop is rice which is the 
major source of farmers' income in this area. Other crops are maize, 
potatoes, kenaf, cotton etc. In 1977, the total land holdings of 
members was 34,454 rai (5,513 hectares), i.e., nearly 60 percent of 
the district's land. Of this amount about 92 percent belongs to 
members. About 75 percent of the land of members is located in an 
irrigated area (CPD 1977,p.13).
1 1 rai = 0.16 hectares
5.2.2 San-Pa-Tong Agricultural Cooperative Ltd
Before becoming San-Pa-Tong Agricultural Cooperative, latest 
registration 1975, the society was amalgamated several times.
Looking back to 1935 when cooperatives were introduced in San-Pa-Tong 
District, there were 6 village credit cooperatives. The number of 
societies had increased to 38 by 1953. Yet, before that time the 
San-Pa-Tong Soya Bean Cooperative was organized in 1947 with its 
objective to serve members in selling soya beans. This society 
proved quite good and owned 7 rai of land for building its office and 
2 storages with the capacity of 1,000 metric tons. At present this 
land is the location of the newly created San-Pa-Tong Agricultural 
Cooperative.
According to the Act of 1968, 21 village credit cooperatives 
were amalgamated into a society called San-Pa-Tong Agricultural 
Cooperative 1 with total membership of 453 in October 1970. The 
remaining 17 village credit cooperatives were also amalgamated into 
another society called San-Pa-Tong Agricultural Cooperative 2 with 
a total membership of 373 in April 1971. Finally, in order to be 
a multi-purpose society, these two societies and the San-Pa-Tong Soya 
Bean Cooperative were amalgamated into one society called San-Pa-Tong 
Agricultural Cooperative Ltd with a total membership of 1,010 in 
June 1971. The newest change in April 1975 was to amalgamate with 
"Fai Poung Sanuk Land Improvement Cooperative" with its membership 
of 345. Therefore the total membership increased from 862 in 1971 
to 1,802 at the end of 1975. The members represented 10.2 
percent of the farmers in the district in 1975.
San-Pa-Tong District is one of the 18 districts in Chiengmai
Province which is located in the upper part of Northern Thailand, 
about 750 kilometres from Bangkok. The district is about 23 
kilometres down to the south of the province. Its transportation 
is very convenient. The district is comprised o£ 12 sub-districts 
and 121 villages. Its population was about 98,000 or 18,200 
households in 1971. About 90 percent of population are farmers in 
a cultivated area of 65,000 rai (10,400 hectares). Farmers can 
double crop because of the availability of irrigation. The main 
crop is rice and glutinous rice which is the most famous of the 
country. Other crops are soya bean, garlic and others.
In 1977, farmers in the agricultural cooperative held 25,559 
rai (4,089 hectares), i.e., 39 percent of the district's cultivated 
area. They owned about 93 percent of their land. The whole of the 
cultivated area of members is located in the irrigated area (CPD 1977,
p.26) .
5.2.3 Ban Lard Agricultural Cooperative Ltd
The society was first organized in Ban Lard district of 
Petchaburi Province as a village credit cooperative in 1940. Up to 
1952, there were 32 village credit cooperatives in 12 villages with 
a total membership of 495, an average of 15.5 members per society 
(Machima 1976a,p.62). These societies proved fairly useful to 
members in credit activity from the beginning but carried out no 
other activities. Late in 1969 these village credit cooperatives 
were amalgamated into a large unit called "Ban Lard Agricultural 
Cooperative". Its main objectives were to provide necessary services 
such as credit, marketing, farm supplies and farm extension to 
farmers which proved to have served a useful purpose. Finally, the
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society was transformed into a multi-purpose cooperative in October 
1972 with two more activities, i.e., rice milling and funeral 
services. At present the society has its own office built on its 
land. Total membership increased from 689 in 1971 to 1,540 members 
in 1975. The members represented 21.7 percent of the farmers in the 
district in 1975.
Ban Lard District is one of the 6 districts in Petchaburi 
Province which is located in the upper part of Southern Thailand, 
about 170 kilometres from Bangkok. The district is comprised of 16 
sub-districts and 103 villages, a total area of 305 square kilometres.
In 1971, its population was 40,910 or 6,294 households. The majority 
of the people, about 95 percent, are farmers living on their farms 
in its cultivated area of 77,744 rai (12,439 hectares). Rice is the 
main product in this area. Other products are non-rice crops, fruits 
and vegetables. In 1977, the total land holdings of members was 40,967 
rai (6,555 hectares) (i.e. 53 per cent of the district's cultivated land) 
of which 84 per cent belonged to farmers. About 44 percent of the cultivated 
area of members was located within an irrigated area (CPD 1977, p.40).
TABLE 5.1
MEMBERSHIP OF THE THREE SOCIETIES, 1971-1975
Name of Society 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Soong-Nern Agricultural Coop^ 668 662 838 872 958
2 -San-Pa-Tong Agricultural Coop 862 894 952 1,098 1,882
3Ban Lard Agricultural Coop 689 707 846 1,012 1,540
Sources: 1 and 3 from Doungsawasdi 1976,pp.18;32.
2 from Machima 1977,p.33.
5.3 Size of Land Holdings
It is clear from the figures available that those farmers 
who were members of the three cooperative societies had much larger 
land holdings than non-members in their districts. Figures cannot 
be calculated exactly, since population figures are available only 
for 1971, and land holdings are for 1977. Nevertheless, a rough 
idea can be given, as in Table 5.2.
Total farm household figures in Table 5.2 are based on the 
following assumptions: that the number of households in each district 
grew at a rate of 3.0 percent a year between 1971 and 1975; and that 
the population of total households who were farmers remained constant 
i.e., about 70 percent in Soong-Nern, 90 percent in San-Pa-Tong and 
95 percent in Ban Lard. It should be pointed out that if either of 
these assumptions is wrong, the number of non-cooperative farmers 
in each district may have been overestimated and thus their average 
land holdings underestimated. But an adjustment for this would not 
change the overall picture.
According to the calculations in Table 5.2, the average land 
holdings of cooperatives' members ranged between nearly 14 rai to 
36 rai (2.2 ha to 5.8 ha). This was 3.7 to 8 times larger than the 
average for all non-cooperative farmers, which on the assumptions 
given, average only 0.43, 0.7 and 1.1 hectares in the three districts
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TABLE 5.2
AVERAGE FARM HOLDINGS IN THREE DISTRICTS 
(1977)
Soong-Nern District San-Pa-■Tong District Ban Lard District
Total Coop Otherd T^otal Coop Othera^ Total Coop Othera^
No. of Farm^ 
Households 9,100 958 8,142 18,400 1,882 16,518 7,082 1,540 5,542
c)Percent - 10.5 - - 10.2 - - 21.7 -
Total Land 
Holdings 
(rai)
59,083 34*454 24,629 65,000 25,559 39,441 77,744 40,967 36,777
c)Percent - 58.3 - - - 39.3 - 52.7 -
Average 
Land £)
Holdings 
(rai)
6.5 36.0 3.0 4.0 13.6 2.4 11.0 26.6 6.6
a) Residual.
b) On assumptions given in text.
c) Percentage of total in cooperative.
5.4 Working Capital or Funds of the Societies
As has been mentioned in Chapter III, a part of the societies' 
funds are obtained from government sources through government agencies. 
Cooperatives obtaining funds from government sources have privileged 
access to cheap credit and those which obtain the largest share from 
the lowest interest funds are particularly privileged. Interest rates 
are different for the various state sources and for various purposes.
If the loanable funds are made available directly by the government
for lending to members, this financial assistance will be free of 
interest. However, if the loanable funds are for investing in rice 
collection and rice storage or mill buildings, the societies will be 
charged a 2 percent interest rate. Rates from the Bank for 
Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) are 9 percent. 
Moreover, since 1975 commercial banks have lent to the cooperatives 
on the basis of tangible security with lower interest rates (7.5 - 
.15 percent:) according to the government requirement as mentioned in 
Chapter III. However, most of such commercial bank lending is made 
through the BAAC as the BAAC pays 8 percent to the commercial banks. 
Information on the proportion of borrowed funds of the three 
societies from different sources is shown below (Table 5.3).
TABLE 5.3
INTEREST RATE CHARGES TO COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES
(1975, percent)
Commercial Banks 7.5-15
Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives 9
Provincial Federation 9
Cooperative Promotion Fund 0-2
Government Farmers' Aid Fund 0-2
Government Farmers' Relief Fund 0-2
United States Operations Mission (USOM) 0-2
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V 1
5.4.1 Soong-Nern Agricultural Cooperative
Like other societies, the total funds of the society have 
increased substantially, as shown in the Table 5.4. As can be seen in
this Table, the funds of the society have been growing year after 
year. In 1971 the total funds of the society were only 4.6 million
Baht. They increased to 9.3 and 13.2 million Baht in 1974 and 1975
respectively. In other words, within 5 years of its operation the 
total funds expanded by about 187 percent. The cooperative is a 
society that has one of the largest amounts of working capital in 
the country, e.g. its total funds of 9.3 million Baht in 1974 was 
nearly triple the average working capital of overall agricultural 
cooperatives. The society has, therefore, expanded its activities 
rapidly and widely.
Most of its funds were derived from borrowed funds, which 
constituted 59 percent of the total in 1971 and increased to 66.3 
percent in 1975. This means that the society depends more on borrowed 
funds than its own funds. The borrowed funds (Table 5.5) were obtained mainly 
from the BAAC and the government controlled Cooperative Promotion 
Fund which charged 9 percent and free or 2 percent of interest rate 
respectively. Other borrowed funds were obtained from the United 
States Operations Mission (USOM) and from the Government Farmers' Aid 
Fund which started from 1973 and is also free of interest. As shown 
in Table 5.5 in 1975 there were no commercial borrowings. Of funds 
borrowed from state agencies, 50 percent came from the BAAC, 43.5 
percent from the Cooperative Promotion Fund, 3.6 percent from USOM 
and 2.9 percent from Government Farmers' Aid Funds. Since approx­
imately 50 percent of loanable funds was charged at 9 percent interest
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rate and the remainder at 0-2 percent, average interest rate must have 
been about 5 percent, compared to commercial bank rates of 7.5 to 15 
percent.
Table 5.4 shows that the total share capital has grown at a 
decreasing rate since 1972, i.e.,from 46.8 percent in 1972, the annual 
increase slowed down to 18.3, 19.4 and 35.0 percent in 1973, 1974 and 
1975 respectively. This is due mainly to the fact that the total 
numbers of members has increased very slowly. The reserve funds 
have also increased at a decreasing rate, i.e., from 25.9 percent in 
1972, they increased by 14.1, 16.0 and 22.3 percent in 1973, 1974 
and 1975 respectively. Other funds tended to decrease as well and 
dropped by 69.5 percent in 1974. Besides, the proportions of the 
share capital, reserves and other funds to the total funds decreased 
during 1973-75 as borrowings from state institutions rose.
The society has been earning relatively small net operating 
profits each year, especially in 1975, when net operating profits 
dropped by 35.0 percent. This resulted from the government policy 
on rice price support.
Another type of society funds was the deposit from its members 
which was small compared to other funds, although it increased year 
after year except in 1975. Yet, the proportion of deposits to 
total funds was only 2 percent in 1975 inspite of an interest rate 
given to members of 9 percent for 1 year time deposit which is 1 percent 
higher than the interest rate from the commercial banks. This may 
be because the wealthier farmers can lend more profitably to poor 
non-members. However, about 56.8 percent of the deposit is as
time deposit.
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5.4.2 San-Pa-Tong Agricultural Cooperative
By 1971 the society had a working capital of 6.2 million Baht. 
Over the next three years it became well-established, with working 
capital rising to nearly 17 million Baht in 1975. Capital in­
creased by 174 percent during 1971-75. In 1974, its funds were 
three-fold higher than the average overall working capital of the 
country (See Table 5.6).
Most of the funds for the society has come from outside the 
movement, i.e., borrowed funds. Almost all these come from state 
agencies, at relatively high average interest rates. The borrowed 
funds of 3.8 million Baht in 1971 rose to 5.3 million Baht in 
1974 and to over 11 million Baht in 1975. The proportion of the 
borrowed funds tended to increase, i.e., from 60.8 percent in 1971 
to 66.3 percent in 1975. The main source of the borrowed funds was 
the Provincial Federation (Chieng-Mai Province), an average of 74.3 
percent during 1971-75, with 9 percent interest rate. It is 
noticeable that even the amount of total borrowing from the Provincial 
Federation tended to increase gradually but its proportion to the 
total borrowings tended to decrease, i.e., borrowings increased from 
3.3 million Baht in 1972 to 7.8 million Baht in 1975 but its proportion 
decreased from 82.1 percent in 1972 to 69 percent in 1975 (See Table 
5.7) .
Another source of borrowing is the Cooperative Promotion Fund. 
Not only the amount but also the proportion of borrowing from this 
source tended to decrease. The amount of borrowing decreased from 
1.2 million Baht to 594.7 thousand Baht and its proportion decreased 
from 32.7 percent in 1971 to 5.3 percent in 1975. This is because 
the government withdrew some funds to help other societies.
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Other reasons for the reduction of borrowing from the two 
sources above are that the society had recently obtained borrowings 
from the Government Farmers' Aid Fund with no charge of interest 
since 1973, from the BAAC since 1974 and from the commercial banks 
in 1975. Briefly, about 86.2 percent of borrowed funds came from 
the sources that charged 9 percent interest rate in 1975, so that 
the average interest rate on all state loans was 7.9 percent in that 
year. The reserved fund of the society decreased its proportion of 
the total funds from 25.6 percent in 1971 to 19.2 and 12 percent in 
1974 and 1975 although it had increased by the amount of 1.6 million 
Baht in 1971 to 2 million Baht in 1975.
The share capital of the society increased tremendously from 
539.6 thousand Baht to 1.5 million Baht, i.e., a 178 percent increase 
in the five years to 1975. This increase resulted from the 
amalgamation which has already been described. However, the proportion 
of the share capital to the total fund did not change much, i.e., its 
proportion was 8.7 percent in 1971 and increased to 8.8 percent in 
1975.
Other sources of funds from within the movement include 
undistributed net operating profit and deposits. Undistributed net 
operating profits tripled from 202.3 thousand Baht in 1971 to 666.3 
thousand Baht in 1975. The proportion of the undistributed net 
operating profit was about 4 percent during 1971-75. For the deposits, 
there was a substantial increase from 54 thousand Baht in 1971 to 1.2 
million Baht in 1975 and its proportion to the total funds increased 
from 1.0 percent in 1970 to 7 percent in 1975. This means that its 
members are better off and more interested in depositing their money 
with the society, i.e., they trust their society more. About 65.5
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percent of deposits are as time deposits of at least a one year period.
5.4.3 Ban Lard Agricultural Cooperative
The total working capital of the society increased moderately 
during 1971 to 1975 from 4.8 million Baht to 8.3 million Baht, i.e., 
a 74 percent increase during the period (Table 5.8). The total 
working capital in 1974 was more than double the average working 
capital of agricultural cooperatives in the country. Much of the 
increase was contributed by deposits from its members.
The highest proportion of working capital was contributed by 
outside borrowed funds, i.e., the proportion of 49 percent during 1971- 
75. There were some big fluctuations in borrowings. The marked 
drops in the borrowings of the society in 1972 and 1973 made a sharp 
reduction in their proportion to the total working capital from 64.7 
percent in 1971 to 54.6 and 34.8 percent in 1972 and 1973 respectively. 
It increased to 38.0 and 52.1 percent in 1974 and 1975. The reason 
for the slow long term growth rate in borrowings could result from 
the substantial increase in deposits from members. The increase of 
the deposits had reached the highest level at 2.8 million Baht in 1974 
and had then fallen to 2.1 million Baht in the following year, 
notwithstanding, its proportion to the total working capital was still 
high, i.e., 25.5 percent in 1975.
A large part of borrowings of the society distributed in 
1971-75 was obtained from the BAAC, about 41 percent during the period. 
Others obtained from the Cooperative Promotion Fund at about 25.2 
percent and 23.6 percent from the Government Farmers' Aid Fund during 
the same period. In 1975, the society was able to borrow over 1.4
million Baht from the Government Farmers' Relief Fund, which represented
AG
RI
CU
LT
UR
AL
 C
OO
PE
RA
TI
VE
no
§
UO
t"'
Pm
O
co
w
MPSoCJ
w
Pi
<
u
o I— 1 CM rH uo Gl o
• i • i • i • 1 • 1 • 1 o
co Cd rH CM UO s— ' rH
1— 1 UO CM
in
p~
co P s
H X^ Cd *d' CM O co o o co UO Cd CD co
(d • • < • • • • • • • 1 •
CQ CM oo o o 01 CD CO ■Cj' 00 CD00 uo rH o CM U0 rH CM p" O
O O r- c-1 CM CO rH | '— CO
O V 's 1 's
p rH CM 00
00 co ■d* o CM co O
ol° • I • 1 • 1 • 1 • 1 • 1 O
Cd oo o 00 00 ■d< rH
co CO
p- P
Cd XI p" Cd CM CO Cd co i— 1 co rH CD CD CM
i— i (d • • • • • • • • • • • • •
PQ 00 co 00 o co CO Cd CO CO CO 00
CM co 00 1— 1 CM CD o 1— 1 CM rH co p~
O p' CD 00 00 co coo - «■ -
p CM CM p-
co CO 00 P- o o
o\° • 1 • 1 i 1 • 1 • 1 • 1 o
oo o o "d1 o d^1 rH
!— 1 co
00
p- -P
oo rC p~ P" CM 00 i— 1 p- p~ t— i •d< co Cd o
rH (Ci • • • • • • • • • • • • •
PQ uo r- OO p- U0 Cd CM o Cd CD *d<
CM CM o 1— 1 rH uo CO cd p" CM "d* CM
O UO CD Cd 1 CM CM CD
O «■ ■S •s
O rH CM U0
p~ 'd* CD o Cd o
o\° • 1 • 1 • 1 • 1 • i i l o
p" O o CM rH
rH uo CM
CM
r- -p
Cd X co CO Cd 1— 1 o uo o -sP Cd O CM i— 1
i— 1 (Ci • • • • • • • • • • • • •
PQ i— i O CO rH uo CM uo CD CD CO CM CO
i— I CM UO i— I CM CD i— t 1 P' P' U0 P" CM
O U0 1 Cd CM 1— 1 CO
O *. 's
O CM i— 1 uo
CM P" CO P' CM OO o
o\° • 1 • I • 1 • 1 • 1 • 1 o
P~ Cd rH 'd' U0 1—1 rH
CD rH
rH
p~ -PCO x:
i—I (0 oo P~ i—1 P' Cd CD
PQ • 1 • I • 1 • 1 • 1 • 1 ••—1 UO O CD i—1 00
O co (O CD CM 00 CDo co 'd’ O P' p~o •s
CO vr
p(D
1—1 o 0) d) 0) (1) pH d)(0 p p -P P P ml P-p (d (d (fl (d (d (d p  <d (d
-H P P nd P w P P 0 P P 1—1Ol g Cd a p (d(d x w x 3 x a x x x x PU -p di p lH -p ■H -p P -p (fl -H p 0£ > £ £ £ £ •H £ P P Eh(U 0 p 0 p 0 O 0 (fl 0 i—1 P 0
p p (D p (U p P p 0 p Ph (fl p
(d Cd (fl Cd x Cd P Cd o, Cd p  -H Cdx: (D -p 0 CD P Qco pp; o PQ Q UO So
ur
ce
: 
De
ri
ve
d 
fr
om
 D
ou
ng
sa
wa
sd
i 
19
76
,p
.3
3.
Ill
34.3 percent of the total borrowing in that year. Of the three 
societies, Ban Lard borrowed the smallest share of funds from 
relatively high interest rate government sources. In 1975, only 
33 percent of borrowed funds were obtained from the sources that 
charged a 9 percent interest rate, so that the overall average rate 
was just over 3 percent (Table 5.9).
The total share capital of the society rose from 341.9 
thousand Baht to over 1 million Baht in 1975, partly through the 
increase of new membership and partly through shares bought by its 
members. The progress of share capital was both in its growth rate 
and proportion to the total working capital.
The surplus not yet distributed constituted only a very small 
proportion of the total working capital. Table 5.8 shows that the 
amount of surplus varied markedly from year to year and that there 
was even a loss in 1975. This was because of a fire in the society's 
mill.
Another source of working capital from within the movement are 
reserves. The increase of the reserves fluctuated from year to year 
and also the proportions of the reserves to the total working capital. 
However, it increased at an average of 11.8 percent during 1971-75 and 
its proportion was about 9.8 percent during the same period.
5.5 Loans to Members
5.5.1 Soong-Nern Agricultural Cooperative
In the five-year period from 1971-75 the society advanced 
short and intermediate-term loans amounting to an average of nearly 
3 million Baht (as shown in Table 5.10), i.e., they had increased 
4.4 times by 1975. Of this amount, 16.7 percent were short-term loans
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and 83.3 percent were intermediate ones. The proportion of the 
short-term loans to total loans outstanding increased from 17.0 
percent in 1971 to 31.2 percent in 1975, but there was no report as 
to why the short term outstanding loans were extraordinarily high 
in 1975.
The survey by Machima (1976b,p.19) reveals that during 1969- 
73 about 49.2 percent of the total short-term loans made were for 
wage payments, 23.7 percent for contract ploughing, 14.6 percent for 
seed purchase, 6.8 percent for meeting payments on partially paid 
cooperative shares and 5.7 percent for machinery maintenance. As 
major parts of intermediate loans, about 38.4 percent was for 
purchasing cattle, 17.7 percent for purchasing land, 15.6 percent for 
clearing the land and almost all the remainder of the loans, about 
24.5 percent, was tied specifically to farming. Only a very small 
share of the loans, about 3.8 percent, was for repairing houses.
TABLE 5.10
SHORT-TERM AND INTERMEDIATE TERM LOANS 
DISBURSED TO MEMBERS, 1971-1975 : SOONG-NERN 
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE
Year
Short-•term Intermediate-term Total
'000 Baht % '000 Baht % ’000 Baht %
1971 262.2 17.0 1,280.4 83.0 1,542.6 100
1972 178.6 15.3 987.1 84.7 1,165.7 100
1973 199.9 9.6 1,884.5 90.4 2,084.3 100
1974 351.4 10.6 2,963.8 89.4 3,315.2 100
1975 2,067.4 31.2 4,578.1 68.8 6,645.5 100
Source: Derived from Doungsawasdi 1976,p.21.
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5.5.2 San-Pa-Tong Agricultural Cooperative
Information on the total value of loans outstanding by the 
society is shown in Table 5.11. Lending activities of the society 
expanded at a rapid rate. The amount of loans increased more than 
six-fold from 1971 to 1975. The proportion of short-term loans to 
total outstanding was about 10 percent while 90 percent was for 
intermediate loans over the same period.
About 81 percent of the short-term loans were spent on farming 
and 19 percent for other purposes during 1974-75 (Machima 1977).
Of intermediate loans, about 28.7 percent were granted for purchasing 
land, 23.8 percent for purchasing cattle, 27.5 percent for mending 
houses and the remainder about 20 percent for unspecified purposes. 
Thus, a higher proportion of loans was spent on non-agricultural 
purposes than in the Soong-Nern Society.
TABLE 5.11
SHORT-TERM AND INTERMEDIATE-TERM LOANS 
DISBURSED TO MEMBERS, 1971-1975 : SAN-PA-TONG 
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE
Short-term Intermediate -term Total
'000 Baht % '000 Baht % '000 Baht %
1971 215.3 16.2 1,113.7 83.8 1,329.0 100
1972 183.7 10.9 1,505.1 89.1 1,688.8 100
1973 314.8 13.9 1,954.3 86.1 2,269.1 100
1974 433.6 10.8 3,579.7 89.2 4,013.3 100
1975 680.5 7.8 8,028.3 92.2 8,708.7 100
Source: Derived from Machima 1977,p.36.
5.5.3 Ban Lard Agricultural Cooperative
The loans granted by the society more than doubled from 
1971 to 1974. They declined from 3.8 million Baht in 1974 to 
3.3 million Baht in 1975 or about 13 percent. The proportion of 
short-term loans to total loan outstanding was about 14.3 during 
1971-75. The great majority of lending was in the form of 
intermediate loans, which were 85.7 percent of the total over the 
same period (See Table 5.12).
TABLE 5.12
SHORT-TERM AND INTERMEDIATE-TERM LOANS 
DISBURSED TO MEMBERS, 1971-1975 : BAN LARD 
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE
Year
Short-term Intermediate-term Total
'000 Baht % '000 Baht % '000 Baht %
1971 263.0 16.1 1,469.0 83.9 1,632.0 100
1972 143.8 10.2 2,273.1 89.8 2,416.9 100
1973 217.2 9.6 2,689.7 90.4 2,909.0 100
1974 513.0 13.8 3,266.5 86.2 3,779.5 100
1975 875.2 26.6 2,413.7 73.4 3,288.8 100
Source: Derived from Doungsawasdi 1976,p.35.
5.6 Repayment Record of Members
5.6.1 Soong-Nern Agricultural Cooperative 
As shown in the Table 5.13, the repayment records of the 
society's members demonstrate an interesting record. The 5 year 
average percentage of actual repayment was about 77.5 percent during 
1971-75. Of this amount of repayment, the actual repayment of
116
short-term loans was relatively higher compared to the intermediate 
ones. That is/the actual repayment rates of short-term loans averaged
82.2 percent and 75.6 percent for intermediate loans during the same 
period.
It is evident from the 3 year average during 1971-73, that the 
total actual repayment of the members was 87.3 percent. This was 
considerably better than the overall country average, which was only 
45 percent.
TABLE 5.13
REPAYMENT RECORD OF MEMBERS, 1971-1975 : SOONG-NERN 
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE 
(in thousand Baht)
Year
Due Repayment Actual Repayment
Short­
term
Inter­
mediate-
term
Total Short­
term
% Inter­
mediate-
term
% Total %
1971 235.0 1,258.8 1,493.8 249.6 106.2 834.0 66.3 1,083.6 72.5
1972 123.4 1,412.3 1,535.7 145.5 117.9 1,139.2 80.7 1,284.7 81.1
1973 153.6 1,421.8 1,575.4 137.7 89.7 1,512.9 106.4 1,650.6 104.8
1974 1,138.2 2,129.8 3,268.0 1,012.3 88.9 1,344.0 63.1 2,356.3 72.1
1975 1,823.9 2,713.9 4,537.8 1,310.0 71.8 1,928.9 71.0 3,238.8 71.3
Source: Doungsawasdi 1976,p.26.
5.6.2 San-Pa-Tong Agricultural Cooperative
Table 5.14 shows the repayment record of members of the San- 
Pa-Tong Agricultural Cooperative. The total actual repayment record 
was 70.8 percent during 1971-75, i.e., the actual repayment record 
for short-term loan was 80.2 percent and the actual repayment record
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of intermediate-term was 68.9 percent. For the first three years 
during 1971-73 the average actual repayment was about 60 percent, 
i.e., 1.3 times higher than the overall country average during the 
same period. Moreover, it is obvious that the total actual repayment 
has been remarkably improved.
TABLE 5.14
REPAYMENT RECORD OF MEMBERS, 1971-1975 : SAN-PA-TONG 
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE 
(in thousand Baht)
Due Repayment Actual Repayment
Short­
term
Inter­
mediate-
term
Total Short­
term
% Inter­
mediate-
term
% Total %
1971 289.5 2,076.2 2,365.7 167.5 57.9 946.2 45.6 1,113.7 47.1
1972 475.7 2,643.3 3,079.0 304.4 69.9 1,345.6 50.9 1,650.0 53.6
1973 390.3 2,740.3 3,130.6 305.4 78.2 2,076.3 75.8 2,381.7 76.1
1974 294.6 2,461.4 2,756.0 340.5 115.6 2,015.3 81.9 2,355.8 85.5
1975 865.9 3,271.1 4,137.0 739.7 85.4 2,708.2 82.8 3,447.9 83.3
Source: Machima 1977,p.41.
5.6.3 Ban Lard Agricultural Cooperative
The repayment record of the members of the Ban Lard Agricultural 
Cooperative reached 85.8 percent in 1974 which was the highest year 
of the total actual repayment. When compared to the average of 45 
percent of the overall country, the members of the society could make 
a record of 65.3 percent during 1971-73. It was apparent that the 
repayment for intermediate-term loans was better than short-term ones, 
which was in contrast to the overall agricultural cooperatives (See
Table 5.15).
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TABLE 5.15
REPAYMENT RECORD OF MEMBERS, 1971-1975 : BAN LARD 
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE 
(in thousand Baht)
Due Repayment Actual Repayment
i eui Short­
term
Inter­
mediate-
term
Total Short­
term
% Inter­
mediate-
term
% Total %
1971 342.1 1,608.9 1,951.0 185.1 54.1 776.8 48.3 961.9 49.3
1972 360.6 2,013.1 2,373.7 253.8 70.4 1,469.5 73.0 1,723.3 72.6
1973 206.3 1,929.3 2,135.6 121.1 58.7 1,410.4 73.1 1,531.5 71.7
1974 545.1 2,120.0 2,665.1 493.5 86.4 2,214.2 85.6 2,707.7 85.8
1975 853.9 2,377.1 3,231.1 574.1 67.2 1,758.2 73.9 2,332.3 72.2
Source: Doungsawasdi 1976,p.40.
5.7 Business of Purchasing Goods for Sales to Members
5.7.1 Soong-Nern Agricultural Cooperative
The business of purchasing goods for resale to members was started 
in 1971. Initially the business was done in selling farm machinery 
and only amounted to a value of 900 Baht. During later years, when the 
society was formed to sell farm supplies as well, sales of fertilizer 
increased rapidly from 244.4 thousand Baht in 1972 to over 1 million 
Baht in 1975. Other farm supplies such as seeds and consumer goods 
were started in 1974 and halted during that year. But sales of farm 
machinery grew rapidly from 900 Baht in 1971 to over 1.2 million Baht 
in 1975. The total .sales of farm supplies and farm machinery 
increased from 900 Baht in 1971 to 2.5 million Baht in 1975.
It should be noted that the sum of nearly 3 million Baht on a 
five year average was lent annually to members for all purposes
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(Table 5.15). Of this total, the share used for the purchase of 
farm supplies, farm machinery, consumer goods and others from the 
society was a relatively small portion. That is, 516 thousand Baht 
for purchasing fertilizer, 20 Baht for seeds, 60 Baht for consumer 
goods and 29 thousand Baht for others, totalling 915 thousand Baht 
or about 31 percent of the total loans.
TABLE 5.16
COMPARISON OF LOANS DISBURSED AND SALES TO MEMBERS : 
SOONG-NERN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE, CLASSIFIED BY 
TYPE OF BUSINESS, 1971-1975 
(in thousand Baht)
Year Total
Loans 
Disbursed
Sales
of
Fert­
ilizer
Sales
of
Seeds
Sales of 
Consumer 
Goods
Sales
of
Farm
Machinery
Sales
of
Others
Total %
Total
Sales
to
Loan
1971 1,542.6 - - - .9 - .9 -
1972 1,165.7 244.4 - - 4.0 7.1 255.5 21.9
1973 2,084.3 435.9 - - 107.8 63.3 607.0 29.1
1974 3,315.2 787.2 .1 .3 470.8 - 1,258.4 37.9
1975 6,645.5 1,112.4 - - 1,266.1 73.6 2,452.1 36.9
5 Year 
Average 2,950.6 516.0 20.0(Baht)
60.0
(Baht)
367.0 20.8 914.8 31.0
Source: Derived from Doungsawasdi 1976,p.22.
5.7.2 San-Pa-Tong Agricultural Cooperative
The business of.purchasing farm supplies and farm machinery was 
formed in 1972. Its sales comprise fertilizer, feed stuffs, insecticides, 
seeds, plows, shovels and consumer goods. Unfortunately, detailed 
records of the earlier operations of the sales are incomplete, but it
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is estimated that total sales of 597 thousand Baht in 1972 increased 
to over 3.5 million Baht in 1975.
Table 5.17 also shows the 4 year average of total sales of 
the society was about 49 percent of a four year average of loan 
disbursed to members. The business was developed on a large scale 
during 1972-75. At present, the society has a separate section for 
the business and for its store as well.
TABLE 5.17
COMPARISON OF LOANS DISBURSED AND SALES TO MEMBERS : 
SAN-PA-TONG AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE, CLASSIFIED BY 
TYPE OF BUSINESS, 1972-1975 
(in thousand Baht)
Year Loan Disbursed Total Sales % Total Sales to 
Loan Disbursed
1972 1,688.8 596.8 35.3
1973 2,269.1 1,721.3 75.8
1974 4,013.3 2,335.3 58.2
1975 8,708.7 3,538.8 40.6
4 Year Average 4,170.0 2,048.0 49.1
Source: Derived from Machima 1977,p.12.
5.7.3 Ban Lard Agricultural Cooperative
The society arranged to begin selling farm supplies and other 
goods to members several years ago. The business grew moderately 
and comprised several things as shown in Table 5.18. Total 
sales had reached a peak in 1974, i.e., about 1.2 million Baht.
The sales fell sharply in 1975 to only 598 thousand Baht owing to the
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government action. It was because the government in 1974 had sent 
a number of officials for giving advice to farmers in this area about 
using technology in fanning. The farmers were, therefore, aroused 
and that made the sale of farm inputs progress. Later, the 
government withdrew those officials to another area and total sales 
declined.
This is shown in the Table 5.18. A sharp decrease of total 
sales in 1975 was mostly due to the decline in farm supplies, i.e., 
feed stuffs, fertilizer and seeds. A 5 year average of total sales 
represented only 28 percent to a 5 year average of loans disbursed.
5.8 Business of Marketing and Processing Members' Produce
An important difference between the three relatively successful 
agricultural cooperatives chosen for intensive study and the majority 
of societies in the country, is that all three run rice mills which 
contribute substantial shares to their total net income. They also 
have rice storages and each collects paddy from its members for 
processing.
5.8.1 Soong-Nern Agricultural Cooperative
Because rice is a major agricultural product of this area, 
marketing of rice has become big business for the society. As a result, 
the society with the approval and financial assistance from the 
government decided to establish a small cooperative rice mill with a 
milling capacity of 16 metric tons a day in 1972. In addition, the 
society has 3 rice storages. This investment has served a useful 
purpose for the society, considering the net income from this business. 
The members can sell their rice at fair prices and the society makes 
profits and brings more income to the society.
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Table 5.19 shows the amount of money spent by the society 
on paddy collection. It increased from 657 thousand Baht in 1971 
to 5.3 million Baht in 1975, i.e., eight-fold during 5 years. In 
period over half of the rise in value was accounted for by 
price increases. The total calculated volume handled, including 
deliveries from non—members, increased less than three—fold. Volumes
figures in Table 5.19 have been estimated from average up-country prices. 
This is probably accurate enough to show the general trend. The calculation 
shows that after 1972 there was little increase in deliveries in real 
terms.
TABLE 5.19
VALUE, PRICE AND QUANTITY OF PADDY COLLECTION 
AND THE PROPORTION OF PADDY COLLECTION FROM MEMBERS,
1971-1975 : SOONG-NERN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE
Year Value of 
Paddy 
Collected
Price
Baht/Metric
ton
Quantity
(ton)
% of
Value from 
Members
Total Paddy 
Collection 
(tons)
%
Increase
from
Members 
(Baht) (1) (2) (3) = ^  ' 1 (2) (4)
(3)xlOO 
(4)
1971 657,147 743 884.5 94.30 938.0 -
1972 1,525,241 984 1,550.0 97.20 1,594.7 70.0
1973 3,109,530 1,560 1,993.3 98.39 2,026.0 27.0
1974 4,900,420 2,152 2,277.1 99.68 2,284.4 12.8
1975 5,293,949 2,221 2,383.6 99.95 2,385.0 4.4
Source: (1) and (4) from Doungsawasdi 1976,p.62;64.
(2) average yearly farm price of paddy, Grade 1
from-.Thailand. Agricultural Economic Division 1975; 1976. 
(3) This column is estimated by dividing the value by average
up-country prices.
(5) Estimate based on assumption given.
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The table also shows the proportion of paddy collected from 
members to the total paddy collection of the society. It will be 
seen that almost all the rice handled by the society's mill came 
from the members. No figures are available to show what proportion 
of members' marketings of paddy was made to the cooperative mill and 
what was sold commercially.
The collected paddy will be milled by the society's mill. The 
milled rice will have partly been sold to the nearby market, the 
residual will have been sent to the Provincial Federation in 
Nakornrajasima Province.
5.8.2 San-Pa-Tong Agricultural Cooperative
Like Soong-Nern Agricultural Cooperative, the San-Pa-Tong Society 
has its own rice mill with a milling capacity of 15 metric tons a day 
and 4 rice storages. In addition, the society owned 2 lorries, one 
middle sized and another small. They are used for facilitating 
transport of farm produce from members to the society.
In this society, a higher proportion of paddy was collected from 
non-members than the other two societies, especially in 1972-77. As 
can be seen in Table 5.20 the proportion of paddy collected from non­
members to the total paddy collected was about 60-2 percent in 1972 
and 1973. It declined to 48 and 21 percent in 1974 and 1975. It 
is clear from the figures that the society was able to attract less 
paddy from non-members for milling each year. By 1975, only about 
137 tons was collected from non-members, not much more than a third 
of non-member deliveries in 1971.
From Table 5.20, the value of paddy collection from members 
increased from 294 thousand Baht in 1972 to 1,279.5 thousand Baht in
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1975, a four-fold increase during 5 years. This exceeds the increase 
in real terms, since over 60 percent of the increase in value 
resulted from price rises.
5.8.3 Dan Lard Agricultural Cooperative
The society was also engaged in milling rice. In 1972, it 
established a rice mill and a rice storage. The mill has a capacity 
of 20 tons a day. Very early in its history the society started 
paddy collection, valued at 80 thousand Baht in 1971. When the 
mill was put into full operation in 1972, the society collected 
paddy from members to the value of 939 thousand Baht. The value of 
paddy collection reached its peak in 1974 at about 1.7 million Baht 
and then declined to 1.4 million Baht. However, the total calculated 
volume of paddy handled by the society fluctuated widely during 1971- 
75 as can be seen from Table 5.21. It is noted that less than 
a fifth of the increase in the value of paddy collected from members 
resulted from larger deliveries. The main part was the result of 
higher prices.
Most of rice handled by the society came from its members.
As shown in Table 5.21, the proportion of value was about 86 percent 
in 1971 and rose to 91 percent in 1975.
5.9 Net Income, Operating Expenditures and Net Operating Profit
It was earlier stated that the data given in the cooperative 
accounts were inadequate to form a judgement on their financial 
position. This shows up particularly when looking at the accounts 
calculable for the three societies being discussed, especially at 
their profit record.
A basic error seems to have been made in accountancy practice,
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which may have been one reason why these three societies have 
been judged to be "highly successful".
The term "net profit" appears to have been used inaccurately 
in the Thai analysis and to have been related to gross profit (i.e. 
to the gross margin on sales or net income) rather than to total incomes 
or expenditures. What is meant is apparently net operating profit, 
which is "the excess of gross margin on sales over operating expenses" 
(Kennedy and McMullen, 1968, p.145). From the gross margin other 
charges are deducted, such as fixed interest charges, rates and taxes. 
Kennedy and McMullen consider that the term "net operating profit" is 
confusing and that "net operating income" would be preferable. But 
in any case, net profits must be related to gross income (or expenditure) 
and not to net income, if profitability is to be discussed.
No data are given on total gross sales value of the three 
societies or on total credit extended, nor is any information given 
on the costs of goods sold or on loans. Figures given (see Tables 
5.22, 5.25 and 5.28) are for net income, i.e., are the gross margins 
for each section of the business. Consequently, true net profit cannot 
be calculated as a percentage of income or of expenditure, so that 
profitability of the societies cannot be worked out.
"Net profits" have been calculated in the Thai original for these 
three societies as a percentage of gross margins (net income) which made 
"net profit" appear extraordinarily high, from 60-78 percent during 1971-75 
for the Soong-Nern Society; similar high "net profits" have also been 
published for the other two societies.
Similarly the word "expenses" is not clear. They do not mean 
total expenditures of the societies. It seems to mean mainly operating
expenses, that is costs of running the offices, selling, stationery, etc.
129
An example to explain the above is given as follows:
EXAMPLE
HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE, SETTING OUT AN ACCOUNT 
( '000 Baht)
Sales, net of discounts 1,000
Costs of goods sold 900
Gross margin on sales(net income) 190
Less operating expenses -55
Net operating profit 45
Less fixed interest charges,taxes,etc. ~5
Net Profit 40
In the above example net profit would be only 4 percent. But 
if net profit is related to gross margin (net income) it would amount 
to 40 percent, which gives a false picture of the societies 
profitability.
5.9.1 Soong-Nern Agricultural Cooperative
Net Income. The gross margin of the society is derived from 
4 sources, i.e., credit section, supply section, rice mill section 
and others which consist of such items as service charges, interest 
on bank deposits, membership admission fees and other miscellaneous 
items. During the 5 years between 1971 and 1975, the structure of 
the total net income had been changed as can be seen from Table
5.22. In 1971, about 92.4 percent of the total net income was 
obtained from the credit section. The others were 0.1, 4.2 and 3.3 
percent from the supply section, rice mill section and "others" 
section respectively. By 1975, although the net income from the
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credit section remained steady in absolute terms, it declined sharply 
to 35.4 percent of the total net income. This was because of the 
big increase in business of the supply section, rice mill section 
and "others" which contributed 17.7, 38.7 and 8.12 percent 
respectively in that year.
It should be observed that the highest amount of total net 
income, approximately 1.1 million Baht in 1974, fell to 801.3 
thousand Baht in 1975. This was entirely due to a decline in net 
income of the rice mill section which was caused by the government 
policy on paddy collection as mentioned in Chapter III. Between 1972 
and 1975, net income from rice milling contributed between 39 and 50 
percent of total net income. In 1974, the total net income of the 
Soong-Nern Society was six times as large as the average for 
cooperatives in the country.
TABLE 5.22
SOURCES OF NET INCOME, 1971-1975 : 
SOONG-NERN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE
Year
Credit Section Supply
Section
Rice Mill 
Section
Others Total
'000 Baht % '000 Baht % '000 Baht % '000 Baht % '000 Baht %
1971 206.3 92.4 .2 0.1 9.4 4.2 7.4 3.3 223.3 100
1972 184.5 36.0 42.2 8.2 257.0 50.1 29.1 5.7 512.8 100
1973 229.4 34.5 63.6 9.5 304.4 45.8 67.7 10.2 665.1 100
1974 238.0 22.2 102.9 9.6 659.5 61.4 73.5 6.8 1,073.9 100
1975 283.6 35.4 142.3 17.7 310.5 38.7 64.9 8.2 801.3 100
Source: Derived from Doungsawasdi 1976,p.23.
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Expenses. The expenditures of the society as already pointed 
out, consist mainly of operating expenses, and exclude purchases 
of commodities etc. They are classified into 6 categories as 
shown in Table 5.23. The major expense of the society 
(excluding materials etc) is salary, about 27.4 percent of total 
expenses in 5 years average. Other expenses were living allowances 
and transportation costs of about 12.9 percent; depreciation counted 
for 27.5 percent. Those main expenses accounted for 67.8 percent of 
total expenses. The rest; 32.2 percent of expenses;was 
stationeries and "others".
From 1971-75 the expenses increased by over 200 percent from 
91 thousand Baht in 1971 to 279 thousand Baht in 1975. Most items 
increased during the 5 year period except "other" expenses. However, 
the proportion of expenses on salary decreased from 36.9 percent in 
1972 to 22.4 percent in 1975. This indicates that the management 
is becoming more efficient.
Net Operating Profit. The net operating profit of the Soong- 
Nern Society increased rapidly, from 132.5 thousand Baht in 1971 to 
804.1 thousand Baht or six-fold by 1974 (See Table 5.24). This was 
due to the expansion of activities. It compared to the average of 
57 thousand Baht in the country or fourteen-fold higher than the 
average for cooperatives. The net operating profit dropped to 522.6 
thousand Baht in 1975, mainly caused by the stock of rice.
The net operating profit is to be allocated according to the 
cooperative by-laws. These are; patronage refund, reserves, bonus 
of board members and employees, subscription to the Cooperative League 
of Thailand and others. An important allocation that should be
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mentioned here is reserves. The average proportion of net operating
profit allocated to reserve funds during 1970-73 was 45.6 percent 
(Machima 1976b,p.35). This indicated that the society tried to 
build its own funds and took a longer term view of benefits to its 
members. In addition, patronage refunds are made to members in 
proportion to their business transaction with the society, and the 
average percentage of this allotted fund during the same period was 
only 16.1 percent. Other net operating profit allocations made 
directly to members wore 14.6 percent as dividend, and 8.5 percent 
as bonus. The remaining 15.1 percent consisted of miscellaneous 
items (Machima 1976b).
TABLE 5.24
NET INCOME, EXPENSES^ AND NET OPERATING PROFIT, 
1971-1975 : SOONG-NERN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE 
(in thousand Baht)
Year Net Income Expenses^ Net Operating 
Profit
1971 223.3 90.8 132.5
1972 512.8 112.9 399.9
1973 665.1 160.8 504.3
1974 1,073.9 269.8 804.1
1975 801.3 278.7 522.6
a) Excludes goods and materials
Source: Derived from Doungsawasdi 1976,p.25.
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5.9.2 San-Pa-Tong Agricultural Cooperative
Net Income. Of all the four main sources of net income,
(i.e., gross margins from each section) the net income from the credit 
section is dominant. This has nevertheless declined as a share of 
the total as other business of the society expanded. Its proportion 
to total net income was about 84 percent in 1971, and decreased to 
41 percent in 1975. This is because the proportion of net income 
from the supply section rose substantially, as well as the proportion 
of income from the rice mill section and others as shown in Table 5.25.
Within this period, the net income from the credit section 
increased only slightly, from 447 thousand Baht in 1971 to 499 
thousand Baht in 1975, which represented a fall in real terms. In 
the same period, net income from the supply section increased eleven­
fold from 49 thousand Baht to 539 thousand Baht; net income from the 
rice mill fluctuated strongly during the period, e.g., from nearly 40 
thousand Baht in 1971 it increased to 196 thousand Baht and 133 
thousand Baht in 1972 and 1975 respectively. However, the total 
net income increased substantially during the period from 535 
thousand Baht in 1971 to 1.2 million Baht in 1975. The total net 
income was 4.5 fold higher than the average for agricultural 
cooperatives throughout the country in 1974.
Expenses. From 1971-75 expenses (excluding materials etc) 
increased by 63 percent, from 333 thousand Baht in 1971 to 542 
thousand Baht (See Table 5.26). Salary increased rapidly, i.e.,
5.5 times; transportation, living allowance and stationeries all 
tripled. Other expenses also increased but slightly. This reflected 
mainly an increase in the business of the society in expanding both
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TABLE 5.25
SOURCE OF NET INCOME, 1971-1975 : SAN-PA-TONG 
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE
Year
Credit Section Supply
Section
Rice Mill 
Section
Others Total
'000 Baht % '000 Baht % '000 Baht % '000 Baht % '000 Baht %
1971 446.7 83.5 48.6 9.1 39.6 7.4 - - 534.9 100
1972 556.2 65.4 95.8 11.3 195.5 23.0 3.0 0.4 850.5 100
1973 277.1 44.6 171.3 27.6 152.7 24.6 19.6 3.2 620.7 100
1974 351.1 45.0 256.8 32.9 90.8 11.6 81.6 10.5 780.3 100
1975 499.4 41.3 539.1 44.6 132.5 10.9 37.6 3.1 1,208.6 100
Source: Derived from Machima 1977,p.44.
activities and the society to a large scale unit. However, the 
increasing cost is still lower than the additional net income.
The major expense of the society is miscellaneous expenses, 
which consist of interest payments, free lunches, special fees for 
committees and others, about 44 percent of total expenses during 
1971-75 but its proportion tended to decrease. It is noted that the 
miscellaneous expenses in 1972 were very high. This is because the 
interest payments accounted for nearly 86 percent of miscellaneous 
expenses in that year. The proportion of salaries to total 
expenses rose sharply from 9 percent in 1971 to 31 percent in 1975. 
Other expenses were depreciation of about 12.5 percent; stationeries 
accounted for 3 percent. The remaining 20 percent of expenses were 
spent for living allowance, transportation and others.
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Net Operating Profit. From Table 5.27, it is evident that 
the net operating profit of the society increased year by year, from 
202 thousand Baht in 1971 to 488 thousand Baht and 666 thousand Baht 
in 1974 and 1975 respectively. The net operating profit was nearly 
nine-fold higher than the average in the country in 1974.
From the allocation of the net operating profit, the major 
allocation is patronage refunds. The average percentage of their 
allotted fund during 1971-75 was 38.2 percent of the total net 
operating profit (Machima 1977,p.27). This means that the society 
benefited its members, because 60 percent of not operating profit was 
given back to them. (In addition to the patronage refund, they also 
received 14 percent as dividend and 8.2 percent as bonus.) Other 
allocations were as follows: 24.2 percent as reserves; 15.4 percent
as miscellaneous items (Machima 1977).
TABLE 5.27
NET INCOME, EXPENSES^ AND NET OPERATING PROFIT, 
1971-1975 : SAN-PA-TONG AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE 
(in thousand Baht)
Year Net Income „ a)Expenses Net Operating 
Profit
1971 534.9 332.6 202.3
1972 , 850.5 502.6 347.9
1973 620.7 276.1 344.6
1974 780.4 292.0 488.4
1975 1,208.5 542.2 666.3
a) Excluding goods and materials.
Source: Derived from Machima 1977,p.47.
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5.9.3 Ban Lard Agricultural Cooperative
Net Income. Like the two societies above, Ban Lard Agricultural 
Cooperative obtains its net income from 4 sources. The total net 
income rose moderately from 1971 until it amounted to 448 thousand 
Baht in 1974 with approximately 34 percent annual average growth 
rate. The total net income was 2.6 fold higher than the average in 
the country. The net income dropped by about 39 percent in 1975 to 
274 thousand Baht, as a result of a decline in income from every 
section but the rice mill section (See Table 5.28).
Within the same period, net income from the credit section 
reached the highest peak in 1974 because the society lent a large 
amount of money which made the proportion of net income from the credit 
section to total net income about 63 percent. This was exceptional.
A year later in 1975, the net income from this section declined to 
94 thousand Baht, slightly below the level of 1971-73.
Net income from the supply section peaked at 91 thousand 
Baht and decreased rapidly to 51 thousand and 5.5 thousand Baht in 
1974 and 1975. This decline was the result of withdrawing the 
government officials from the area as has already been described.
For the net income from the rice mill section, it increased 
every year except in 1974, in which year the society collected less 
paddy than in other years. In that year the proportion of net income 
from the rice mill to total net income was about 9.4 percent 
compared to 63 percent in 1975.
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TABLE 5.28
SOURCES OF NET INCOME, 1971-1975 : BAN LARD 
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE
Year
Credit Section Supply
Section
Rice Mill 
Section
Others Total
'000 Baht % '000 Baht % '000 Baht % '000 Baht % '000 Baht %
1971 110.9 59.4 61.2 32.7 - 14.8 7.9 186.8 100
1972 99.8 38.4 51.4 19.8 92.3 35.5 16.4 6.3 260.0 100
1973 95.2 26.1 91.0 24.9 153.8 42.1 25.0 6.9 365.1 100
1974 281.7 62.9 50.9 11.3 42.0 9.4 73.4 16.4 448.0 100
1975 93.7 34.2 5.5 2.0 172.6 63.0 2.1 0.8 273.8 100
Source: Derived from Doungsawasdi 1976,p.37.
Expenses. In the 4 years from 1971-74 the expenses increased
by an annual average of under 12 percent which is much lower than the 
increase in additional net income. The major expenses were salary 
and depreciation. The proportions of salary and depreciation to 
total expenses were about 37 and 28 percent during 1971-74, leaving 
35 percent for living allowance and transportation, stationeries and 
others.
In 1975, the major expense was depreciation. It increased 
to nearly 225 thousand Baht and its proportion to total expenses rose 
to almost 64 percent. This was due to a fire in the rice mill of 
the society.
Net Operating Profit. Table 5.30 demonstrates the rapid 
increase of net operating profit from 89 thousand Baht in 1971 to 294 
thousand Baht in 1974 or about 23.1 percent. This was about five­
fold higher than the average for the country. In 1975, a loss of
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nearly 79,000 Baht was incurred in the society resulting from 
several causes which could not be avoided, e.g. the government's 
rice price support policy and the mill fire.
TABLE 5.30 
a.)NET INCOME, EXPENSES AND NET OPERATING PROFIT, 
1971-1975 : BAN LARD AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE 
(in thousand Baht)
Year Net Income Expenses^ Net Operating 
Profit
1971 186.8 97.9 88.9
1972 260.0 107.0 153.0
1973 365.1 134.9 230.2
1974 448.0 153.9 294.1
1975 273.8 352.5 (78.6)
a) Excluding goods and materials.
Source: Derived from Doungsawasdi 1976,p.39.
5.10 Comparison of the Three Societies 
5.10.1 Working Capital
Table 5.31 presents comparisons of the total amount of working 
capital for the three societies. The Table shows that the San-Pa- 
Tong Society had more working capital than the other two societies 
during 1971-75. And, all three societies had much larger working 
capital than the average for agricultural cooperatives in the country. 
In 1974, the total amount of just under 10 million Baht of the
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San-Pa-Tong Society was three times as high as the average working 
capital of the overall agricultural cooperatives and the Soong-Nern 
and Ban Lard Societies had 2.8 and 2.2 fold the average respectively.
TABLE 5.31
COMPARISON OF WORKING CAPITAL OF THE THREE 
SOCIETIES, 1971-1975 
(in million Baht)
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Soong-Nern Agri Coop 4.6 5.6 7.5 9.3 13.2
San-Pa-Tong Agri Coop 6.2 7.1 7.6 9.9 17.0
Ban Lard Agri Coop 4.8 5.3 7.4 7.4 8.3
However, the working capital per member of Soong-Nern Society 
was highest at approximately 10.7 thousand Baht each, while San-Pa-Tong 
had about 9 thousand Baht and the Ban Lard about 8.3 thousand Baht.
This may be compared to the average of 5 thousand Baht of working 
capital per member for the overall agricultural cooperatives over the 
same period. In making this comparison between the better cooperatives' 
working capital and those of other cooperatives, it must be remembered 
that the latters' funds are largely tied up in doubtful debts.
The three societies depend heavily on borrowed funds rather 
than their own funds. During 1971-74 the San-Pa-Tong Society 
borrowed from outside about 56 percent of total funds while the shares 
of outside funds for the Soong-Nern Society and Ban Lard Society were
143
about 54 and 48 percent. This compared to the average of 63.5 
percent for overall agricultural cooperatives. This more favourable 
position was because the three societies have been putting money to 
reserves and building their own funds more than others in the country.
The source of borrowed funds is also important because of the 
different interest rates charged. From the study, the San-Pa-Tong 
Society has borrowed about 82 percent of funds from the sources that 
charge 9 percent interest rate and obtained the remainder at 0-2 
percent interest rate from the government sources during 1971-75.
Its average interest rate was therefore around 8 percent. The 
Soong-Nern and the Ban Lard Societies obtained the average of a much 
higher share of funds, i.e., 45 percent and 59 percent from low-interest 
government sources respectively and paid 9 percent interest rate for 
the remainder, i.e., 55 and 41 percent respectively during the same 
period (See Tables 5.5, 5.7 and 5.9). Their average interest rates 
were therefore just over 5 and 4 percent respectively.
As a result of having inadequate funds of their own, the 
societies have therefore had many creditors every year. The amount 
due to these creditors has also been used temporarily as the funds of 
the societies. The total amount varied from year to year depending 
on the size of business and the decision toward the repayment of 
debts to such creditors.
5.10.2 Loans to Members
The amount of loans granted by the San-Pa-Tong Society was 
about 8.7 million Baht, which was 569 percent higher than in 1971, 
while the Soong-Nern Society and the Ban-Lard Society were about 340 
and 138 percent higher, respectively. In 1974, loans disbursed
during the year per member were roughly the same in the three societies. 
In the Soong-Nern Society the average was highest at about 3.8 thousand 
Baht ($US183), as compared to 3.7 and 3.6 thousand Baht of the Ban 
Lard and the San-Pa-Tong. This was not much higher than the average 
of three thousand Baht for the overall agricultural cooperatives 
throughout the country at the same time.
It should be observed that of the total amount of loans 
disbursed during 1971-75, the San-Pa-Tong Society was highest but the 
loans per member were lowest, although higher than the average over 
the country. This was probably because the society has a larger 
membership than the other two societies.
TABLE 5.32
COMPARISON OF LOANS DISBURSED TO MEMBERS 
OF THE THREE SOCIETIES, 1971-1975 
(in million Baht)
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Soong-Nern Agri Coop 1.5 1.2 2.1 3.3 6.6
San-Pa-Tong Agri Coop 1.3 1.7 2.3 4.0 8.7
Ban Lard Agri Coop 1.6 2.4 2.9 3.8 3.8
5.10.3 Repayment 
Table 5.33 gives
Record
comparisons of the repayment record of the
three societies, showing that the Soong-Nern Society had a significantly 
higher repayment record both in short term and intermediate term loans
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than the others up to 1973. However, it has recently deteriorated 
and is still too low for longer term viability. It is noted that 
the repayment record for intermediate term loans of the Soong-Nern 
and the San-Pa-Tong were better than short-term loans which was the 
opposite situation to Ban Lard.
In 1974, the actual repayment rate of the Soong-Nern, San-Pa-Tong 
and Ban Lard Society were about 72.1, 85.5 and 85.8 percent 
respectively, compared to 51.5 percent of overall country over the 
same year (DCA,p.23).
A tentative conclusion could be drawn as to why the members 
of the three societies can repay loans at the higher rates. This 
is due to the fact that most of the members were selected before 
becoming members. They are better-off and have several occupations. 
Besides, since the societies have several sources of borrowing, 
their members are more certain of being able to borrow again after 
repaying the old debts.
TABLE 5.33
COMPARISON OF REPAYMENT RECORD OF MEMBERS 
OF THE THREE SOCIETIES, 1971-1975 
(in Percentage)
Soong-Nern San-Pa-Tong Ban Lard
Year-------------------------------------------------------------
Short­
term
Inter­
mediate-
term
Total Short­
term
Inter­
mediate
term
Total Short­
term
Inter­
mediate
term
Total
1971 106.2 66.3 72.5 57.9 45.6 47.1 54.1 48.3 49.3
1972 117.9 80.7 81.1 69.9 50.9 53.6 70.4 73.0 72.6
1973 89.7 106.4 104.8 78.2 75.8 76.1 58.7 73.1 71.7
1974 88.9 63.1 72.1 115.6 81.9 85.5 86.4 85.6 85.8
1975 71.8 71.0 71.3 85.4 82.8 83.3 67.2 73.9 72.2
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5.10.4 Business of Purchasing
The business of selling to members is an important activity 
of the societies. The total sales of farm supply and farm machinery 
have increased rapidly year after year. Table 5.34 shows the 
proportions of their loan money which is spent by members for 
purchasing commodities from the societies. During 1971-75, about 
31, 49 and 28 percent of loans to members were spent on purchasing 
from the Soong-Nern, San-Pa-Tong and Ban Lard Societies respectively.
It is considered that the three societies have done more 
business with their members than other cooperatives in the country.
For example, in 1974 the proportion of loan money spent on cooperative 
goods may be compared to 18 percent for the whole country over the 
same period (DCA, 1975).
TABLE 5.34
COMPARISONS OF PURCHASING PERCENTAGE OF MEMBERS 
OF THE THREE SOCIETIES TO THE TOTAL SUM OF LOANS, 1971-1975
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 Average
Soong-Nern Agri Coop - 21.9 29.1 37.9 36.9 31.0
San-Pa-Tong Agri Coop - 35.3 75.8 58.2 40.6 49.1
Ban Lard Agri Coop 28.9 34.9 28.3 31.7 18.2 28.0
5.10.5 Business of Marketing Members' Produce
As already stated, there are no figures showing what proportion
of members' crops are sold through their cooperatives. From the figures
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of rice marketings, however, a rough guess can be made, from which 
it is clear that rather a low proportion of members' marketings goes 
through their societies. For the rice crop, rough figures of 
members' likely output can be calculated, by multiplying their 
known irrigated hectarage by estimated average rice yields per hectare. 
Then average deductions can be made for seed use and home consumption. 
Such a calculation shows that from 5 to 20 percent of members' rice 
surpluses were probably sold through the three cooperatives in 
1975. Adjustments to the various assumptions would not raise these 
shares much and might reduce them. Moreover, they confirm field 
reports complaining of members' lack of loyalty to their societies, 
although the members' record in the three societies dealt with here 
in this respect is better than the average for cooperatives throughout 
the country.
TABLE 5.35
COMPARISON OF TOTAL PADDY HANDLED BY THE THREE 
SOCIETIES, 1971-1975*
(in metric tons)
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Soong-Nern Agri Coop 938 1,595 2,026 2,284 2,385
San-Pa-Tong Agri Coop - 616 573 607 739
Ban Lard Agri Coop 125 973 762 1,003 698
* Includes deliveries from non-members.
Source: Tables 5.19, 5.20 and 5.21.
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Based on the information available, two of the three societies' 
rice mills operated at well below capacity levels. The rice mills 
of the Soong-Nern, San-Pa-Tong and Ban Lard Society have a milling 
capacity of 16, 15 and 20 metric tons per day. These mills can in 
theory operate around the clock, seven days a week if necessary. 
However, according to the survey by CRC (1976) it is likely that there 
will be times when the mills will have to shut down owing to break­
downs. Therefore, allowing for some shut-down time in running a 
mill it could work an average of 16 hours a day of operation for 24 
days a month (CRC 1976). This would mean that the Soong-Nern mill 
had a monthly capacity of about 255 tons, San-Pa-Tong of around 240 
tons and Ban Lard of about 320 tons. On the assumption that all 3 
mills run for 8 months in the year annual capacities would be roughly 
2,000, 1,900 and 2,500 tons respectively. The actual volume in 1975 
milled by the three were 2,385, 739 and 698 tons respectively. This 
would mean that the Soong-Nern mill was working at full capacity 
utilization. This can be seen from Table 5.2.2 (p.127) which shows 
that the Soong-Nern cooperative derived a higher proportion of its 
net income from rice milling than did the other two societies. The 
remaining two, however, achieved a level of about 39 and 28 per cent 
on the time assumption given.
It is apparent that the two societies' mills did not have 
sufficient paddy to keep their mills running at anything like capacity. 
The mills were able to operate only during the first crop harvest 
season, a period of four to five months. This is because in many 
cases it was clear that the rice was going to money lenders to pay 
for crop loans. Another reason, and an important one, is that the 
cooperative members are simply a very low percentage of the total 
number of farmers in the area served by cooperatives, the figure 
frequently given was lower than 10 percent (CRC,p.13). Besides, it
is probable that the societies are not efficient enough to attract
many outside customers.
5.11 Summary of the Three Societies
In this chapter an attempt has been made to present an 
analysis of the three societies/ because they were once judged to 
be the "most successful" agricultural cooperatives in the country. 
This study also shows that they were better than the average for 
agricultural cooperatives in Thailand, but it would not go sofar as 
to call them "very successful" yet. Data were inadequate to judge 
their financial performance and profitability. It was, however, 
found from the comparisons that in many aspects they are growing 
more than the average in the country in membership, amount of 
working capital, volume of businesses, services to members and net 
operating profit allocated to members. Moreover, considering the 
volume of loans per member and the repayment record of members of 
the three societies, they were better than the average as well. 
Notwithstanding, the three societies have only served the aim of 
modernizing agriculture to a limited extent but failed to help the 
poorest farmers of their districts, as the requirement of land 
collateral for loans has still continued.
The three societies, i.e., the Soong-Nern Agricultural 
Cooperative Ltd, the San-Pa-Tong Agricultural Cooperative Ltd, and 
the Ban-Lard Agricultural Cooperative Ltd appear to have been better 
than the others because of the following factors:
The three societies-are located in the area 
of irrigation and nearby markets with good
communications.
Although most of the members are nearly 
illiterate, they have been able to 
cooperate with the cooperatives and will 
do more as they understand the cooperative 
concept.
Before joining the societies, all members 
were selected and most of them are middle 
income class and have much larger land 
holdings than non-members in their districts. 
Amalgamation of small village credit 
cooperatives to a big agricultural cooperative 
in a district made larger scale business 
activities possible : larger volumes of
business, more active participation from 
members and better supervision and control.
It could not have served such a useful purpose 
if the operation had been carried out by a 
small village credit cooperative as it was 
originally organized.
The societies have a larger than average 
amount of working capital. Although the 
working capital is mainly obtained from the 
borrowing, it is charged with the very low 
interest rate.
The three societies have tried to build their 
own funds in the longer term view by ploughing 
back a part of net operating profit to their
reserves.
The members have been found to be more 
loyal to their societies than have members 
of other societies. They have done a fair 
part of their businesses through the 
societies, e.g. deposits, marketing their 
produce and purchasing goods.
However, although the three societies are fairly successful in 
their operations there arc some x^roblcms dealing with the societies 
as follows:
Lack of revolving funds for purchasing paddy 
from members as much as this is possible 
because the societies have to pay large lump 
sums when doing the business.
The repayment record of the societies' 
members is still low although they are 
better than the average in the country.
Lack of agricultural extension services from 
state agencies and inadequate government 
training programmes, especially on credit 
administration and farm planning.
The societies lack sufficient permanent 
agricultural extension officers of their 
own which impedes the expansion of 
members' production.
Some groups of members lack better 
understanding of cooperative principles and
technical know-how of production.
The rice mills of two of the three 
societies are underutilized because of 
inadequate paddy collection and failure
to attract outside customers.
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Summary
The Thai government considers the cooperative movement to be 
essential to help relieve the farmers from severe indebtedness and to 
provide credit facilities to farmers for the improvement of agricultural 
production. Therefore, village credit cooperatives were launched early 
in this century on the Raifeisen model. It was found fairly successful
at the beginning on a very small scale. However, this type of cooperative
did not make any progress since its main function was limited to the 
provision of credit with a small volume of business, which failed to render 
effective service to members and to provide sufficient income to cover 
minimum operating expenses.
The later attempt of the Thai government from the late 1960s onwards 
was to launch a multi-purpose society in order to serve the two principal 
objectives of government policy, that is, the welfare of the farmers, 
especially poorer farmers, and the modernization of agriculture. In 
principle, it is expected to serve many purposes such as credit, marketing, 
supply and agricultural extension services to cater for the needs of its 
members. In practice, however, it does not seem to have served any of 
these purposes well. For example, defaults on loans exceed repayments; 
middle men and money lenders continue to flourish; members do not patronize 
their societies adequately; the societies are too poor to hire competent 
staff; they are too remote to ensure access for their members to needed 
supplies and marketing facilities; economies of scale remain unrealized
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owing to mismanagement; and the failure to exhibit real opportunities for 
participation discourages members unused to cooperation. Another and 
most important reason that Thailand's attempts at the launching of a 
multi-purpose cooperative society has not been more successful is that 
it has overlooked important limitations in the management skills available.
The multi-purpose societies need such skills, administrative know-how and 
reliable staff for their management. These skills can now hardly be 
found among rural people and available leaders and advisors.
The negative impression of cooperative management may have been 
given too much prominence in Chapter III. Some cooperatives are more 
efficient than others, while some may have no trained management at all.
From a closer look at cooperative management in Thailand, it is clear that 
less than half of the 544 agricultural cooperatives employ a manager, mostly 
selected from amongst their staff, while the others are managed by the 
board of directors or by district cooperative officers who are less experienced, 
Moreover, there are few staff in these cooperatives. The reason for this 
is the low pay in cooperatives and especially the low increments for 
responsibility. Many efficient young men and women show no interest in 
getting employment in agricultural cooperatives.
A further serious problem affecting the efficiency of management 
is that of democratic control. Cooperatives with thousands of members 
located in several villages have an entirely different problem in creating 
and continuing membership and responsibility than the small cooperative in 
which all the members live in the same community. It was found that 
members in many villages have little relationship with their societies and 
are not adequately informed about the activities of their organization.
In addition, the complexity of Farmer Associations and farmers who are
individual clients of the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperatives (BAAC) being in the same area in which a cooperative 
functions is also a problem.
Social factors also play an important role in the poor 
management. A major problem is the character of Thai peasant society 
itself. A majority of the members may be quite pleased with their 
organization. Most members, however, are not seriously interested 
in the business of the cooperative and have a weak sense of loyalty 
to their society. The lack of commitment is shown in situations 
where alternatives are opened, i.e., sale of produce to private traders, 
purchasing goods from local merchants etc. Those who show least 
sense of loyalty to the cooperative movement are, by and large, the 
very poor farmers who often have urgent cash needs that cannot be met 
fully or quickly enough by the society; hence they look for alternative 
means of selling their produce, and are frequently indebted to the 
village merchant or money lender who required delivery of the produce 
to apply on their debts to him.
It is clear from the same chapter that the Registrar of 
Cooperatives has wide powers over the cooperative movement. More 
specifically in many cases application of these powers leads to mis­
management and misallocation of funds. Moreover, cooperatives suffer 
from too much government involvement. They are not able to be either 
democratic or truly cooperative if they are run directly by a 
government official rather than the people who should benefit from 
them. Besides, serving the government's policy has made the whole 
cooperative system complicated because the government, so far, has 
not made clear a plan to implement their policy.
156
Concerning the main objectives of establishing the co­
operatives, the Thai government emphasizes the objection of relieving 
the farmers from debts. But, since they are businesses, loans are 
made to those who supply reasonable surety of repayment. In this 
process, the small farmers are likely to lose out. In addition, 
loans from cooperatives can be criticized on the ground of inefficiency 
of supervision. This is because the cooperatives lack their own 
agricultural extension officers and the number and quality of government 
extension officers are not adequate for the cooperatives throughout 
the country.
There is no concrete evidence to show an inherent organizational 
inconsistency among various government departments concerning co­
operatives. However, there are some indications to show that such 
a trend exists in the cooperatives. That is, the cooperative movement 
has been under the control of several Ministries. It was finally 
placed under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. 
Under this Ministry, the cooperative has some coordination with several 
departments. On the other hand, several departments seem to have 
more or less something to do with the cooperative activities. In­
dications are that the inefficiency and lack of coordination of the 
bureaucracy causes duplication of work, in spite of the government's 
shortage of resources.
Lack of sufficient funds is another major problem for all 
agricultural cooperatives. They depend heavily on funds from outside, 
especially from the BAAC, which cannot lend the cooperatives the 
volume of loan money requested. The result of this, is partly to 
cause a default on loans of the cooperatives to the lending
institution, which in turn results from a default on loans by the 
members. The societies not only lack funds for lending to members, 
but also lack funds for running their businesses. As a matter of 
principle, funds from the BAAC can only be used to lend to members. 
Any cooperatives which run other businesses, e.g. collecting produce 
from members and selling goods to members, have to seek the capital 
for these businesses from other sources and usually obtain only a 
very small portion from the movement itself. This is one reason why 
the societies cannot run the full business cycle properly.
Chapter III also deals with the operation of cooperative 
marketing. The analysis revealed that few societies can market 
members' produce in the quantity which represents a reasonable 
proportion of members' total produce. This is caused by a low 
response and participation of the members towards the societies 
and their activities. The inefficiency of management and government 
policy are also some of the factors that affect the operation of the 
societies. For the business of selling goods to members, once 
again their business has been very small and has shown very little 
significance. Moreover, the Agricultural Cooperative Federation of 
Thailand (ACFT), which is the national marketing organization which 
both purchases and sells on behalf of member societies, does not play 
a leadership role in marketing. Failure of this organization will 
surely be a major setback to the establishment of a sound marketing 
and purchasing system.
The last section of Chapter III deals with the supporting 
activity of cooperatives, i.e., cooperative education and training.
It is, needless to say, an important way of instilling new ideas into
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the management of rural cooperatives in Thailand. However, the main 
emphasis so far has been laid on leaders and staff, the ordinary members 
have hardly had an opportunity to be trained.
Chapter IV presents an analysis of balance sheets and income 
statements, which are intended to show the financial condition of 
the agricultural cooperatives in aggregate. It was found that the 
data on this aspect are very inadequate and not shown clearly. A 
few important items are missing; for example, provision for 
depreciation, a detailed cash flow statement which would provide 
specific information on the sources and amount of cash inflows and 
cash outflows for the period, with the balancing item being the 
increase or reduction of deposits of the BAAC. In addition, the 
account presentation is very confusing which easily leads to mis­
interpretation .
Chapter V discussed the three agricultural cooperatives which 
had been thought to be very successful in a previous Thai study. This 
judgement about success may have been an overestimate. Their financial 
success in fact seems to have been limited, and there is no useable data 
on profitability. Nevertheless, from the analysis in this thesis the 
three societies are shown to have been better than the average and to 
have served the aim of modernizing agriculture to a certain extent.
That is, the societies are offering several services, e.g. extending 
cheap credits, selling farm supplies, purchasing crops, rice milling 
etc. But the aim of farmers' welfare in general seems to be largely 
neglected. The societies cannot take in the poorest farmers because of 
the requirement of land mortgage to obtain loans. Consequently only a 
very small share of farmers in each district are members and these are
the larger landholders.
However, it was found that the advantages in social structure 
and the economic nature and extent of government support, are the chief 
factors that made the three societies more useful to their members than 
other cooperatives in the country. But the previous judgement that they 
were "highly successful" had to be modified.
6.2 Policy Implications
The study undertaken in this thesis has presented some existing 
problems which the agricultural cooperatives encounter. Owing to 
lack of data, however, no concrete conclusions can be drawn and this 
prevents the presentation of concrete policy implications to overcome 
those problems mentioned in Chapters II, III, IV and V. The best that 
can be done is to outline several of the current problems and to make 
suggestions aimed at improving the efficiency of cooperative 
performance so as to make the cooperative movement in Thailand more 
successful.
Starting from the problem of sloppy management, one way of 
getting around this problem has been to intensify cooperative 
education efforts. It is generally assumed that cooperative 
movement education is needed for improving performance in cooperatives. 
Increased understanding of management principles does help both the 
committee members and the staff of a primary society. But, again 
it must be borne in mind that once a society has been organized, it 
is necessary to instill the cooperative spirit into the members from 
time to time. Without adequate member education programmes, no 
cooperative organization can even approximate the goals of efficient 
member control. The finance of cooperative education should come 
from the government.
Parallel to this, another way of improving the efficiency of 
the staff is relative to salary increases and promotion. The policy
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should be adopted that if a person works hard and the output 
increases as a result of it, he or she should be given encouragement 
in the form of better payment or promotion. There are various 
compensation methods that may be used, but it is likely that a 
straight salary plus a bonus or some type of fringe benefits will 
yield the best results. Doing this, however, might have an impact 
on the funds of cooperatives. In this case the government should 
help cooperatives by paying some part at the beginning as a subsidy 
until the cooperatives can help themselves.
As immediate reform might be to improve the efficiency of the 
accounting system both in methods and in timeliness. It is clear that 
the balance sheets and the income statements of agricultural cooperatives 
are very out of date and are presented confusingly. A starting point 
would seem to be better instruction on the drawing up of simple accounts, 
especially for the primary cooperatives. These need not be complicated, 
but the adoption of a double entry bookkeeping system and of a cash flow 
statement which summarizes the business transactions involving cash 
receipts and cash disbursements throughout each year would seem to be 
essential. Provision for doubtful debts and depreciation should also be 
shown in order to keep assets and net worth from being artificially 
inflated. For societies which are handling goods, the accounts should 
show the inventory or stock of goods sold on hand at the year's end and 
at the beginning clearly.
An area of concern is in regard to the role of the Thai 
government. Nobody can easily deny the fact that a heavy bureaucratic 
machinery to control the cooperative movement has become an increasing 
burden on society. Several schemes are being carried out by the 
government departments to improve the technical side of cooperative 
management. This will not solve all management problems in the 
movement. It is generally considered that the role of government
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toward cooperatives should be gradually changed from a direct assistance 
role (management and financing) to a catalyst role (educational, 
regulating, facilitating).
However, there would be nothing inherently wrong if the 
government takes up the work of sponsorship in order to assist the 
growth of a sound cooperative movement. Because of the absense of 
a well thought-out constructive policy and financial and other needed 
support, a few cooperatives might have failed. With a constructive 
approach, the government should be able to take up the work of 
sponsorship in the interest of the community till the cooperatives 
are in a position to take upon themselves this responsibility.
Another area in which government affects cooperatives is 
under the Cooperative Law of 1968, which may have to be amended.
The law contains many obsolete clauses which hinder the societies' 
growth. In addition, criteria should be laid down for the careful 
selection of cooperative department officials. Emphasis should be 
on the areas of business administration and finance rather than on 
cooperative philosophy and evolution as is normally the case until 
now (Manuspaibool 1972). More important, there should be a close 
coordination of the cooperative societies with the various departments 
concerned.
It is also considered that an important gap in government 
policy for creating better conditions for the development of 
cooperatives has been the lack of a clear-cut policy objective. Most 
policies are adopted to solve urgent problems. There should be a 
long term policy plan for cooperatives. In setting up a new society, 
there should be a feasibility study considering the possibility.
The authorities should not lean on the policy of having cooperatives 
in every district but should concentrate on the quality and pre­
feasibility study. In addition, consideration should be given to 
converting the farmer clients of the BAAC to be members of
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agricultural cooperatives in order to allow them all to get assistance 
from one institution.
It may also be suggested that greater flexibility in the relation­
ship between the government and the cooperatives is urgently needed.
Since physical conditions vary so much in different places and different 
farming industries and communities, the pattern of the societies should 
not be rigid. In some places a single-purpose cooperative might be more 
effective than multi-purpose one, or in other places a small cooperative 
with very few members with close existing ties might be better than a 
large, loosely knit one. Some may need close official guidance or even 
supervision, others may be strong enough in local leadership to be left 
to flourish on their own. Greater flexibility could be allowed to the 
the first class cooperatives in management instead of applying the same 
regulations to all cooperatives.
It would be possible to have flexibility and foresee another 
alternative since there are limitation to the multi-purpose society.
We can again turn to look at single-purpose cooperatives. It is not 
necessarily true that Thailand has always experienced the failure 
of single-purpose cooperative, as it did by and large with its credit 
cooperatives. There are some examples of successful one-purpose 
cooperatives which have been essentially built around groups of 
families with traditional ties. For example, in Southern Thailand 
a Group Marketing Organisation (GMO) is working which is a group of 
rubber smallholders who agree to improve the quality of their sheet 
rubber and to sell it. together in bulk at an agreed place and 
time. Each smallholder processes his rubber with his own equipment 
(some may do it with friends or relatives, thereby forming themselves 
into a Group Processing Centre). A small GPC with about ten participants 
often works well for it is operative in a more friendly atmosphere.
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ihio is a very simple form of cooperation with very little management,money 
and time involved with its main objective the improvement of rubber
quality for group sales, which has produced satisfactory results 
(Chaiprasit and Lim 1976, p. 73). Another example of a successful 
single-purpose cooperative can be found in India where a diary cooperative 
starting amongst small cattle farmers, has done so well under dedicated 
leadership that it is now serving as a model for all India (Subramaniam 1978).
The Farmer Associations with legal status like cooperatives 
should not necessarily be considered a pre-cooperative and should not 
be absorbed by existing cooperatives or developed into cooperatives 
in other cases. This is because these Farmer Associations at the moment 
serve a different class of clients. An attempt to force them into the 
cooperative form under the Cooperative Law of 1968, would force out the 
landless peasants and other poor farmers. Such absorption is official 
policy at present, but flexibility on these issues is important.
Moreover, a cooperative should consist of only one village 
which has an adequate amount of members to be able to establish a 
society. Last but not least, the cooperative would need to extend 
its scope to represent also the interests of particular subclasses 
such as the small farmers. The selection of members should not be 
judged by land ownership alone, but rather on a basis of desire, 
interest and the farmer's reputation.
The interest rate policies should probably be revised in this 
sector. As things are at present, it is noticeable that the 
shortage of funds of the cooperatives partly stems from the 
difference of interest rates between the various government rates 
and the commercial bank rates for agricultural lending. The 
government charges nil or 2-9 percent interest rates while the 
commercial bank rates are about 12-15 percent. As a result of this, 
the cooperatives have been prevented from obtaining more funds from 
their members or from the market. Because of this, the cooperatives
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are demanding more and more funds from the government, whose funds 
are limited. Agricultural Cooperatives should not depend on the 
funds from the BAAC all the time. They must accumulate funds of 
their own, through reserves, deposits, other investment or the 
cooperatives should be granted permission to increase the interest 
rate charged on loans to members in order to become economically 
viable. In addition, if cooperatives were permitted to offer higher 
interest rates on members' deposits, they would probably be able to 
attract more funds. In other words, various capital accumulative 
programmes should be adopted.
Government policy of ensuring that cooperatives charge comparatively 
low interest rates on loans to their members needs to be reconsidered.
This low interest rate policy has disadvantages in that it is providing 
the privilege of subsidised credit to cooperative members who are generally 
the better-off farmers in their communities. It thus widens income 
disparities between members and non-members.
As has been argued in page 5 9  , the present low, interest rates
charged create a rationing of credit, which operate in practice in 
favour of the large farmers. Gonzalez-Vega (1977) has argued that it 
is not the lowness of the government-sponsored interest rates charged 
which is important to the agricultural credit system, but the volume 
of relatively low interest rate credit that is available. More credit 
at a higher rate would benefit more farmers, especially the smaller 
farmer who are excluded by present effective rationing of cooperative 
loans. This arguement has also recently been put forward strongly 
by the Asian Development Bank (1977).
Loans should be more closely tied to the adoption of better 
farming practices or to improvements in farm industry organization. The 
mere lending of money, at however low the interest rate, will be only 
a "one shot" benefit to farmers unless it provides a way of improving 
farmers' earning capacity. This means that cooperative funds should
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generally be used for enabling societies to render cheaper or more 
efficient services to members in marketing, milling etc., or to provide 
them with the means to invest in raising the productive capacity of their 
farms. In view of the developing land shortage, this will generally 
be connected with the adoption of higher yield technology, so that often 
extension services and farm inputs would need to be provided simultaneously 
with the credit.
Now that the cooperative movement has expanded into a multi­
purpose business, it is at a turning point, and government should 
provide an appropriate policy. It should concentrate on management 
to promote an increase in the farmer-member's patronage of his 
cooperative's services. In addition, the basic investment in paddy 
collection facilities is probably not the best use of government 
budgeted cooperative funds. Moreover, if the government wishes the 
cooperatives to carry out rice purchases for general community reasons, 
which may be risky or unprofitable, societies should be paid a subsidy 
or guaranteed against losses.
The success of the ACFT, especially, is very important to the 
development of agricultural cooperatives in Thailand. Its marketing 
functions are particularly important now that the societies are 
undertaking multi-purpose activities. It has to be upgraded to win 
the confidence of member societies. Technical assistance in 
planning, budgeting and execution is needed.
Clearly, the data available are too general and limited to 
be accepted as an approach to study the performance of cooperatives.
It is thus necessary to revise the approach used by the department 
concerned and to strive for a better quality of information on 
decision making and performance in cooperative groups and associations.
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Such an investigation must be based on very comprehensive field 
research and should also aim to take in the Farmers' Associations, 
about which little is known officially. Such basic research ought 
to indicate whether or not the cooperatives have benefited farmers 
and others in the rural community as well as whether social goals 
have been met.
Certainly, such an investigation should help not only to 
evaluate the cooperatives' performance in meeting their objectives 
but should also be an effective contribution to the social and economic 
development of the country.
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